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*
In the fall of 2008 the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy commissioned an international evaluation of the finnish national 
innovation system. as I was in the final months of my term as an econom-
ic advisor at the Bureau of European Policy Analysis to JM Barroso, european 
commission, and not yet fully returned to my professorship at Katholieke Uni-
versiteit Leuven (Belgium), the timing was perfect for me to learn about the 
features of the innovation system that continues to be admired and imitated 
worldwide.
ShootIng a MovIng target
the evaluation mission turned out to be challenging not only due to its con-
siderable scope and shortness of time, but also because of the several ongoing 
transitions in the finnish system, in part induced by the June 2008 proposal 
for Finland’s National Innovation Strategy that served as our starting point; at 
least four major reforms advanced along with our evaluation and dozens of 
new policy initiatives have seen the light this year alone. our solution to this 
moving target problem was to employ heterodox approaches and work (part-
ly) in smaller groups. Despite the evolving nature of the system, as well as the 
valuable and welcomed diversity in the opinions of the panel, we ended up 
with a coherent joint view on conclusions that should help in implementing the 
Strategy and in steering the system towards a better future.
our evaluation task is outlined in the original contract notice (ref. no. 
2327/420/2008), as well as in the evaluation brochure, prepared for the open-
ing press conference on 11 December 2008: the Ministries specifically wanted 
an independent outside view of the system. We were to look into the current and 
future challenges and consider whether or not they are sufficiently acknowl-
edged and addressed. We were to point out needs for institutional and policy 
adjustments and reforms, as well as to draw conclusions on policy governance 
and steering. given the short time and broad coverage of our task, we were to 
evaluate the system as a whole rather than focus on individual actors, organi-
zations, and instruments. In our evaluation we looked particularly at whether 
public bodies and policies assist and incentivize both public and private indi-
viduals and organizations in generating and utilizing novel ideas.
In collaboration with the two Ministries, the evaluation panel settled 
on six main points of view in the evaluation; the basic choices of the Strategy 
*   The preface in this Full Report is an abbreviated version of the preface in the Policy Report.underlie each point of view. We organized ourselves into six sub-panels, one 
for each main point of view. Based on the work by the sub-panels, we draw 
our overall conclusions as the whole panel.
each sub-panel was led by an international expert working with two 
finnish ones: an academic scholar and an innovation researcher representing 
etLa. given the task and the time, each sub-panel had to make hard choices 
as to its approach and emphasis; all pressing issues could not be addressed. 
In writing the report we have attempted to produce self-contained chapters, 
even if this necessarily brings about some repetition.
fInLanD haS aMpLe upSIDe potentIaL
While not obvious on the surface, a closer look suggests that finland appears 
to have certain structural challenges. reactions to them may have been ham-
pered because, according to many indicators, up until recently finland was 
doing well in its traditional strongholds. now there is both a need and an op-
portunity to make a clear break with the past.
the ongoing economic and financial crisis started to fully unfold only 
after we had submitted our evaluation proposal and had laid-out our detailed 
work plan. thus, some issues related to the crisis are not integrated into our 
analysis. In any case, developing a country’s innovation system is a medium- 
and long-term issue. the current crisis may nevertheless be of such a nature 
that it induces more long-term and even permanent changes in the geography 
and locus of specialization in innovative activity.
It is quite possible that finland currently has one of the best national 
innovation systems worldwide. even that may not be enough in an era, where 
the global operating environment is rapidly evolving and the whole concept 
of a national innovation system has rightly been questioned. companies have 
been the primary object of the innovation policy but, as they become increas-
ingly footloose and geographically dispersed, the focus may have to shift to 
nurturing and attracting creative individuals.
the survey conducted to support the evaluation suggests that the ac-
tors of the finnish innovation system are optimistic about the ongoing reforms 
and the future of the system. I personally share this optimism: while some of 
our proposals are laborious to implement, with some adjustments the good 
finnish system could be much better equipped to meet future challenges!acknoWLeDgeMentS
In the course of the past year or so, the evaluation exercise proved to be both 
enjoyable and educational. the final outcome can be seen in the Policy Re-
port, as well as in this complementing Full Report. the former serves as a 
gentle introduction and summary of our core findings; the latter provides fur-
ther details and elaboration. I must say that I am personally very happy with 
the outcome, since in my opinion we managed to meet and even exceed the 
high expectations (at least my own). obviously this is first and foremost due 
to my fellow panelists, impeccably supported by Etlatieto Oy (a subsidiary 
of ETLA, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy) and the research team 
– thank you very much to all those involved! over a dozen separate studies 
were conducted to support our work. Some of these are published separately 
along with the two main reports.
on behalf of the whole panel, I would like to express our gratitude to 
the two Ministries, as well as to the Sounding Board overseeing the project, 
not only for their generous support, but also for vigorously defending the 
integrity of the panel.
In the course of the exercise we have interviewed and heard over one 
hundred key actors and experts of the innovation system, the names of which 
are listed below. furthermore, around two thousand individuals responded 
to the survey conducted to support the evaluation. the inputs of these indi-
viduals and organizations is highly appreciated – without it, we could not 
have completed our work.
Brussels, 18 September 2009,
reinhilde veugelersAho esko, nokia; Alahuhta Matti, aalto university; Alitalo Sirpa, M. of empl. and 
the e.; Alkio Mikko, M. of empl. and the e.; Andersen Dorte nøhr, Danish enterpr. 
and constr. auth.; Antikainen Janne, M. of empl. and the e.; Antola tuula, kaipaus; 
Anttila tapio, Sitra; Bason christian, Mind Lab; Björkroth Johanna, u. of helsinki; 
Cardwell Will, technopolis ventures; Dammert ritva, academy of f.; Eerola essi, 
vatt; Eskelinen Jarmo, forum virium helsinki; Eskola antti, M. of empl. and the e.; 
Gädda Lars, forestcluster; Grundstén henri, finnish Ind. Inv.; Hägström-Näsi chris-
tine, forestcluster; Hakkarai-nen Maija, tekes; Halme kimmo, advansis; Hämäläi-
nen timo, Sitra; Hammer-Jakobsen thomas, copenhagen Living Lab; Hansen Marie 
Louise, Danish enterpr. and constr. auth.; Hassinen Saara, Shok health and Well-
being;  Hautamäki antti,  u.  of  Jyväskylä;  Häyrinen  kari,  finpro;  Heikkilä  pauli, 
finnvera; Helve heikki, city of kuopio; Hermans raine, tekes; Hetemäki Martti, M. 
of finance; Holstila eero, city of helsinki; Honkanen Seppo, helsinki u. of techn.; 
Husso kai, r. and I. council; Järvikare terhi, M. of finance; Kallasvaara heikki, u. 
of helsinki; Kalliokoski petri, vtt; Känkänen Janne, M. of empl. and the e.; Kari 
Seppo, vatt; Karjalainen Sakari, M. of educ.; Kauppinen petteri, M. of educ.; Kavo-
nius veijo , M. of empl. and the e.; Kekkonen timo, ek, c. of finnish Ind.; Kemp-
painen hannu, tekes; Kervola petri, city of kuopio; Kivikoski Jussi, tekes; Kop-
pinen Seija, vtt; Korhonen kalle J., M. of empl. and the e.; Kosonen Mikko, Sit-
ra; Kulmala harri, fIMecc; Kutinlahti pirjo, M. of empl. and the e.; Laine Seppo, 
finpro; Laino-Asikainen tiina, finpro; Lehikoinen anita, M. of educ.; Lehto petri, 
M. of empl. and the e.; Lemola tarmo, advansis; Löppönen paavo, academy of f.; 
Löytökorpi Sari, the adv. Board for Sectoral res.; Lystimäki Jussi, Idean; Marjosola 
Juha, finnish Ind. Inv.; Martikainen Mikko, M. of empl. and the e.; Mattila Markku, 
academy of f.; Misukka heljä, M. of educ.; Mustonen riitta, academy of f.; Ne-
vamäki riina, M. of empl. and the e.; Nie-minen Markku, ge healthcare; Niiniluoto 
Ilkka , u. of helsinki; Nummikoski velipekka, M. of finance; Nybergh paula, M. of 
empl. and the e.; Ollila Jorma, nokia; Ormala erkki, nokia; Paloheimo annamarja, 
finnvera; Parkkari tuomas, r. and I. council; Pauli anneli, eu commission; Pekka-
rinen Mauri, M. of empl. and the e.; Pellikka riikka, M. of empl. and the e.; Pelto-
nen petri, M. of empl. and the e.; Pikkarainen Mika, M. of empl. and the e.; Pohjola 
hannele, ek, c. of finnish Ind.; Pötz Marion, copenhagen Business School; Pulk-
kinen raimo, tekes; Pursula tiina, gaia; Rintala kari, te-centre; Romanainen Jari, 
tekes; Rosted Jørgen, fora; Saapunki Juha, pkt-foundation; Saarnivaara veli-pekka, 
tekes; Savolainen terttu, M. of Social affairs and health; Seppälä esko-olavi, r. and 
I. council; Sipilä Jorma, u. of tampere; Suurnäkki anna, vtt; Syrjänen Mikko, gaia; 
Toivanen hannes, M. of empl. and the e.; Tukiainen pauliina, kcL; Turunen Ilkka, 
M. of educ.; Vähä-Pietilä kirsi, tekes; Valle antti, M. of empl. and the e.; Vartia pentti, 
the adv. Board for Sectoral res.; Vesa heikki, M. of empl. and the e.; Vestala Leena, 
M. of educ.; Virkkunen henna, M. of educ.; Virtanen erkki, M. of empl. and the e.; 
Vuola olli, neapo; Wentzel Johan , Sentica partners; Wilhelmsson thomas, u. of hel-
sinki; Ylikarjula Janica, ek, c. of finnish Ind.
In the course of the evaluation, the panel interviewed and heard over one 
hundred key actors and experts. the panel would like to thank them all – 









































































very	much	needed	for	Finland	to	be	prepared	for	the	challenges	that	lie	ahead.	Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  11 
2.	 Broad-Based	InnovatIon	PolIcy
charles	edquist,	terttu	luukkonen,	and	Markku	sotarauta*
We welcome the basic ambition of the broad-based innovation policy. It provides a 
balance between the supply and demand sides of innovative activity, includes non-
technical innovations, as well as – besides direct economic impact – emphasizes wider 
societal considerations.
Conceptually the new broad-based innovation policy is, however, fuzzy, and it 
is therefore important that the government soon provides clear contents to the concept 
so as not to let it dissipate.
The Finnish system does not have a strong systems-wide coordination. The 
lack of involvement of the Ministry of Finance and less active involvement of the 
Prime Minister’s Office in coordinating research and innovation policy formulations 
is a drawback. There are significant overlaps in the services offered by public organiza-
tions. Streamlining is urgently needed.
Broadly speaking the ongoing reforms provide a good basis for pursuance of a 
broad-based innovation policy. The university reform, offers great opportunities for 
Finland. We have some concerns as to the university inventions act, but its final im-
pact cannot be conclusively assessed yet. 
The SHOK initiative may be helpful in incrementally renewing traditional 
Finnish industries, but it is unlikely that it would breed new clusters or promote radi-
cal/disruptive innovations.
The reform of public research organizations (PROs) seems to be in a permanent 
gridlock, which is unacceptable and unaffordable. PROs could be a thrust in the Finn-
ish system – an opportunity that is now being wasted.
Sitra is a uniquely Finnish construction and the ‘libero’ of the system. While 
its position has at times been challenged, it has served a purpose in the past and in 
our opinion will continue to do so. The Finnish system is highly consensus-driven 
and needs more diversity in ideas as well as parties willing to take a more futurist 
long-term view.
*  Charles Edquist is a professor in innovation studies at Lund University (Sweden) and the director of its 
Centre for Innovation, Research and Competence in the Learning Economy (CIRCLE). He is co-ordinator 
and co-editor (Edquist and Hommen, 2008) for the project National Systems of Innovation in a Globalising, 
Knowledge-based Economy: A Comparative Study of Small Countries in Europe and Asia. Terttu Luukkonen 
is a head of unit at ETLA. Markku Sotarauta is a professor at the University of Tampere.






























any, explicitly made clear what this means in practice, and how the policy instru-
ments ought to be reformed to support this new thinking – and which new instru-











































































the	first	possible	meaning	of	a	broad-based innovation policy entails	the	idea	
that,	in	addition	to technological	process	innovations	and	goods	product	in-




































































































of	both	requirements	for	public	action	in	this	area.	At the moment, we advocate 
experimentation with demand-based policy initiatives especially with regard to public 









































































































































































































































































concerning	public	sector	research.24  ·  Charles Edquist, Terttu Luukkonen, and Markku Sotarauta
Figure 2.1.  The importance of the governmental actors in the NIS
Notes: The source is Kotiranta et al. (2009). The respondents were requested to indicate the importance 
of the various governmental actors in the National Innovation System using a scale of 1–4 (the last being 
very important) and the answers were averaged over the respondents’ organizations. A connecting link is 
established if the relevance is 3.5 or higher. Dotted circle actors have only out-bound links. Long dotted line 






























# of in-bound connections:

























































Figure 2.2.  Sitra in the eyes of other NIS actors (see also Figure 2.1)
Notes: The source is Kotiranta et al. (2009). The respondents were requested to indicate the importance of 
the various governmental actors in the National Innovation System using a scale of 1–4 (the last being very 
important) and the answers were averaged over the respondents’ organizations. A connecting link is estab-




















































































































































































industrial	 production	 and	 distribution	 Industrialists	 thus	 provide	 vitally	
important	complementary	assets	needed	in	the	commercialization	process.	












































































Figure 2.3.  Budget funding of public research organizations in 2009, mill. euro
Notes: The source is Statistics Finland. Evira: Finnish Food Safety Authority (Elintarviketurvallisuusvirasto); FGI: 
Finnish Geodetic Institute (Geodeettinen laitos); RKTL: Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute (Riis-
ta- ja kalatalouden tutkimuslaitos); SYKE: Finnish Environment Institute (Suomen ympäristökeskus); MTT: 
Agrifood Research Finland (Maa- ja elintarviketalouden tutkimuskeskus); Metla: Finnish Forest Research Insti-
tute (Metsäntutkimuslaitos); MIKES: The centre for metrology and accreditation (Mittatekniikan keskus); VTT: 
Technical Research Centre of Finland (Valtion teknillinen tutkimuskeskus); FIOH: Finnish Institute of Occupa-
tional Health (Työterveyslaitos); THL: The National Institute for Health and Welfare (Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin 
laitos); GTK: Geological Survey of Finland (Geologian tutkimuskeskus); FMI: Finnish Meteorological Institute 
(Ilmatieteen laitos); STUK: Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority Finland (Säteilyturvakeskus); Optula: The 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy (Oikeuspoliittinen tutkimuslaitos); NCRC: National Consumer Re-
search Centre (Kuluttajatutkimuskeskus); FIIA: Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Ulkopoliittinen insti-
tuutti); VATT: Government Institute for Economic Research (Valtion taloudellinen tutkimuskeskus); Kotus: Re-
search Institute for the Languages of Finland (Kotimaisten kielten tutkimuskeskus). The primary production 
in the figure includes SYKE, FGI, and EVIRA because they are part of a consortium of research institutes under 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.










































































































sectors.36  ·  Charles Edquist, Terttu Luukkonen, and Markku Sotarauta
2.5.4.	 unIversItIes



























































































































































societal and economic engagement of universities is related to their primary tasks, 




of	universities	within	the	broad-based	perspective,	the	main	question	is	how	40  ·  Charles Edquist, Terttu Luukkonen, and Markku Sotarauta
education	and	research	could	become	more	systematically	integrated	in	the	
operation	of	the	society	at	large.	Technology transfer is an important element in a 
wide spectrum of ways in which universities are engaged in the economy and innova-
tion activities. Additionally, when assessing the extent of universities’ socioeconomic 
engagement, five different dimensions ought to be taken into consideration. These 
emanate from the strategic choices made by the universities themselves and include 1) 
science-based innovation activities, especially technology transfer, 2) engagement in 
the labour market, i.e. lifelong learning in the working life, 3) engagement in socio-
ecological development for sustainability, 4) engagement in the regional development 






















































































































































































































Figure 2.4.  Total participations in FP6 per million inhabitants (2005)































Notes: The source is Tekes/European Commission (EU FP6 2002–2006) and UNFDA. Participation means a 
participation of one organization in a project. There may be several participating organizations – and thus 




















Figure 2.5.  Total participations in FP6 per R&D expenditures (2005)
Notes: The source is Tekes/European Commission (EU FP6 2002–2006) and Eurostat. Participation means a 
participation of one organization in a project. There may be several participating organizations – and thus 
participations – from one country in a single project.































































































































































































































significant	 resources	 should	 be	 awarded	 to	 the	 renewed	 advisory	
Board	of	sectoral	research	to	strengthen	its	capacity	to	implement	horizon-























































be	taken	as	part	of	Finland’s	internationalization	strategy.54  ·  Charles Edquist, Terttu Luukkonen, and Markku Sotarauta
Box 2.1. What is required for the further development of a broad-based innovation policy in 
Finland?
By Charles Edquist and Markku Sotarauta
A “broad-based innovation policy” is not in operation in Finland in a comprehensive and systematic 
sense. One reason for this is that the meaning of “broad-based innovation policy” has simply not 
been made clear by policy-makers or in the general discussion. It is hard to implement something 
which is not specified. However, we have also indicated that some of the policy initiatives recently 
launched may be in the process of contributing to developing a broad-based innovation policy (see 
section 2.7).
We could have ended here. However, we feel that we are obliged to say something about 
how a comprehensive and systematic broad-based innovation policy could be designed and imple-
mented. The purpose here is not to provide the final solution, but to provoke politicians and policy-
makers in Finland – and elsewhere – to actually develop and implement “a broad-based innovation 
policy”. Our attempt to do so below will relate back to the (conceptual) beginning of this report. This 
section will therefore be partly repetitive and of a summarizing nature.
At the very end of section 2.2.6, we stated that innovation policy is (only) those actions by 
public organizations that actually influence the development and diffusion of innovations. This is 
also our very definition of innovation policy as we presented it in the beginning of section 2.2 and 
in Appendix 1. Since there has been some confusion on this issue, we would like to ask the rhetori-
cal question what is innovation policy supposed to influence – if not innovations? This is parallel to 
the fact that regional policy is intended to influence regions and that growth policy is intended to 
influence economic growth.
In section 2.2.5 we discussed the rationales for public intervention and specified them in terms 
of two conditions: that a problem must exist and that the state must have the ability to solve or 
mitigate the problem. We then explained that one problem, in our sense, has to do with (a low) 
performance of the innovation system, caused by deficiencies in the key activities of the innova-
tion system. We further argued that the explanations of that (low) performance (i.e. identifying the 
deficiencies) are also crucial for the design of innovation policy. These explanations are a matter of 
the determinants/activities of the innovation system (outlined in Appendix 2 and discussed in sec-
tion 2.2). The list of the activities of an innovation system can be used as a checklist in an analysis of 
the explanations of (a low) performance of the system. Another rhetorical question could be asked 
here: Is it not natural that an innovation policy is influencing innovations by, in its turn, influencing 
the determinants of innovations, i.e. the activities in innovation systems (as hypothetically listed in 
Appendix 2)?
One reason for us to feel an obligation to provoke politicians and policy-makers to develop and 
implement “a broad-based innovation policy” is that the many interviews that we have conducted 
during this evaluation have indicated that the central policy-makers do not know about the details 
of the performance of the Finnish national system of innovation, i.e. about the innovation intensities 
of various categories of innovations (propensities to innovate).34 No policy-maker presented, during 
the interviews, any data with regard to innovation intensities for different categories of innovation 
in the Finnish national system of innovation. It is obvious that there should be a more solid empirical 
evidence base to underpin policy formulation – and thereby contributing to a better defined policy. 
Neither did the policy-makers point out any systematic explanations for various intensities (low or 
high) of different kinds of innovations. They argued only in an ad hoc manner on these issues.35 This 
means that they have not been able to identify the strong and weak points respectively in the Finn-
ish innovation system. In addition, the interviews have revealed that there are implicitly a lot of very 
vague underlying assumptions about problems in the innovation system and their causes.
The various partial policies and initiatives that we have discussed in this panel report were 
initiated before a “broad-based” innovation policy started to be discussed at any depth in Finland. 
Therefore these initiatives cannot possibly be a part of an ex ante systematic attempt to develop a 
broad-based policy. This is all the more the case since, as we have noted, no one has specified what 
such a broad-based innovation policy could be. This implies that additional policy elements cer-
tainly will have to be designed and implemented before a broad-based policy in a systematic sense 
will be in place. The relevant public policy agencies in Finland have not – as a collective of public 
organizations – been able to identify the problems that should be solved by means of the innova-Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  55 
tion policy. Neither have they had the ability to solve or mitigate those problems. Accordingly, the 
conditions that constitute the rationales for public policy intervention that we specified in section 
2.2.5 have not been fulfilled.
In order to develop such a broad-based innovation policy the following elements are neces-
sary:
1.  The problems to be solved by means of public innovation policy should be identified through 
  analysis. These problems entail the objectives sought by the innovation policy goals, but that  
  private organizations are unwilling or unable to achieve. (See section 2.2.5.)
2.  The main causes of these problems should be identified. (See section 2.2.5 and above in this  
  section.)
3.  The state (national, regional, local) and its public agencies should have the ability to solve or 
  mitigate the problems. This means that the state must design the various instruments needed.  
  (See section 2.2.5.)
We will discuss these three elements in this final section, each in one sub-section.
However, first we want to make clear that innovations as such are not – in the final instance 
– interesting from a policy and political point of view. Innovations are interesting because they – in 
their turn – influence other things, such as productivity growth, social conditions, competitiveness, 
sustainable development, military force and health care.36 Hence, innovations are important for what 
they can do, with regard to other socioeconomic phenomena. These are (supposed to be) influenced 
by innovations and, hence, this is a matter of consequences of innovations. Innovation policy entails 
activities that influence the development and diffusion of innovations (for definitions, see Appendix 
1). This means that our notion of innovation policy is very wide, although it is limited to include only 
those activities that actually influence the development and diffusion of innovations.37 These ac-
tivities are not, in a direct sense, influencing productivity growth, etc. To be short: innovation policy 
influences innovations and innovations influence – in their turn – a whole lot of other things.
We also want to remind about our discussion in section 2.2 regarding what a “broad-based 
innovation policy” could mean:
1.  It may entail the broadening of the concept of innovation as such – to include product innova-
  tions in services (including service innovation in public service production) and organizational  
  process innovations. This implies that it is important to identify the intensities of different cat- 
  egories of innovations.
2.  It may mean taking all determinants of the development and diffusion of innovations into ac- 
  count. (This would include policy instruments operating from the demand side.) This implies that  
  it would be important to know the determinants that influence the development and diffusion  
  of innovations. Innovation policy is a matter of how public actors can influence these determi- 
  nants.
1.  Identification of problems
A problem that shall be solved by means of innovation policy can be identified by means of empirical 
analyses comparing various systems of innovation. In principle, such a policy problem is constituted 
by a low performance of the innovation system, i.e. low innovation intensity with regard to some 
category of innovation.
The performance of an innovation system is the same as the output of the system, i.e. what 
‘comes out’ of it. That output is – simply – innovations. To simplify, we are here assuming that the inno-
vation policy objectives are formulated in terms of innovation intensities for certain kinds of innova-
tions. As we know, this is often not the case. Instead, innovation policy objectives are often formulated 
in much looser terms, e.g. in terms of achieving increased economic growth, a better environmental 
balance or more military strength – objectives which are only partly achieved through innovations, 
and partly through other means. Hence, most national or regional innovation policies implemented 
are not based upon the relative performance – in terms of innovation intensities of different catego-
ries of innovations – of the country or region in question. However, in order to achieve more precision 
in innovation policy-making, the objectives should be formulated in terms of intensities of various 
kinds of innovations. Until then the policy-makers act in the dark – or at least in the mist. Only pure 
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an innovation system should not be measured in terms of economic growth or military strength.38
The innovations in terms of which the objectives should be formulated may be of different 
kinds or classes. Some examples are
1.  The development of innovations (‘new to the world’) or the diffusion or absorption of innova- 
  tions (that are ‘new to the firm’, ‘new to the country’ or ‘new to the region’).
2.  Radical or incremental innovations
3.  Product innovations or process innovations.
4.  High-tech products or low-tech products.
5.  Innovations related to specific sectors of production (material goods in general, specific goods  
  producing sectors; intangible services in general, specific service producing sectors, etc).
6.  Innovations related to different socioeconomic phenomena: economic, social, environmental,  
  military, etc.
The performance of a system of innovation can be measured by means of the propensity to in-
novate (or innovation intensity). Ideally, propensities should be known for many specific categories 
of innovations (see just above), which is why the Community Innovation Surveys (in Europe) and 
similar surveys carried out in non-European countries are so important. They measure (describe) 
– among other things – the propensity to innovate for specific categories of innovations in vari-
ous innovation systems (national, sectoral and regional). If we do not know these propensities, we 
cannot identify problems to be solved by innovation policy. Hence the measurement of propensi-
ties to innovate with regard to specific categories of innovations is of utmost importance for policy 
purposes. It is important to develop the CISs to measure innovations of different kinds in an even 
more fine-tuned way, for example developing a refined version of the classification above – or other 
taxonomies.
To be useful for policy purposes, these measurements and descriptions should be compara-
tive between systems. The reason is that it is not possible to say whether innovation intensity is high 
or low in a certain system if there is no comparison with innovation intensities in other systems. This 
has to do with the fact that we cannot identify ‘optimal’ or ‘ideal’ innovation intensities.
This also means that problems cannot be identified through theoretical analysis alone.39 The 
problems cannot be identified through a comparison between an empirically existing system of in-
novation and an optimal one – since we are unable to specify an optimal system of innovation (just 
as we are unable to specify optimal innovation intensities). What remains is then to compare existing 
systems of innovation with each other. Such comparisons can be made between the same systems 
over time, or between different existing systems.40 Only in this way can we identify the “policy prob-
lems” or “systemic problems”. In other words, ‘systemic problems’ can be identified only by compar-
ing existing innovation systems with each other – over time and space.
The number of studies that are measuring innovation intensities for different categories of 
innovations in a comparative perspective between innovations systems is surprisingly few. Most of 
them use CIS data. OECD (2009) is a recent one where Finland is included (as one of 17 countries). 
There data on the following indicators is presented:
–  the percentages of all firms that have introduced a new to the firm product innovation,
–  the percentage of all firms having introduced a process innovation,
–  the percentage of all firms having introduced either a product or a process innovation,
–  the percentage of all firms having introduced a new to the market product innovation,
–  the percentages of firms having introduced a marketing innovation, and
–  the percentages of all firms having introduced an organizational innovation.
OECD presents data for these categories for all firms, for SME’s, for large firms, for manufac-
turing and for services – all for 2004–2005 (OECD, 2009). Edquist and Zaballa (2009) present data 
on the same indicators and some additional ones, for a longer time period, (1996–2006), and for a 
larger number of countries. There it is indicated, for example, that the Finnish national innovation 
system performed better with regard to product innovations in services than in manufacturing, that 
Finland’s relative position deteriorated with regard to products new to the firm for manufacturing 
during the early years of the new millennium, and that Finland performed very well with regard to 
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1996–2006. As mentioned above, there should be a more solid empirical evidence base to back 
policy formulation. The content of these references indicate that it is possible to develop such an 
empirical base. Comparative data that includes Finland does exist. It is rather complicated to de-
velop such an empirical base in detail. But it is very important.
The rationale of innovation policy is to solve or mitigate policy problems. If the system is per-
forming very well, thanks to its spontaneous operation (based on the actions performed by private 
organizations), then no problem exists and policy intervention is not motivated. Such intervention 
is only called for when the system is performing badly – in a relative sense. In other words, a ‘prob-
lem’ exists only if the (politically formulated) objectives in terms of innovation intensities are not 
achieved by private organizations.
2.  The analysis of the causes of the problems
An identification of a ‘problem’ by means of empirical-comparative analysis is not sufficient as a basis 
for designing innovation policies; it is only a first step. The existence of a problem is only a necessary 
condition for pursuing an innovation policy. To know that there is reason to consider public inter-
vention is not enough. An identification of a problem only indicates where and when intervention is 
called for. It says nothing about how it should be pursued. In order to be able to design appropriate 
innovation policy instruments, it is necessary to also know the causes behind the problem identified 
– at least the most important ones. 
A (low) propensity to innovate with regard to a certain category of innovations is actually 
what should be explained. This is where the determinants of the development and diffusion of in-
novations systems enter the stage. These determinants are referred to as ‘activities’ in section 2.2. In 
Appendix 2 we hypothetically list ten such activities, clustered in four thematic categories:
I  Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process,
II  Demand-side activities,
III  Provision of constituents of SIs, and
IV  Support services for innovating firms (please see Appendix 2).
Each of the ten different activities may be considered to be a partial determinant of the devel-
opment and diffusion of innovations. The demand-side activities – category II in Appendix 1 – are 
simply those determinants that influence innovation processes from the demand side, i.e. from the 
user side (as opposed to the supply side, such as R&D). Hence it is important to point out that we are 
here not pointing to determinants on the supply side or on the demand side. We point to all deter-
minants of the development and the diffusion of innovations, including supply and demand. This 
means that a broad-based innovation policy is also potentially considering policy instruments with 
regard to all these determinants of innovation processes. This includes supply-oriented policies and 
demand-oriented policies, but also policies related to constituents in innovation systems as well as 
support services. (See Appendix 2.)
The combination of a problem identifying analysis and a causal explanation may be called 
a ‘diagnostic analysis’. Such an analysis may provide a basis for an efficient therapy or treatment 
– namely, an innovation policy. Without a diagnosis it is impossible to know what prescriptions (in-
struments) are required. Satisfactory causal explanations in the social sciences are rare phenomena. 
Therefore, an inability to explain in detail is not a reason to abstain completely from intervention 
in the process of innovation.41 Because problems identified may sometimes be very severe – for 
the economy, for the environment, or for the social conditions – trial-and-error intervention may 
be necessary. However, it is still necessary to have some clue about the most important causes of a 
problem.
3.  The ability to solve or mitigate the problems
If a policy-maker in the field of innovation has identified the policy problems and their main causes, 
he knows if and where to intervene and also how. It might still be the case, however, that the policy 
agencies do not have the ability to solve or mitigate the problems. It might, for the time being, be im-
possible to solve or mitigate the problems identified from the public sphere. This might be because 
of a lack of policy instruments. This may be a temporary or absolute lack. In the latter case it will 
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organizations have to develop new policy instruments. New organizations (players) or institutions 
(rules) may have to be created for developing the ability. This includes being prepared to develop 
instruments that may influence all the determinants of the development and diffusion of a certain 
category of innovations.
Hence all potential determinants of the development and diffusion of innovations should be 
considered when designing and implementing (broad-based) innovation policies. These determi-
nants or activities in innovation systems were discussed in section 2.2 of this report. Ten activities in 
innovation systems are listed in Appendix 2, clustered in four groups. Together, these determinants 
constitute the innovation system. Therefore a “broad-based” innovation policy can be said to the 
same as a “systemic” innovation policy (see section 2.2.2).
To operate in this “broad” way would certainly include utilizing innovation policy instruments 
operating from the demand side.42 However, these constitute only one category of policy instru-
ments that will have to be used in a broad-based innovation policy. Instruments have to be used 
with regard also to all the other activities in all the four categories. Many of these instruments remain 
to be designed if the policy agencies shall develop their ability to solve or mitigate the problems 




vanen,	H.	(2008).	The Proposal for Finland’s National Innovation Strategy.	the	Ministry	of	employ-
ment	and	the	economy.
asheim,	B.,	coenen,	l.,	Moodysson,	J.,	&	vang,	J.	(2007).	constructing	knowledge-based	regional	





Market	approach:	Methodology	and	rationale.	Communication from the European Commission, 
SEC(2007)1730.
edler,	J.	(2009).	Demand Policies for Innovation in EU CEE Countries.	Paper	presented	at	the	Innova-
tion	for	competitiveness	IncoM,	Prague,	January	22–23.
edquist,	c.	(1997).	systems	of	Innovation	approaches	–	their	emergence	and	characteristics.	In	
c.	edquist	(ed.),	Systems of innovation – Technologies, institutions and organizations.	london:	Pinter	
Publishers/cassell	academic.
edquist,	c.	(2006).	systems	of	Innovation:	Perspectives	and	challenges.	In	J.	Fagerberg,	d.	c.	
Mowery	and	c.	r.	nelson	(eds.),	The Oxford Handbook of Innovation,	181–208.
edquist,	c.	(2008).	design	of	Innovation	Policy	through	diagnostic	analysis:	Identification	of	
systemic	Problems	(or	Failures). CIRCLE Electronic Working Papers, 2008–06.
















Invention	ownership	Model.	University of California, Davis, manuscript.
Kotiranta,	a.,	nikulainen,	t.,	tahvanainen	a-J.,	deschryvere,	M.	&	Pajarinen,	M.	(2009).	evalu-
ating	national	Innovation	systems	–	Key	Insights	from	the	Finnish	Innoeval	survey.	ETLA 
Discussion Papers,	1196.60  ·  Charles Edquist, Terttu Luukkonen, and Markku Sotarauta
lester,	r.	(2007).	universities,	Innovation,	and	the	competitiveness	of	local	economies:	an	over-
view.	In	r.	lester	and	M.	sotarauta	(eds.),	Innovation, Universities and the Competitiveness of Re-
gions.	Helsinki:	tekes	(technology	review	214/2007).










Ict-klusterista.	Acta Universitatis Lappoensis, 46.
nelson,	r.	(ed.).	(1993).	National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis.	new	york:	oxford	
university	Press.
oecd	(2009).	Innovation in Firms – A microeconomic perspective,	organisation	for	economic	co-
operation	and	development.
ritsilä,	J.,	nieminen,	M.,	sotarauta,	M.,	&	lahtonen,	J.	(2008).	societal	and	economic	engage-



















rakentumiseen	ja	toimintaan.	Acta Universitatis Lappoensis, 76.
teubal,	M.,	avnimelech,	G.,	&	rosiello,	a.	(2007).	Towards Framing of Venture Capital Policies: A 
Systems Evolutionary Perspective with Particular Reference to the UK/Scotland and Israeli Experiences.	
Paper	presented	at	the	atlanta	conference	on	science,	technology,	and	Innovation	Policy,	at-
lanta,	usa,	october	19–20.Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  61 
unu-MerIt	(2009).	Monitoring	progress	towards	the	era.	Final	report,	6	May	2009.
valentin,	F.	&	Jensen,	r.	(2007).	effects	on	academia-Industry	collaboration	of	extending	univer-





valtiontalouden	 tarkastusvirasto	 (2008).	 t&k-arviointitoiminta.	 Toiminnantarkastuskertomukset 




  1 
appendix	1.	
Innovations New creations of economic significance, primarily carried out by firms (but not in isolation). 
They include product innovations as well as process innovations. 
Product Innovations New – or improved – material goods as well as new intangible services; it is a matter of what
is produced. 
Process Innovations New ways of producing goods and services. They may be technological or organizational; it 
is a matter of how things are produced. 
Creation vs. diffusion of 
innovations
This dichotomy is partly based on a distinction between innovations that are ‘new to the 
market’ (brand new, or globally new) and innovations that are ‘new to the firm’ (being 
adopted by or diffused to additional firms, countries or regions). In other words, ‘new to the 
firm’ innovations is actually (mainly) a measure of the diffusion of innovations. 
Systems of innovation 
(SIs)
Determinants of innovation processes – i.e. all important economic, social, political, organ-
izational, institutional and other factors that influence the development and diffusion of in-
novations. 
Components of SIs Include both organizations and institutions. 
Constituents of SIs Include both components of SIs and relations among these components.
Main function of SIs To pursue innovation processes – i.e. to develop and diffuse innovations. 
Activities in SIs  Factors that influence the development and diffusion of innovations. The activities in SIs are 
the same as the determinants of the main function. The same activity (e.g. R&D) can be per-
formed by several categories of organizations (universities, public research organizations, 
firms). And the same kind of organization (e.g. universities) can perform more than one kind 
of activity (e.g. research and teaching). 
Organizations  Formal structures that are consciously created and have an explicit purpose. They are play-
ers or actors.
Institutions  Sets of common habits, norms, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate 
the relations and interactions between individuals, groups and organizations. They are the 
rules of the game. 
Innovation policy  Actions by public organizations that influence the development and diffusion of innova-
tions.Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  63 
aPPendIx	2:	Key	actIvItIes	In	systeMs	oF	InnovatIon
Source: Edquist (2006).
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aPPendIx	2.	
I. Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process 
1. Provision of R&D and, thus, creation of new knowledge, primarily in engineering, medicine and natural sciences. 
2. Competence building, e.g. through individual learning (educating and training the labour force for innovation and
R&D activities) and organizational learning.  
 
II. Demand-side activities  
3. Formation of new product markets. 
4. Articulation of quality requirements emanating from the demand side with regard to new products. 
 
III. Provision of constituents of SIs 
5. Creating and changing organizations needed for developing new fields of innovation. Examples include enhancing
entrepreneurship to create new firms and intrapreneurship to diversify existing firms; and creating new research or-
ganizations, policy agencies, etc. 
6. Networking through markets and other mechanisms, including inter-active learning among different organizations 
(potentially) involved in the innovation processes. This implies integrating new knowledge elements developed in dif-
ferent spheres of the SI and coming from outside with elements already available in the innovating firms.  
7. Creating and changing institutions – e.g., patent laws, tax laws, environment and safety regulations, R&D invest-
ment routines, cultural norms, etc. – that influence innovating organizations and innovation processes by providing 
incentives for and removing obstacles to innovation. 
 
IV. Support services for innovating firms 
8. Incubation activities such as providing access to facilities and administrative support for innovating efforts. 
9. Financing of innovation processes and other activities that may facilitate commercialisation of knowledge and its
adoption. 
10. Provision of consultancy services relevant for innovation processes, e.g., technology transfer, commercial informa-
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aPPendIx	3:	aBout	deMand-Based	InnovatIon	PolIcy
according	to	edler	(2009),	demand	based	innovation	policy	is	“a set of public 
measures to increase the demand for innovations, to improve the conditions for the 
uptake of innovations and/or to improve the articulation of demand in order to spur 
innovations and the diffusion of innovations.”	the	following	table	presents	exam-
ples	of	types	of	action.
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appendix3.	
Instrument  Role of State Functioning 
Public demand  
General procurement  Buy and use State actors consider innovation in general procurement as main criteri-
on (e.g. definition of needs, not products, in tenders). 
Strategic procurement 
(technology-specific) 
Buy and use State actors specifically demand an already existing innovation in order 
to accelerate the market introduction and particularly the diffusion. This 
can include the targeted co-ordination of different government bodies 
and moderation with manufacturers. 
State actors stimulate deliberately the development and market intro-
duction of innovations by formulating new, demanding needs. This can 
include the targeted co-ordination of different government bodies and 
moderation with manufacturers. 
Co-operative procure-
ment 
Buy / use mo-
deration 
State actors are part of a group of demanders and organizes the co-
ordination of the procurement and the specification of needs.  
Special form: catalytic procurement: the state does not utilise the inno-
vation itself, but organizes only the private procurement. 
Direct support for private demand  
Demand subsidies  Co-financing  The purchase of innovative technologies by private or industrial de-
manders is directly subsidized.  
Tax incentives  Co-financing   Amortisation possibilities for certain innovative technologies.
Indirect support for private and public demand: information and enabling (soft steering)
Awareness  building 
measures 
Informing State actors start information campaigns, advertises new solutions, con-
ducts demonstration projects (or supports them) and tries to create con-
fidence in certain innovations (in the general public, opinion leaders, 
certain target groups). 
Voluntary labels or in-
formation campaigns  
Supporting In-
forming 
The state supports a co-ordinated private marketing activity which sig-
nals performance and safety features.  
Training and further 
education 
Enabling The private consumers or industrial actors are made aware of innovative 





Societal groups, potential consumers are given a voice in the market 
place, signals as to future preferences (and fears) are articulated and 
signalled to the marketplace (including demand based foresight). 
Table continues on the next page.Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  65 
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Instrument  Role of State Functioning
Regulation of demand or of the interface demander –producer







The state sets norms for the production and introduction of innovations 
(e.g. market approval, recycling requirements). Thus demanders know 
reliably what certain products perform and how they are manufactured. 
The norm affects firstly the producer (norm fulfilment), but spreads to 
the demander by means of the information about norm fulfillment.  Regulation of product 
information 
Usage norms   The state creates legal security by setting up clear rules on the use of in-




Moderating The state stimulates self-regulation (norms, standards) of firms and sup-
ports or moderates this process and plays a role as catalyst by using 
standards.  




State action creates markets for the consequences of the use of techno-
logies (emission trading) or sets market conditions which intensify the 






Strategically co-ordinated measures which combine various demand-






Combination of supply-side instruments (R&D programmes) and de-
mand-side impulses for selected technologies or services. 
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aPPendIx	4:	FIGures	on	euroPean	collaBoratIon
Appendix Figure 1.  Participations in ERA-nets in FP6 as related to gross domestic R&D ex-
penditure (million euro, 2005)
Source: Tekes/European Commission (EU FP6 2002–2006) and Eurostat.
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Source: Tekes/European Commission (EU FP6 2002–2006) and Eurostat.
Appendix Figure 2.  Participations in Integrated Projects (IP) in FP6 as related to gross do-
mestic R&D expenditure (million euro, 2005)
Appendix Figure 3.  Participations in Networks of Excellence (NoE)) in FP6 as related to gross 
domestic R&D expenditure (million euro, 2005)
Source: Tekes/European Commission (EU FP6 2002–2006) and Eurostat.
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endnotes
1   These, and other concepts, are defined in Appendix 1.
2   Even earlier, technologies were considered to include only or mainly (technological) process innova-
tions.
3   This is indicated by the fact that “innovation system” had more than 795 000 hits in Google, and that 
“system of innovation” had more than 540 000 hits by April 2009.
4   The traditional system of innovation approaches focused strongly upon the components within the 
systems, i.e. organizations and institutions (see, e.g., Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
5   The ten key activities listed in Appendix 2 constitute a hypothetical list of determinants – and the list 
will be subject to revision when our knowledge about determinants of innovations increases. For the time 
being, it serves as a reasonable approximation of the determinants of innovation processes.
6   Users may be firms, public agencies and individual consumers.
7   This is expressed, for example, in the objective to integrate working life development into innovation 
policy planning and implementation. In addition, broad-based innovation policy can also be seen to call for 
innovations carried out by the public sector itself, e.g. in public service production. 
8   See also http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/leadmarket/leadmarket.htm
9   The Ministry of Employment and the Economy organized a User-Driven Innovation seminar in Helsinki 
on 10 June 2009. To see the seminar material, please, consult: www.tem.fi/UDI-seminaari.
10   Policy objectives are formulated in a political process, normally not – or only to a very limited extent 
– by analysts.
11   Influential in this respect was the Governmental report on globalization entitled Osaava, avautuva ja 
uudistuva Suomi – Suomi maalimantaloudessa (Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisu 19/2004). 
12   Finnish Innovation Fund, see more about Sitra in Section 2.4.2. 
13   The predecessor of the present Research and Innovation Council, the Science Policy Council of Finland, 
was established as early as 1963. It was transformed into the Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland 
in March 1987, and its new name was adopted as of the beginning of 2009. 
14   According to the interviews that the panel has conducted, the Finance Minister and Ministry have been 
less active in research and innovation policy questions in the Research and Innovation Council and the Min-
istry has not been represented at any meeting of the Research and Innovation Council or its predecessor.
15   The Minister of Finance is a member of the RIC but has never attend a council meeting according to the 
minutes of the council.
16   According to the Annual report, in 2007 the initial capital of Sitra had the value of 821 million euro, the 
return on capital was 7.5%, and its funding decisions totaled 42 million euro.
17   By the early 2000s, Sitra had become a major investor in biotechnology. Since 2004 it has tried to exit 
from its biotechnology portfolio, though it has met with difficulties in this respect. Its investment strategy 
at the moment is to invest in firms which are part of its programmes with the purpose to make these pro-
grammes more effective. 
18   Examples of Sitra’s programmes include health care programme looking for new solutions for health 
care services, a food and nutrition programme striving to promote healthy nutrition, an energy programme 
with the objective of improving energy efficiency of the built environment, and a growth programme for 
the mechanical industry. The concluded programmes include, e.g., an environment programme, Russia pro-
gramme, India programme, and Innovation programme. Sitra has also been involved in networking in fore-
sight activities; in this latter area, largely overlapping foresight activities taking place simultaneously on the 
initiative of Tekes and the Academy of Finland. 
19   The GDP share of primary production was only 3% in 2008, though these figures should not be directly 
compared.
20   Patents are often considered to be innovation indicators. However they are not, in the proper sense of 
the word. Patents are rather an indicator of invention. They indicate that something is new, but not neces-
sarily that it is economically useful. (Keep in mind that most patents are never used.)
21   More researchers have also voiced worries that the increasing trend for patenting in general will be a 
threat for the advance of science and technology by restricting the commons. See, for example, Kenney and 
Patton (2009).; Heller and Eisenberg (1998). 
22   See., e.g., Kaataja, 2009; Lester and Sotarauta, 2007; Männistö, 2002; Tervo, 2002.
23   Co-evolution takes place if two or more actors and/or their environments influence each other’s selec-
tion, and/or retention processes and, if a series of variations take place at the same time in the respective 
agents (Sotarauta and Srinivas, 2006; see also, Sotarauta and Kautonen. 2007)Broad-Based Innovation Policy  ·  69 
24    Forum Virium Helsinki’s  key  member  companies  are  Destia,  Elisa,  Logica,  Nokia, TeliaSonera, Tieto, 
Veikkaus and Finnish Broadcasting Company. Partners include Digita, Itella, SOK, MTV Media and Vaisala. 
The public sector is represented by the City of Helsinki, SITRA (The Finnish Innovation Fund ), TEKES (Finn-
ish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation) and VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland). SME 
partners are Adage, ConnectedDay, Futurice and Idean. FVH’s development projects also encompass a large 
number of high-growth companies based in the Helsinki region. (for more see http://www.forumvirium.
fi/en/)
25   http://www.demola.fi/ – Demola is a partnership between universities and colleges, companies and 
other organizations.
26   http://www.openlivinglabs.eu/
27   See Centre of Expertise Programme 2007–2013; www.oske.net
28   Social sciences can be included here.
29   For example, the latest report issued by the predecessor of the Research and Innovation Council, the Sci-
ence and Technology Policy Council of Finland: Linjaus 2008; the strategy of the Academy of Finland of October 
2006; and the strategy of Tekes of 2008.
30   Source: UNU-MERIT (2009).
31   http://cordis.europa.eu/era/concept_en.html.
32   The Government’s Communication on the EU policy, highlights ways in which active influence on EU 
policies can take place (Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 2009). 
33   The efficiency programme during the second cabinet of Matti Vanhanen aims to reduce the work force 
in the governmental sector by 2011 with 9645 person-years, and additionally, by 2015, with 4800 person-
years. http://www.vm.fi/vm/fi/05_hankkeet/02_tuottavuusohjelma/index.jsp.
34   A list of categories of innovations is presented later in this section.
35   It should be made clear that innovation policy-makers in other countries have not managed to be more 
specific and systematic on these issues.
36   Of course, we need much more knowledge about the specific relations between innovations and these 
socioeconomic phenomena.
37   As indicated at the end of section 2.2, we also have a broad understanding of what an innovation sys-
tem is.
38   The main reason for this is that it does not make sense to consider the innovation system to be the 
same as the whole economy or the whole society. It is much more sensible to limit the notion of innovation 
system to be constituted by innovations of various kinds and the activities that influence their development 
and diffusion – see section 2.2. This requires, of course, that the innovation output of innovation systems 
can be measured; it is very difficult to improve what cannot be measured. Much remains to be done with 
regard to measurement of innovations. Of course, we also need to know the approximate consequences 
of innovations for economic growth, environmental balance and military strength, since this is what inno-
vation policy-makers want to achieve in the end. However, the consequences of innovations are different 
from innovations as such or the determinants of innovations – and it is important to distinguish between 
these three categories. In the literature on innovation systems it is clear that consequences of innovations 
are normally not included in the definitions of systems of innovation. The consequences of (different kinds 
of) innovations are, as is generally accepted, extremely important for productivity growth, environmental 
balance and military strength. However, the study of consequences of innovations is a very complicated is-
sue in itself. Growth is not an output measure of the innovation system, but innovations are very important 
for economic growth. Hence innovation policy is an important part of growth policy, but they are not the 
same.
39   However, we have stressed the importance of taxonomies of innovations. The creation of such taxono-
mies has a conceptual and theoretical basis or dimension.
40   It is also possible to compare an existing system with a ’target system’. Such a system can be specified. 
However, it cannot be argued that it is an optimal one.
41   Systematic identification of determinants of innovation processes is a surprisingly under-researched 
area in innovation studies. Partly for this reason, but also because of the very complex nature of innovation 
processes, as well as the difficulty of developing causal explanations in the social sciences, it is very difficult 
to arrive at a ‘complete’ causal explanation of the propensity to innovate in an SI. We might have to accept 
being able to point out only the main activities behind a low propensity to innovate – and design instru-
ments that can influence these activities.
42   In vital areas such as energy and the environment, potential demand-based measures include the pub-
lic procurement of innovation and setting of norms and regulations, thus providing powerful incentives for 
the development of new innovations, but also streamlining R&D support from the supply side to reinforce 
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cal Choice and Strategies for Growth in Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland (Yale Univ. Press) won the 2008 Don K. Price 
Award. Mikko Ketokivi a senior lecturer in management at Helsinki University of Technology and an affiliate 




There is nothing in the logic of innovation that leads to emphasizing the supply of 
or the demand for novel ideas. Arguing for either side is misguided. The two sides 
are complementary. Thus, we welcome the balanced view implied in Finland’s new 
innovation strategy (Aho et al., 2008), although we disagree with some of its policy 
premises and recommendations. The primary goal of demand- and user-orientated 
innovation policy is to have (private) input and output markets that celebrate innova-
tion. The tools to achieve this are mostly indirect. Intense competition is the key. Laws, 
regulations, and standards are important. The role is direct when there is demand 
(generation) by the public sector (including public procurement) and/or supply by 
it (public goods and services). As far as direct public support of private innovative 
activity is concerned, our advice is to be impartial to the source, type, and application 
domain of innovation. To the extent this is not the case, we recommend adjusting 
towards impartiality. Demand and user orientation in innovation policy is consistent 
with promoting market entrants and radical/disruptive innovation.
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3.1.	 INtRodUctIoN
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Innovator End-user
Expertise   
domain 1   
Expertise   
domain 2   
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Figure 3.1.  Key concepts and their linkages
Note: Arrows refer to knowledge flows.Demand- and User-Driven Innovation  ·  75 













Push: explore the new
creativity, serendipity,
trial & error





















































































































































































































recent	innovations	is	”the scanning transmission electron microscope system plat-
form with unprecedented stability coupled with aberration correction and monochro-













































































employment:	“Particularly within the past couple of decades, the private business 
sector has recognized the usefulness of anthropological perspectives on product and 
market development and intercultural communication, as well as management and 
organizational development. In this field, anthropological skills in analyzing complex 
data and drawing on comparative insights help shed new light on problems and chal-













	 the	 intellectual	 foundation	 for	 contemporary	 research	 and	 application.	 	





















































Figure 3.3.  Sources of knowledge in innovative activity
Notes: The percentages refer to the share of firms considering the information source very important (the 
figure in parenthesis is the corresponding important or very important percentage). Based on the survey 
conducted to support the evaluation; questions 20 and 21 in the firm survey, i.e., refers to both Finnish and 

























































































novation.	We	can	therefore	conclude	that	about 1/4 of Finnish companies 

















































Table 3.1.  The relationship between firms’ user orientation and profitability

















Role of end user 
in innovation
No significant  Count 29 27 30 32 118
role % within Role of end 
user in innovation
22.3% 24.4% 28.0% 25.3% 100.0%
Object of market 
research
Count 84 51 51 70 256
% within Role of end 
user in innovation
33.3% 20.2% 19.2% 27.4% 100.0%
Actively provides 
information
Count 81 82 80 96 339
% within Role of end 
user in innovation




Count 47 33 45 44 169
% within Role of end 
user in innovation
29.1% 19.1% 26.9% 25.0% 100.0%
Total Count 241 193 206 242 882
% within Role of end 
user in innovation










user-based	innovation	and	at	the	most	general	level,	understand the locus of in-











Table 3.2. The relationship between firms’ user orientation and labor productivity


















Role of end user 
in innovation
No significant  Count 25 24 27 39 115
role % within Role of end 
user in innovation
20.9% 19.2% 24.5% 35.5% 100.0%
Object of market 
research
Count 60 63 50 69 242
% within Role of end 
user in innovation
26.4% 25.9% 19.4% 28.3% 100.0%
Actively provides 
information
Count 73 87 97 75 332
% within Role of end 
user in innovation




Count 36 44 47 38 165
% within Role of end 
user in innovation
22.6% 25.9% 26.9% 24.6% 100.0%
Total Count 194 218 221 221 854
% within Role of end 
user in innovation
26.6% 23.3% 24.2% 25.9% 100.0%





















































































and	identify	a	policy	dimension	as	well:	“Development block analysis enables 
policy makers to discern and evaluate transformation problems between user needs 
and production characteristics occurring in early development of new technologies. 
Policy may also have to fill such gaps in a way that will both stabilize situations and 

























“Before entering the forest machines business, Einari was a forest worker. Displeased 
with the forest tractors available at the time, he decided to build his own. The result-
ing innovation was a log forwarder – ‘Ponsse’ –, which proved to be so durable and 
efficient that Einari set up a machine shop to manufacture more. Today, the business 
based on this innovation is an important player in the global forest industry.”	(www.
ponsse.fi,	accessed	25	May	2009,	the	authors’	translation).92  ·  Dan Breznitz, Mikko Ketokivi, and Petri Rouvinen
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ENdNotES
1   The previous evaluation of the Finnish innovation support system concluded in that “The use of de-
mand-side innovation policies has been neglected in recent years.” (Georghiou, Smith, Toivanen, & Ylä-Antti-
la, 2003, p.117).
2   A premise we have taken for granted.
3   In part our argumentation rests on the assumption that ignorance and irrationality is not too prevalent 
and/or it cannot be significantly aided via direct policy action.
4   Public support for living labs, user groups, and cluster interaction may be seen as examples of policy 
actions related to profit-seeking innovators’ user-orientation; in our view these actions are hard to justify on 
the grounds of enhancing user-orientation, even if they may well have other valid motivations.
5   Here we abstract from the important caveats in a small open-economy context as well as from the 
consideration of both positive and negative externalities to third parties.
6   The latter of the above questions could be restated as follows: How to equip users with the expertise 
and desire to demand and expect innovative offerings as well as with the ability and willingness to enhance, 
expand, and develop them? This points to the direction of engaging educational system as well as of discov-
ering one’s own “internal entrepreneur” in some capacity.
7   Furthermore, there seems to be a stubborn myth in Finland that users are simply too ignorant to take 
up all the great inventions that are to be found throughout the country. We are, however, unable to find any 
evidence of this. The fact that most innovations are never commercialized is not evidence of this, as one 
of the fundamental functions of the market is to separate good ideas -- that are (privately) financed and 
become innovations -- from bad ones -- that are let to rest in peace.
8   Finland catching up with the global technology frontier; the increasing role of services.
9   Democratization of coded information and related empowerment of users, global technological trajec-
tories, globalization and  the related second unbundling.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  103 
4.   Globalization and business – 
innovation in a borderless
World economy
Karl aiginger, Paavo okko, and Pekka ylä-anttila*
Innovation and globalization are closely connected. Openness and innovation benefit 
the society both independently and jointly. Today’s innovative activity is inherently 
global. Especially small countries are increasingly dependent on global knowledge 
flows. This poses a challenge to national innovation policies. Furthermore, traditional 
innovation policies are not easy to justify in the case of a small open economy. More 
emphasis should be put on enhancing diffusion of technologies and new knowledge, 
localizing international knowledge spillovers, as well as on promoting the develop-
ment of production factors that are less mobile internationally. 
The Finnish innovation system has been performing relatively well in interna-
tional comparison. There are, however, a number of signals of needs for change – these 
are, in part, due to changes in global drivers of innovation. The system is – as well as 
the whole Finnish economy – much less international than often thought. This applies 
especially to the higher education and research. Yet, deeper tapping into the global 
knowledge pool should be one of the future corner stones of innovation and sustained 
well-being. 
In the global economy Finland is strongly specialized in two industrial sectors: 
ICT and forest. Both are in turmoil due to shifts in global demand and relocation of 
production. Our analyses show that there are clear signals of even broader deficits in 
industrial structure and needs for broad upgrading of quality of exports and produc-
tion. 
Policies – both policy organizations and instruments – to support business 
sector internationalization needs streamlining. Today, practically all innovation and 
business support organizations provide internationalization services for firms.
*  Karl Aiginger is director of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), as well as a professor at 
the Vienna University of Economics and at the University of Linz. He is the editor-in-Chief of the Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade. He has been the lead manager and contributor to European Competitive-
ness Reports since 1998. Paavo Okko is a professor (emeritus) at Turku School of Economics. Pekka Ylä-Anttila 
is the CEO of Etlatieto.
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4.1.   introduction
Setting the context: Finland in the global economy – One of the Nordics
in an international comparison Finland has been a high performing economy 
with a quick recovery after the crisis of the early nineties, showing persist-
ently faster than average growth since then. it shares several features of the 
nordic or scandinavian socio-economic model, including the changes and 
adaptations to make the economies fit for increasing competition in the glo-
balised world. as pointed out by several cross-country comparisons the nor-
dic economies have succeeded – better than most other countries – in com-
bining economic efficiency and technological dynamism with a fair income 
distribution and social cohesion.1
Finland’s long term economic growth – over the past 50 years – has clearly 
exceeded that of the eu-15. the period includes the crisis of the early nineties 
in which GdP decreased by more than 10%. Growth is definitely higher than 
the average of the nordic group since 1990. the resulting position in GdP/
capita is above european average.
Unemployment rate is, however, higher than in the nordic bloc. that ap-
plies especially to youth unemployment, which is well above european aver-
age. The employment rate is marginally higher than in eu-15. employment rate 
is, however, lower in Finland for young people as well as for people.
labour market is less regulated than in eu on average, but the differ-
ence is smaller between Finland and continental european countries. regu-
lation is stricter than, e.g., in sweden and denmark, and flexibility since the 
nineties had not been very pronounced. the share of flexible contracts (part-
time plus fix-term contracts) is now much lower than in sweden and has not 
increased as much as in other countries. it is now also below eu average and 
below continental countries (in which labour markets are more regulated). 
the difference between wages paid by firms and net income of employees 
(tax wedge) has decreased since its peak in the mid nineties, but is still above 
eu average and higher than in the continental countries, signalling lower in-
centives to hire new employees. career or job related training in firms is very 
high, as in other nordic countries.
Finland is a country with a large public sector, and a relatively large 
number of state-controlled firms. the share of government expenditures in 
GdP is rather high, so are tax rates. as in other nordic countries, Finland has 
a dual tax system in which corporate taxes are kept low as to help firms to stay 
internationally competitive despite the high overall tax level. the tax system 
is more redistributive than in continental countries but far less than, e.g. in 
sweden. expenditures on education are high in international comparison, so 
are expenditures on innovation.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  105 
High investment into the future
Finland has so far managed to stay competitive in the globalizing world by 
going for excellence in education, innovation and by making use of the in-
formation technology. expenditures on research and development increased 
from 1.2% in the early eighties to about 3.5% in 2008 (second only to sweden 
in eu-27). Finland is leading in the quality of the education system as re-
vealed by Pisa ratings, despite the fact that expenditures are not much higher 
than in eu on average. Finland’s expenditures on ict are high too (6%, eu 
average 5.6%, sweden 7.3%). if we take research, education and expenditures 
in ict together as an indicator for “investment into the future”, we see that 
this indicator increased from 13.3% (1992) to 15.9% (2006), which is the second 
highest rate in the eu-27, well above the eu-15. Finland has the highest share 
of employees with tertiary education. However, people with higher education 
start late to work (according to oecd the average labour market entry is at 
the age of 28), there is a gap between finishing secondary education and start-
ing tertiary education. this is obviously a problem since Finland is one of the 
countries with the most rapidly ageing population.
Summarizing policy priorities and macro performance
Finland is a successful economy as far as growth and other macroeconomic 
performance indicators are concerned. High growth, above average per capita 
income, balanced trade and balanced budgets until recently are on the positive 
side, low employment rate and rather high unemployment rate (specifically 
for the young people and low employment rate specifically for the elderly) 
are less favourable stylized facts. structural change was strong in the nineties, 
but Finland still has a relatively large low-wage sector and a high share of 
production in price elastic industries. the manufacturing sector is large and 
has been growing fast until recent years, the agricultural sector is still rather 
large (oecd, 2008), and the service sector relatively small.
Finland is part of the nordic socio-economic model, and enjoys its 
positive features of a cohesive society, with a high welfare standard. Finland 
careful upholds incentives and competitiveness by lowering regulation, tax 
wedge and the tax burden for firms. the labour market is relatively flexible, 
but not as flexible as in other nordic countries. there have been signs of mis-
match (labour shortage despite of rather high unemployment rate) and of low 
regional mobility. the share of flexible contracts is quite low. environment has 
less priority than in other nordic countries, if concluded by high co2 emis-
sions and energy consumption per capita, and low environmental taxes. High 
per capita energy consumption is mainly due to industrial structure and is 
rapidly decreasing as a consequence of industrial transformation. the use of 106  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
nuclear power instead of alternative energy sources or the strife for excellence 
in energy efficiency is the answer to the climate problem.
education and innovation have a very high priority, definitely higher 
than in other european countries and even within the leading nordic coun-
tries. as far as openness of the economy and society is concerned Finland 
has a medium position, at best. Furthermore, there are signs for asymmetric 
openness. inward investment is lower than outward Fdi, migration is low, 
and number of foreign students and researchers is low.
Approaching the global technology and productivity frontier
since the late 1980s Finland has been moving from an investment-driven catch-
ing-up country towards innovation-driven and knowledge-based economy. 
the transformation relates to the high level of education and increasing tech-
nology inputs, but it is as much a consequence of the productivity-enhancing 
structural change – or creative destruction.2 although starting already in the 
late 1980s, the period since the mid-1990s has been essential in this respect. 
resources moved from less productive plants and firms to more productive, 
and from less productive industries to more productive ones, also entries and 
exits increased contributing to productivity. there was a radical change in firm 
and industrial structure. in less than a decade, electronics – notably telecom 
equipment production – grew by far the largest industrial and exports sector. 
by the turn of the millennium the country had become the most ict-special-
ized country in the world in terms of ict’s share in production and r&d.
as a consequence of the structural transformations over the past two 
decades the economy today is close to the global productivity and technol-
ogy frontier (Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). as pointed out by modern economic 
growth literature, being close to the frontier calls for different growth policies 
from that pursued in the catching-up stage of development.3 the closer to 
the world technology frontier, the more economies pursue innovation-based 
strategy with younger firms, experimentation, and better selection of firms 
and managers. investment in fixed capital would be lower, but exploring 
novel combinations with higher failure rate and subsequent higher exit and 
entry rates would be more common. that calls for different institutions than 
in investment-driven stage of development.
recent studies using comparable data sets on inputs and output sug-
gest that the country has climbed relatively high in multifactor productivity 
in almost all sectors. Hence, policies targeted towards specific sectors or firms 
do not seem justified. rather, the relevance of institutions and individuals in 
policy considerations has increased.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  107 
Figure 4.1.  Labor productivity in Finland and the US, in 2004 Euros
Data source: O’Mahony and Timmer (2009, Table 3).
The source is Nevalainen and Maliranta (2009), data from the national accounts, and Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics.
Figure 4.2.  Relative levels of multifactor productivity, 2005 (US=1)
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the crucial policy issues now include: are the current institutions and 
policies compatible with new stage of development or do they still reflect 
the catching-up phase? can the country keep its top position in productivity 
without major changes in policy instruments? and in particular: What does it 
take to keep the productivity enhancing structural change as the major source 
of productivity growth?
there are indications in the recent comparative innovation studies that 
Finland’s innovation performance has been stagnant over the past few years.4 
although the framework conditions – education and technological infrastruc-
ture – are among the best in the world, the innovation performance has deteri-
orated. the reasons for losing the top position relate to management practices 
and inability of organizations to make use of individuals’ creativity and inno-
vation potential. that signals the need to renew the incentive mechanisms as 
proposed by the new growth literature referred to above.
4.2.  analysis and evaluation
4.2.1.  national Policies in a World WitHout borders
an essential feature of the globalized world economy is that knowledge flows 
more and more freely across national borders. ideas, inventions, technologies 
and innovations spread within multinational enterprises (mnes), in global 
production networks, or embodied in goods and services. World trade has 
been constantly growing faster than world GdP, foreign direct investment by 
mnes more than trade, and the documented surge in non-equity, contract-
based value-added networks (or strategic alliances) has even outstripped the 
Fdi growth.5
the basic idea of modern production networks is to enhance collabora-
tion and transfer knowledge from one country or location to another to facili-
tate development of new products and increase the productivity of the whole 
production system.
How does the idea of national innovation policy fit into this increas-
ingly internationalized world economy? the fact that benefits from new in-
novations and knowledge generation are by no means confined within the 
national borders, poses the fundamental policy challenge for a small open, 
knowledge-based economy. the key policy issue is: do the standard policy 
justifications and premises of national policies hold in a globalized world 
economy? or should they be changed and reassessed given the more or less 
free flow of ideas and knowledge?
there is a strong theoretical argument that national innovation poli-
cies are not easy to justify in the case of a small open economy while most of Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  109 
the benefits (consumer surplus) from the innovations go outside the national 
borders.6 the policy rationales as such hold also in the highly international-
ized market7, but obviously national policies need to be adjusted to take into 
account the increasingly globalized world economy.
at the general level there seems to be a strong correlation between 
openness – or degree of globalization – and innovativeness as evidenced by 
Figure 4.3. countries that show high level of innovativeness (measured by 
the european innovation scoreboard index) are those that are also most glo-
balized (measured by KoF index of globalization8). interestingly, when de-
composing the overall globalization index into sub indices, it turns out that 
Figure 4.3.  Globalization and innovativeness
Data sources: Innovation index: European innovation scoreboard 2007, globalization indexes: Dreher (2006). 
Country abbreviations: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, CA = Canada, CH = Swit-
zerland, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, EL = Greece, ES = 
Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, HR = Croatia, HU = Hungary, IE = Ireland, IL = Israel, IS = Iceland, IT = Italy, LT 
= Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = 
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KOF index of political globalization (2006)110  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
the highest correlation with innovativeness is that with social globalization. 
social globalization measures personal contacts, information flows, and cul-
tural proximity – the density and accessibility of new ideas. one cannot, of 
course, say anything about the causality, but the strong association between 
globalization and innovativeness opens some interesting aspects to assess in-
novation and innovation policies in a borderless world.
the first important aspect is that all countries are both senders and re-
ceivers of global knowledge spillovers. the amount of the spillovers has been 
steadily increasing, since knowledge as such has become a more important 
production factor in all industries and, at the same time, the share of knowl-
edge-intensive industries in most economies has increased. the essential poli-
cy issue is: How to tap into the global knowledge pool and spillovers? Finland 
produces at best less than one per cent of global knowledge (the country’s 
share in global r&d expenditure is about 0.6%). most – or almost all – of 
the economically relevant knowledge is generated outside Finnish borders. 
the recent economic growth literature shows that even in the larger coun-
tries the ideas developed elsewhere are of great – and increasing – importance 
to economic growth.9 Hence, the crucial issue is, whether the channels and 
mechanisms to capture global technology and knowledge spillovers are ef-
ficient enough.
the second aspect relates to the mobility of production factors. Finan-
cial and physical capital have become increasingly mobile at the same time 
when the mobility of human capital has increased less. technological infra-
structures are relatively immobile. should policies be geared more towards 
these and less towards mobile and increasingly footloose firms? are some 
of the innovation enhancing factors less mobile and more embedded in the 
economy than others?
a third interesting aspect, related to the two above, is that of locational 
competition and locational advantages. certain industries and certain kinds 
of firms tend to locate in relatively well defined regions or hubs. is there a 
justification for policy intervention that enhances local clusters, in order to 
internalize the external economies arising from local knowledge production?
in what follows we will use empirical data to look at to what extent 
the Finnish innovation system, policies and policy organizations are in line 
with globalization and growing amount of global knowledge spillovers. in 
the small open economy the key policy objective inevitably is to enhance 
diffusion of globally developed technologies and tap into the international 
knowledge pool.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  111 
How globalized the Finnish economy and society are?
there are several ways of measuring globalization and at least half a dozen of 
indices often used in policy analyses or public debate.10 according to a new 
index constructed in vujakovic (2009) Finland ranks a bit less favorable than 
in some of the previous studies. the country is number 18 among the 70 coun-
tries included in the sample.
the rank is below the rankings of the other nordic countries. it looks 
that Finland is highly integrated in the global financial system, but much less 
globalized as far as social and trade globalization are concerned. the observa-
tion fits well with the findings of the modest internationalization level of the 
research system and low researcher mobility. Furthermore, if anything the 
globalization of the Finnish economy and society – compared to other coun-
tries – has decreased over the past ten years.
Figure 4.4.  Globalization of countries and changes in globalization according to a New Glo-
balization Index
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One-sided globalization?
the large Finnish firms today are among the most globalized in the world.11 
outward foreign direct investment stock has grown more than tenfold since 
the early 1990s. although the inward stock has grown even more rapidly, the 
stock is still some 25% smaller than the outward stock (Figure 4.5). the Finn-
Figure 4.5.  Outward and inward FDI stocks in Finland, 1975–2008 (bill. euro at 2007 prices)
Source: UN world investment report 2008.
Sources: Bank of Finland and ETLA/Maury.
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ish firms have been investing clearly more abroad compared to how much 
Finland has been able to attract foreign investment.
of course, the excess of outward Fdi over the inward is also an indi-
cation of the competitiveness of Finnish firms and does not as such tell very 
much of in- and outflows of knowledge and information. there are probably 
a lot of knowledge inflows within the Finnish multinationals.
although the largest Finnish firms are highly internationalized, the 
business sector as a whole, compared to many other small countries, is not, as 
evidenced by Figure 4.6.
another way to investigate the likely effects of globalization of busi-
ness is to look at the presence and r&d activities of foreign multinationals’ 
subsidiaries in Finland compared to other oecd countries. that is done in 
Figure 4.7.
the role of r&d conducted by foreign firms is relatively small in Fin-
land compared to most other european countries. in addition, as data in Fig-
ure 4.7 seem to indicate, the r&d intensity of foreign firms in Finland is lower 
than the average of the sampled countries (foreign affiliates’ turnover share is 
slightly bigger than their share of r&d, i.e. Finland is below the diagonal).
Figure 4.7.  Share of R&D and turnover of affiliates under foreign control
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Figure 4.9.  The difference in the share of lower than upper secondary school education 
between native and immigrants population in two age groups, %
Source: Adapted from Braunerhjelm et al. (2009, p. 168); data source OECD.
Figure 4.8.  Immigrants as a percentage of total population 1960–2005
Source: Adapted from Braunerhjelm et al. (2009, p. 59); data source WDI online 2009.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  115 
A prisoner of its own success?
the Finnish economy is dominated by a few large multinational enterprises 
(mnes) many of which have specialized on production where large size, low 
costs and high capital intensity are defining the competitive edge. this special-
isation is suboptimal for a small, high wage country, located at the economic 
and geographic periphery of europe where demand is at least quantitatively 
satisfied and future growth is expected to happen in high quality products 
and  niche-markets  respectively.  a  country  like  Finland  should  specialize 
more in industries, where complex solutions and capabilities to respond to 
consumers’ or investors’ demand is defining the competitive edge. existing 
firms in developed, high wage countries should specialize in product innova-
tion, adding features and services to the product. the forefront Finnish firms 
have moved far to this direction, but the smes are lagging behind.
as  production  processes  become  increasingly  geographically  frag-
mented due to globalization, the rapid emergence of global value chains and 
value-added networks can be observed. Globalization of value chains is mo-
tivated by a number of factors, of which enhancing efficiency is the most im-
portant. one way of achieving that goal is to source inputs from more efficient 
producers, either domestically or internationally and either within or beyond 
the firm’s boundaries. this fragmentation of the production process has given 
rise to considerable restructuring in firms, including the outsourcing and off-
shoring of certain functions (oecd, 2007).
Within global value chains, mnes (like nokia) play a prominent role, 
as their global reach allows them to co-ordinate production and distribution 
across many countries and shift activities according to changing demand and 
cost conditions. cross-border trade between mnes and their affiliates, often 
referred to as intra-firm trade, accounts for a large share of international trade 
in goods.
the increasing integration of new players (china, india, russia, etc.) 
into  the  global  economy  challenges  existing  comparative  advantages  and 
the competitiveness of countries, forcing them to search for new activities in 
which they can excel and confront the competition. the main drive for indus-
trial countries is to move up the value chain and become more specialised in 
knowledge-intensive, high value-added activities.
specialization in more traditional cost-based industries and activities is 
no longer a viable option for most industrialised countries. the manufactur-
ing sector is most strongly affected and in most oecd countries the process is 
accompanied by de-industrialisation, driven by rapid changes in productivity 
in the manufacturing sector and by a shift in demand towards services. in-
vestment in knowledge is crucial for sustained economic growth, job creation 
and improved living standards. such investment has increased in all oecd 116  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
countries in recent years. at the same time, most oecd countries are shifting 
into higher-technology-intensive manufacturing industries and into knowl-
edge-intensive market services. a considerable number of them still have a 
strong comparative advantage in medium-low-technology and low-technolo-
gy industries; this advantage will, however, diminish as developing countries 
move up the value chain themselves.
a first rough indication of countries’ integration into the world econ-
omy is derived from the ratio of international trade in goods and services to 
GdP. small open economies like Finland are generally more integrated, as 
they tend to specialise in a limited number of sectors (e.g. telecommunication 
as well as pulp and paper in Finland) and need to import and export more 
goods and services to satisfy domestic demand than larger countries. While 
integration into the world economy in Finnish manufacturing is in line with 
comparable countries, the trade in services is relatively low.
empirical evidence of the globalization of value chains materializes in 
the decline in the production depth in favour of greater uses of intermediary 
goods as the share of manufacturing value added in gross production decreas-
es. this pattern can also be observed in the Finnish economy where the overall 
production depth in manufacturing has decreased more than 10 percent since 
the beginning of the 1990s. the production depth of the Finnish economy is 
now around 30 percent, i.e. about the oecd average (Figure 4.10).
compared to other countries the Finnish economy is characterized by 
relatively small export shares (Figure 4.11) and low intra-industry trade in 
manufacturing (Figure 4.12) as well as limited – although increasing – off-
shoring (Figure 4.13) (oecd 2007, Prime minister’s office 2006).
Figure 4.10.   Production depth (value added as a percentage of production), 1990 and 2003
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































since mass consumer products generally cannot be produced competi-
tively in small high-wage countries, nokia has relocated the production of 
cellular phones almost completely – to a large extent to asia. nokia has cho-
sen the way of international in-sourcing, which means that despite produc-
tion was transferred to another country (off-shoring), it remains within the 
Figure 4.11.  Share of exports in manufacturing production (%), 1990 and 2003
Source: Adapted from OECD (2007).
Figure 4.12.  Manufacturing intra-industry trade as a percentage of total manufacturing 
trade, average 1996–2003
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firm done by subsidiaries abroad. thus the intra-company production depth 
remains high (contrary to the decreasing production depth in the Finnish 
economy as a whole; see Figure 4.10), despite extensive relocation of labour 
intensive production to low wage countries. it is remarkable that also major 
part of the production of complex high-end products has been moved out. 
major part of r&d, headquarter activities, logistics and marketing still locate 
in Finland.
the bulk of new investment of core industries is thus done abroad 
which leads to a low investment rate in the Finnish economy as a whole. the 
investment rate of 20 percent (in 2008) is substantially below the oecd-aver-
age and down from more than 30 percent in the late 1980s. the terms of trade 
have developed weakly and will most probably continue to do so. Finland’s 
industry is specialized in products the real prices of which tend to decrease, 
e.g. cellular phones and paper. Productivity benefits therefore flow to a sig-
nificant extent to foreign customers.
The (increasing) quality deficit in Finnish production and exports
Globalization implies that high income countries specialize in goods and serv-
ices produced with sophisticated inputs (qualified labour, research, knowl-
edge). While this dimension is well known and often investigated, there are 
other dimensions of structural change across and within industries less ex-
plored. High income countries should specialize in industries in which quality 
Figure 4.13.  Offshoring/outsourcing abroad, total economy, 1995 and 2000
Notes: Adapted from OECD (2007). Offshoring/outsourcing has been calculated as the share (in %) of im-
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defines the competitive edge (and retreat from industries where price com-
petition is all important) and they should upgrade production and services 
in each industry, supplying goods in the highest “quality segment” of each 
industry.
neither quality competition as dominating mode is easy to define, nor 
is  quality  upgrading  within  industries  easy  to  define.  However, aiginger 
(2000 and 1997) developed a set of indicators to monitor the quality position 
of economies. this method has been widely used for analyzing the catching 
up of transition countries within and outside europe (e.g. sieber, 2009). the 
supporting study for this evaluation, reported in appendix 2 of this chapter, 
replicates this endeavour for Finnish manufacturing for the period 1985 to 
2006.
While Finland is excellent as far as technology input and the education 
base are concerned, and is a high-income country with a large and dynamic 
manufacturing sector, there are clear signals for deficits in industrial structure 
as well as broad upgrading of quality of exports and production.
most indicators indicate quality upgrading for Finnish manufacturing, 
but most indicators also show that structure of manufacturing within as well 
as between industries is less favourable than for european average and most 
importantly less quality oriented if compared to leading countries. Further-
more, the majority of indicators show that progress made up to 2000 has since 
levelled off, if not reversed (at least as compared to peer countries).
4.2.2.  innovative individuals and communities – HoW innova-
tions emerGe in a Globalized World economy?
The role of national mega clusters in knowledge creation
the “new paradigm globalization” discussed above (new functions and even 
individual tasks within firms becoming tradable in the world economy) is 
breaking the national production, manufacturing and technology systems. 
specialization is not necessarily taking place by industries or at the firm level 
but at the level of functions and tasks. that has been leading to loosening of 
the national and regional cluster structures. What we see increasingly are the 
regional or local hubs of specialization rather than strong national clusters.
in Finland there have been two globally strong industrial clusters – ict 
and forest industry – which both have played an important role in the na-
tional innovation system.12 Finland is the most ict specialized country in the 
world – in terms of value added, but especially in terms on r&d. more than 
half of total r&d expenditure is used in the ict sector. the forest industry 
cluster, for its part, has been a unique concentration of competencies in pulp 
and paper manufacturing, research and education, and also service provision. 120  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
the Finnish technical universities still produce a major part of paper technol-
ogy engineers and industry related research.
the challenge today is that both clusters are losing ground as a con-
sequence of globalization. in both clusters the Finnish located activities are 
decreasing rapidly. the forest cluster is in deep crisis due to technological ad-
vance (ict based communication is replacing paper) and weakening demand 
in developed countries. Paper consumption is increasing mainly in emerging 
economies where the production is being relocated. the making capacity in 
Box 4.1. ICT Cluster in Finland
ICT cluster has grown by far the most important industrial concentration in Finland since the mid-
1990s. It can be characterized as strong national cluster with several regional hubs in the country. It 
centers upon telecommunications equipment manufacturing and related service provision. It is not 
only Nokia and other firms that have been successful in producing competent human resources and 
world-class R&D to support the cluster’s development.14 Nokia is, however, the dominant and the 
only really big player of the cluster today. ICT cluster as a whole – both employment and sales – grew 
very rapidly up until the turn of the millennium. There was a clear turn in the trend in beginning 
of the 21st century which marked a start of relocation of component manufacturing, and to some 
extent service production. So far the relocation of R&D has been modest, concentrating mainly on 
localization and other close-to-market of (product) development. However, relocation of software 
development has been on increase.15
It can be argued that the Finnish ICT cluster has become to a cross-roads.16 Strong specializa-
tion in production and research has beard fruit but might not be the way to go further. The market 
for ICT equipment and services is maturing and partly changing dramatically towards services. It is 
very difficult for a small country, and a company originating from a small country, to be both market 
and technology leader.
Figure 1.  ICT Cluster in Finland – Employment, sales, and number of establishments
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Finland has been cut by almost one fifth since 2005, and it is likely to be cut by 
another fifth over the next ten years.13 there is a need for a radical change also 
in the forest sector related r&d. the Finnish located pulp and paper industry 
has only limited chances to compete with traditional products and current 
specialization patterns.
ict cluster is in the different stage of its life cycle – still potentially 
growing, but main part of ict manufacturing and some parts of r&d have 
been moved to cost competitive locations. the size of the Finnish ict cluster 
has diminished remarkably (see box 4.1).
nokia is the major player not only in the ict sector research, but in the 
whole Finnish innovation system. the company’s share in total Finnish r&d 
expenditure is as much as one third and its share in the business sector r&d 
about a half. overall the business r&d is very concentrated in Finland: top 10 
companies conduct about 60% of all r&d in the enterprise sector.
the significant role of nokia in the Finnish innovation system is not, of 
course, any concern as such. on the contrary, there is every reason to make 
sure that as big part as possible of nokia’s high-end research stays in Finland. 
it can be concluded from industry and labor market data that nokia’s r&d 
in Finland has moved towards more strategic and high-skill activities, while 
the adaptation-to-market, and routine type of development has been growing 
abroad or been relocated. Hence, there has been a major structural change in 
nokia’s r&d in Finland.
rather than nokia’s dominance the concern in Finland is a relatively 
small number of smes engaging in r&d, as indicated by Figure 4.14. another 
concern is that currently business sector r&d is heavily concentrated in ict 
Figure 4.14.  Nokia in the Finnish business sector R&D in 2006
Notes: Sources are OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008, p. 24; the Finnish breakdown by 
ETLA. * Business enterprise R&D intensity as a percentage of GDP. ** In the order of importance in terms of 
R&D conducted in Finland: Wärtsilä, ABB, Metso, Ericsson, Orion, Stora Enso, Kemira, TietoEnator and Amer 
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Box 4.2. Nokia in the Finnish Economy
To assess the role of Nokia in the Finnish economy and innovation system, several indicators are 
used, like share of GDP, employment and R&D expenditure.
In 1995, Nokia’s share of the Finnish GDP hardly exceeded 1 percent but five years later in 
2000, the share had quadrupled corresponding as much as 4 percent of the GDP (Figure 1). After 
the turn of the millennium, the share has varied between 2.9 and 3.8 percents. These figures show 
that in spite of rapid internationalization of Nokia’s production and R&D, Finland is still an important 
location for value creating functions and tasks of the company. An increasing part of Nokia’s exports 
from Finland are various kinds of services – like maintenance, project management, other manage-
ment and headquarter services etc.
Nokia’s contribution to GDP growth further emphasizes its role in the economy. Thanks to the 
increased value-added, the company has contributed significantly to total GDP growth since the 
mid 1990s (Figure 2).
Source: Ali-Yrkkö (2009).
Figure 1.  Nokia’s share of Finnish GDP, %*
* (Nokia’s value added in Finland/GDP)*100, in market prices. Source: Ali-Yrkkö (2009).
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The share of Nokia
In 2000 Nokia’s contribution to GDP growth was close to 2 percentage points, when the total 
GDP growth was 5 percent. Hence, Nokia was responsible for more than one third of the total GDP 
growth in that year. Conversely, in 2001 the Finnish GDP growth slowed down to 2.6 percent and 
Nokia’s growth contribution was close to zero. During 2005–2007, Nokia’s contribution rose again.
R&D in relation to GDP has grown steadily in Finland over the past few decades. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s the R&D intensity has exceeded that of the EU average (Figure 3). Figure 3 
reveals that Nokia has contributed significantly to the R&D intensity of Finland accounting for one 
third of the total R&D expenditure (GERD) – without Nokia the R&D share of GDP would be 2.5%, still 
higher than EU average and approximately at the same level as in the US.
During the last couple of years the growth pattern of the business sector R&D has changed 
somewhat (Figure 4). Nokia’s R&D has grown less than that of the rest of the business sector, reflect-
ing a slight shift away from the Nokia dominance.
Figure 3.  R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Source: Ali-Yrkkö (2009).
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sector. strong specialization has been one of the strengths of the Finnish econ-
omy, but at the same time it poses a risk of missing future growth prospects in 
domains beyond the current technologies and competences.
recent data show, however, weak signals of change. the r&d expendi-
ture by non-nokia sector has been increasing at the same time when nokia’s 
expenditure, and more notably the r&d working hours, have somewhat de-
clined (see box 4.2).
Is there a Finnish paradox?
the Finnish education system – especially the basic education – has been 
ranked very high in international comparisons. the coverage of the basic 
education system is good and the variation among the schools is low at the 
same time when educational attainment has come out on top in the oecd 
studies.17 there is much less evidence on the quality and efficacy of higher 
education, but nevertheless the enrollment rates are high – about 50% of each 
age group take a tertiary degree. education is the key element of innovation-
driven economy and society. Human capital and skilled labor are a necessary 
complement to technological advances. on the other hand, the demand side is 
also important: innovations do not take place or diffuse without demanding 
and well-educated customers and consumers.
against this background it is somewhat surprising that according to 
recent studies Finland is not specializing in education-intensive sectors in 
production (and trade) as much as some other smaller economies.18 there is 
a heavy specialization in high-tech and especially in ict industries, but less 
so – compared to other smaller countries – in human capital intensive pro-
duction. this is probably one of the structural weaknesses of the economy. 
Finland is probably not making a full use its growth potential based on skills 
and human capital.
the ongoing university reform is a one way to respond to this chal-
lenge. there are obvious shortcomings in the university technology transfer 
mechanisms, as indicated by recent studies, the transfer mechanisms are still 
in their infancy.19 if properly implemented the university reform – giving 
much more financial and operational autonomy to the universities – is likely 
to enhance innovation and university-industry collaborative research by pro-
viding more incentives for that. it is also important that polytechnics keep and 
strengthen their original role as institutions having dense connections to work 
and practice, and close collaboration with local business.
university reform together with recently implemented university in-
ventions act is likely to improve innovation management in universities and 
thus improve individuals’ incentives to develop and exploit their inventions 
commercially. However, it is evident that there is a need to substantially in-Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  125 
crease knowledge in international iPr practices. much of the research is done 
within international collaborative networks and most of the potential innova-
tions are aimed for the international markets. iPr issues are clearly underrep-
resented both in research and university education.
number of researchers in relation to population in Finland is the high-
est in the world. that has sometimes been used as a performance indicator 
of the innovation system. it measures, of course, only innovation input and 
needs to be related to output indicators. that is done in the figure below using 
patent data for some other smaller countries. the performance of the Finnish 
innovation system looks much less flattering than usually thought. the met-
rics used is, of course, far from complete but indicative.
Introvert universities?
universities and university researchers play an important role in making use 
of international knowledge flows and adding to the global knowledge pool. 
in recent policy discussion a lot of attention has been paid on the low level 
of internationalization of the Finnish research and university system.20 From 
global vantage point universities are competing for the talented researchers, 
professors and students. Finnish universities, maybe with few exceptions, 
have not been successful in this competition. the number of foreign profes-
sors, researchers, and Phd students is low. one of the key motivations for the 
ongoing university reform was the fact the Finnish universities have become 
more introverted rather than opened up to the increasingly internationaliz-
Figure 4.15.  The relationship between the R&D capital stock and triadic patents
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ing research and education. reflecting the concern on this matter, ministry 
of education has prepared an internationalization strategy for the university 
sector in accordance with the current government program.
the data show that the concern is justified and the strategy was urgent-
ly needed and it should be effectively implemented. international researcher 
mobility has declined from the already low level. For example, the number of 
Finnish scholars in the us universities has gone down since the mid 1990s by 
three percent annually while the average for the oecd countries shows an 
annual growth of more than three percent. at the same time the share of non-
national science and technology professionals in Finland (as a share of total 
s&t employment) has remained among the lowest in the eu (Figure 4.16).
the low level of internationalization is also evident from the interna-
tional student data. While the number of Phd students (and degrees) in rela-
tion to population and relevant age group is high in Finland, the number of 
foreign Phd students is low in international comparison.
there have been some attempts to meet the challenge, like the so called 
FidiPro  program  (Finland  distinguished  Professor  Program),  funded  by 
academy of Finland and tekes. the program aims at attracting foreign top 
researchers to Finnish universities and research institutes for longer periods. 
the program has taken a good start but it will, even at best, be only a partial 
solution to the problem. university steering and funding mechanisms should 
be designed to include incentives for internationalization of research and edu-
cation.
4.2.3.  demand and user orientation
Open innovation model is underutilized?
the idea of open innovation has rapidly gained ground both in firms’ inno-
vation strategies and as a guideline for public innovation policies.21 obvious 
reasons for that are the increasingly opening up of the world economy to-
gether with technology advances, and the subsequent surge in information 
and knowledge flows.
the idea of open innovation emphasizes utilizing more external knowl-
edge flows (in- and out-) to complement, and partly replace, internal innova-
tion efforts. that means reorganizing enterprises’ innovation activities and, 
correspondingly need to redesign public policy tools. these should include 
more instruments to support networks and research collaboration.
there is quite little empirical data of open innovation practices in Fin-
land, let alone international comparative analysis. However, the low presence 
of foreign-owned r&d units together with low and decreasing researcher mo-
bility indicates that open innovation advantages are not fully utilized. on the Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  127 
Figure 4.16.  Non-national science and technology professionals in selected countries, % of 
in total S&T employment
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007.
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus 75/2007 (selected countries), p. 2.
Figure 4.17.  Graduates at doctorate level in relation to relevant age group and share of for-
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other hand, there is evidence that the extent of collaboration with other firms 
and universities is very high among Finnish enterprises compared to other 
eu countries.22 the problem – if and when there is one – can be identified to 
international collaboration and making use of globally available knowledge.
4.2.4.  systemic aPProacH
in the globalized world economy the interdependencies in knowledge gener-
ation, diffusion and adoption are of crucial importance. Production and r&d 
take place in global systems of value-added networks and strategic alliances. 
Global sourcing is more extensive in technology-intensive industries than in 
low-tech sectors.23
Hence, globalization adds a special flavor to the request of taking sys-
temic view in innovation policies. there are some signs of increasing systemic 
thinking among policy organizations within the country.24 However, the inter-
national aspect in innovation needs much more attention.
the Finnish research and science system is an integral part of the eu 
level research system. the country has so far benefitted from the joint europe-
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an s&t policies and research programs. there is every reason to contribute to 
the implementation of a real european research area (era). From the Finn-
ish perspective among the most crucial elements of era would be realizing 
a single labor market for researchers. making era a reality would enhance 
collaborative research and specialization across countries – and from the eu-
ropean perspective strengthen european research system in a global world.
4.3.   conclusions and Policy recommendations
4.3.1.  Key observations
Global drivers of innovation
innovation and globalization are closely connected. there is a growing amount 
of evidence that openness of the economy and society benefits innovation. in-
novation today is a global undertaking.
countries that show high level of innovativeness are those that are 
also most globalized. interestingly, when looking at different dimensions of 
globalization, it turns out that the highest correlation with innovativeness is 
that with social globalization. social globalization means personal contacts, 
information flows, and cultural exchange – the density and accessibility of 
new ideas. especially small countries are increasingly dependent on global 
knowledge flows. this poses a challenge to national innovation policies.
the recent economic growth literature shows that even in the larger 
countries the ideas developed elsewhere are of great – and increasing – im-
portance for economic growth. Hence, the crucial issue is, whether the chan-
nels and mechanisms to capture global technology and knowledge spillovers 
are efficient enough.
there  are  new,  and  potentially  huge,  global  drivers  of  innovation. 
these include open innovation, prolific demand for solutions to environmen-
tal problems, and rapidly changing geography of innovation towards devel-
oping countries. all of these have been recognized, but not yet fully reckoned 
with in policy making. especially important is the rising role of large emerging 
economies (notably china and india) in the global innovation system. they 
appear already now as significant providers of high-tech products (goods and 
services) in the world market, and increasingly in the same product groups as 
Finland. china is already the third largest r&d spender globally, and its r&d 
investment is increasing faster than in any other country. this provides a huge 
challenge, but even huger opportunities.
in almost every country the stimulus packages to bridge the global re-
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nologies. this induces new demand and gives an extra boost to innovation 
in resource- and energy-saving technologies and cross-disciplinary applica-
tions.
Finland in the global economy
Finland is a successful economy as far as growth and other macroeconomic 
performance indicators are concerned. High growth, above average per capita 
income, balanced trade and balanced budgets until recently are on the positive 
side, low employment rate and rather high unemployment rate (specifically 
for the young people and low employment rate specifically for the elderly) are 
less favourable stylized facts. structural change was strong in the nineties, but 
Finland still has a relatively large low-wage sector and a high share of produc-
tion in price elastic industries. the manufacturing sector is large and has been 
growing fast until recent years, the agricultural sector is still rather large, and 
the service sector relatively small.
education and innovation have a very high priority, definitely higher 
than in other european countries and even within the leading nordic coun-
tries. as far as openness of the economy and society is concerned Finland has 
a medium position, at best. Furthermore, there are signs of asymmetric open-
ness. inward investment is lower than outward Fdi, immigration is low, and 
the number of foreign students and researchers is relatively small.
since the late 1980s Finland has been moving from an investment-driv-
en  catching-up  country  towards  innovation-driven  and  knowledge-based 
economy. the transformation relates to the high level of education and in-
creasing technology inputs, but it is as much a consequence of the productiv-
ity-enhancing structural change – or creative destruction. although starting 
already in the late 1980s, the period since the mid-1990s has been essential in 
this respect. resources moved from less productive plants and firms to more 
productive, and from less productive industries to more productive ones, also 
entries and exits increased contributing to productivity. there was a radical 
change in firm and industrial structure. in less than a decade, electronics – no-
tably telecom equipment production – grew by far the largest industrial and 
exports sector. by the turn of the millennium the country had become the 
most ict-specialized country in the world in terms of ict’s share in produc-
tion and r&d.
as a consequence of the structural transformations over the past two 
decades the economy today is close to the global productivity and technology 
frontier. as pointed out by modern economic growth literature, being close to 
the frontier calls for different growth policies from that pursued in the catch-
ing-up stage of development. the closer to the world technology frontier, 
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experimentation, and better selection of firms and managers. investment in 
fixed capital would be lower, but exploring novel combinations with higher 
failure rate and subsequent higher exit and entry rates would be more com-
mon. that calls for different institutions than in investment-driven stage of 
development.
the Finnish innovation system has been performing relatively well in 
international comparison. there are, however, several signals of needs for 
change. these are, in part, due to changes in global drivers of innovation. 
the system is much less international than often thought. this applies espe-
cially to the higher education and research. if anything, the internationaliza-
tion of research and higher education system have, over the past few years, 
decreased from their already low level. yet, deeper tapping into the global 
knowledge pool should be one of the future corner stones of innovation and 
sustained well-being.
4.3.2.  conclusions
Industry and firm structure
the most important industrial clusters – ict and forest industry – are in tur-
moil due to globalization. both have benefited and will benefit from global 
markets but there is an urgent need for renewal. Forest related industries are 
in crisis which is more profound than any structural transformation before. 
the renewal of forest industry has to be based on more intense use of multiple 
technologies, skills, and human capital – and will take at least 10–20 years.
Globalization implies high income countries should specialize in in-
dustries in which quality defines the competitive edge (and retreat from in-
dustries where price competition is all important) and they should upgrade 
production and services in each industry, supplying products in the highest 
“quality segment” of each industry.
While Finland is excellent as far as technology input and the education 
base are concerned, and is a high-income country with a large and dynamic 
manufacturing sector, there are – according to a special study conducted for 
this evaluation – clear signals for deficits in industrial structure as well as 
need for broad upgrading of quality of exports and production. most indi-
cators indicate quality upgrading for Finnish manufacturing, but most indi-
cators also show that structure of manufacturing within as well as between 
industries is less favourable than for european average and most importantly 
less quality oriented if compared to leading countries. Furthermore, the ma-
jority of indicators show that progress made up to 2000 has since levelled off, 
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the business r&d is very concentrated in Finland: top ten companies 
conduct about 60% of all r&d in the enterprise sector. nokia alone is respon-
sible for nearly half of business r&d. the significant role of nokia in the Finn-
ish innovation system is not, of course, any concern as such. on the contrary, 
there is every reason to make sure that as big part as possible of nokia’s high-
end research stays in Finland. it can be concluded from industry and labor 
market data that ict sector’s and nokia’s r&d in Finland has moved towards 
more strategic and high-skill activities, while the adaptation-to-market, and 
routine type of development has been growing abroad or been relocated.
rather than nokia’s dominance the concern in Finland is a relatively 
small number of smes engaging in r&d. another concern is that currently 
business sector r&d is heavily concentrated in ict sector. strong specializa-
tion has been one of the strengths of the Finnish economy, but at the same 
time it poses a risk of missing future growth prospects in domains beyond the 
current technologies and competences.
according to recent studies Finland is not specializing in education-
intensive sectors in production (and trade) as much as some other smaller 
economies. there is a heavy specialization in high-tech industries, but less 
so – compared to other smaller countries – in human capital intensive pro-
duction. this is probably one of the structural weaknesses of the economy. 
Finland is probably not making a full use its growth potential based on skills 
and human capital.
Innovation governance and management
there  are  obvious  shortcomings  in  university  technology  and  knowledge 
transfer. the current university management and administration do not pro-
vide proper incentives, research organizations tend to be introvert and closed-
up to the external world. the ongoing university reform can, if properly im-
plemented, contribute to improving the situation.
universities are a central – if the most central – part of national inno-
vations systems. universities and university researchers play an important 
role in making use of international knowledge flows and adding to the global 
knowledge pool. From global vantage point universities are competing for 
the talented researchers, professors and students. Finnish universities, maybe 
with few exceptions, have not been very successful in this competition.
open innovation model is not fully utilized in Finland – neither by firms 
nor by policy makers. improving the internationalization of the innovation 
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Box 4.3. Finpro – promoting internationalization of Finnish firms
Finpro is a public-private partnership organization which supports Finnish companies in their in-
ternationalization activities. The organization was founded in 1919 as the Finnish Export Associa-
tion, became later known as the Finnish Foreign Trade Association, and was named Finpro in 1999. 
Finpro has a network of over 50 ‘Trade Centers’ in more than 40 countries. Total staff is about 350, of 
which 250 abroad. Finpro’s budget is about 40 million euro, the government direct funding is close 
to 60%.
Finpro has been integrating into the innovation system by offering expert services to innova-
tion support organizations and producing market information of various technology fields. Finpro 
regards its mission to include increasingly a role of an information intermediary, providing informa-
tion on global megatrends, new business models, and early signals of market opportunities. It offers 
both free-of-charge and invoiced services. The company clientele is about 4500 Finnish businesses.
Finpro’s integration with the innovation support system includes also relying more on funding 
from public innovation agencies. As much as 30% of Finpro’s invoiced revenues come from govern-
ment organizations. That adds over 10 million euro to the direct government budget funding of 22 
million. The biggest single public sector client is Tekes whose share is one third (more than 3 million) 
of the total. Finpro acts overseas on behalf of Invest in Finland and Finnish Tourist Board, which 
partly explains the rising share of public organizations in Finpro’s funding. Finpro is also an active 
player in Finnish Innovation Center program (FinNodes).
Finpro’s most important (top 5) invoiced clients in 2008 (total invoiced revenues from the cli-
ents below was about 10 million euro):
–	 Tekes
–	 Finnish Tourist Board (MEK)
–	 Fintra
–	 The Federation of Finnish Technology Industries
–	 Invest in Finland
Our survey reveals that Finpro is serving to a large extent the same target group as other 
innovation organizations – its clients are more innovative than average and more internationally 
oriented. They also regard, more frequently than average, the other actors of the innovation system 
– notably Tekes, VTT and universities – as important for their business.
The role of Finpro in the Finnish innovation system has obviously changed over the past ten 
years. At the same time promoting internationalization has become ever more important task on 
the agenda’s of other innovation agencies, practically all of them are offering some kind of services 
related to internationalization activities – often overlapping with each other. Therefore, the evalua-
tion panel welcomes the ongoing project initiated by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
to map the service provision and streamline the system. It would be very important to separately 
assess the role of Finpro as one of key players of the innovation system and the most important 
internationalization promoting organization.
Policies promoting internationalization – everyone’s job?
internationalization of business is, in one form or another, on the agenda of 
nearly all public enterprise policy agencies. although, admittedly, interna-
tionalization is a cross-cutting issue to be addressed by most of the policy or-
ganizations, there is plenty of room for increased coordination and measures 
to avoid overlaps in the system.
an obvious improvement would be merging of Finpro and invest in 
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merger would most probably enhance the efforts to attract foreign investment 
and ensure more efficient use of resources. as discussed above, the specific 
Finnish challenge is the low level of inward foreign direct investment. Glo-
balization is two-way traffic and that should show in how the policy agencies 
are organized.
the current set-up of the business support system reflects also more 
generally the traditional industrial society. the support organizations still 
carry – in spite of major changes in ways of operation – signs of traditional 
industrial and export-oriented economy. the emphasis is in supporting or-
ganizations (firms), exports, and other international business operations, and 
less in supporting individuals, inward investment, and social dimension of 
globalization – which, however, looks even more important for innovation 
than economic and financial integration. in that sense, the current system is 
not in line with the national innovation strategy that stresses the importance 
of innovative individuals and communities in the borderless world.
4.3.3.  Policy recommendations
all countries, especially small open economies, are increasingly dependent 
on global knowledge flows. this poses a challenge to national innovation 
policies. there is a strong argument that traditional policies – subsidies or 
other direct policy measures – are not easy to justify in the case of small open 
economy while most of the benefits (consumer surplus) from nationally gen-
erated innovations go outside national borders.
However, at the same time the role of knowledge in creating growth 
and well-being is proliferating. investment in knowledge generation is grow-
ing faster than ever. Hence, more emphasis should be put on enhancing dif-
fusion of technologies and new knowledge. Global knowledge sourcing has 
become a key element in today’s business and public policies.
enhancing internationalization throughout the innovation system and 
especially in research and higher education is extremely important for Fin-
land. concentrating on human capital, education and other less mobile fac-
tors can safeguard the benefits of globalization to the use of domestic welfare 
even if the business environment is global.
While close to the global productivity and technology frontier, more 
risk taking in innovation policies is justified. that implies more experimen-
tation and, subsequently, more variation in innovation outcomes, including 
higher risk of failures, and, as a consequence, willingness and tolerance to 
accept public policy failures.
Policies to promote internationalization of business should be stream-
lined and made more effective by merging Finpro and invest in Finland or-Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  135 
ganizations, and by cutting the overlaps in the activities of other policy or-
ganizations.
measures to encourage private venture capital investments should be 
implemented. introducing r&d tax incentives as a new policy tool should be 
seriously considered as proposed by the governmental working group.
Finally, Finland should assume more active role in eu s&t policies and 
contribute, e.g., to the emergence of real european research area and in par-
ticular to formation of single labor market for researchers.136  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
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aPPendix 1: statistics
Table 4.1.  Performance: Short and long run growth of GDP
Source: WIFO calculations according to Eurostat (AMECO). As to sub-aggregates and EU-15 weighted aver-
age over countries.
Annual growth in % Unemployment Rate Employment Rate
1960/1990 1990/2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Scandinavian Model 3.3 2.4 4.6 4.3 70.2 77.0
Denmark 3.0 2.1 7.2 3.1 76.8 78.9
Finland 3.9 2.4 3.2 6.3 74.1 71.8
Netherlands 3.5 2.6 5.8 3.0 65.0 79.2
Sweden 2.9 2.3 1.7 6.0 71.8 74.9
Continental Model 3.6 1.7 7.3 7.2 63.4 68.0
Germany  3.2 1.8 6.1 7.3 69.5 74.3
France 3.9 1.9 8.4 8.0 59.7 62.1
Italy  4.0 1.3 8.9 6.8 57.4 64.4
Belgium 3.4 2.0 6.6 7.1 58.3 63.4
Austria 3.5 2.3 3.1 3.9 69.2 71.9
Anglo-Saxon Model Europe 2.6 2.7 7.3 5.7 70.7 72.1
Irland 4.2 6.0 13.4 6.1 54.6 69.5
United Kingdom 2.5 2.5 6.9 5.7 71.8 72.2
Mediterrean Model 4.6 2.9 10.9 10.1 56.4 66.9
Greece 4.5 3.1 6.4 9.0 59.1 63.4
Portugal 4.8 2.1 4.8 7.7 70.5 72.3
Spain 4.6 3.0 13.0 10.8 53.2 66.6
Anglo-Saxon Model Overseas
USA 3.5 2.8 5.5 5.7 74.3 72.2
Canada 4.0 2.7 8.1 6.2 71.2 75.6
Australia 3.8 3.5 6.9 4.2 69.2 75.5
New Zealand 2.4 2.9 7.8 3.8 53.7 60.0
EU-15 3.4 2.1 7.9 7.1 64.3 69.1Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  139 
Table 4.2.  Indicators on the socio-economic model
1990 2008
Labour market regulation: all contracts
Sweden  3.5    2.6 
4 
Finland  2.3    2.1 
4 
EU-15  2.8    2.4 
4  
Public debt as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  28.2    39.9 
Finland  6.3    30.4 
EU-15  51.9    61.9  
Budget surplus/deficit as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  -11.2 
2    2.6 
Finland  5.4    5.1 
EU-15  -3.9    -1.6  
Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  60.0    53.6 
Finland  47.9    47.1 
EU-15  48.0    46.6  
Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  65.3    56.2 
Finland  53.3    52.3 
EU-15  42.4    45.0  
R&D as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  2.98 
1    3.73 
4 
Finland  2.12 
1    3.45 
4 
EU-15  1.95 
1    1.91 
4  
Expenditures for education as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  7.75 
1    7.18 
4 
Finland  7.27 
1    6.42 
4 
EU-15  4.96 
1    5.21 
4  
ICT expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  3.97 
1    7.25 
4 
Finland  3.94 
1    6.03 
4 
EU-15  3.60 
1    5.64 
4  
Exports as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  29.7    54.4 
Finland  22.5    46.1 
EU-15  26.0    40.5  
Imports as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  29.1    48.5 
Finland  23.9    40.8 
EU-15  26.7    39.8  
Active FDI (stocks) as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  25.9 
3    66.6 
5 
Finland  13.9 
3    43.2 
5 
EU 25  21.2 
3    26.0 
5  
Passive FDI (stocks) as a percentage of GDP
Sweden  12.5 
3    57.9 
5 
Finland  6.9 
3    33.5 
5 
EU 25  13.6 
3    18.9 
5  
CO2 emissions (t per 1000 euro)
Sweden  0.30    0.16 
Finland  0.63    0.41 
EU-15  0.61    0.32  
Energy consumption (TJ per mill. euro)
Sweden  6.8    4.4 
Finland  10.2    6.7 
EU-15  6.5    3.9  
Notes: 11992; 21993; 31996; 42006; 52007.140  ·  Karl Aiginger, Paavo Okko, and Pekka Ylä-Anttila
Table 4.3.  Employment rates
Source: WIFO calculations according to Eurostat (AMECO). As to sub-aggregates and EU-15 weighted aver-
age over countries.
Total   Female   Age 55-64  
 2000    2006    2000    2006    2000   2006
 Scandinavian countries    73.6    74.2    69.5    70.7    56.4    63.1  
 Denmark    76.9    77.4    71.6    73.4    55.7    60.7  
 Finland    66.5    69.7    64.2    67.3    41.6    54.5  
 Sweden    75.2    74.2    70.9    70.7    64.9    69.6  
 Anglo-Saxon countries    71.2    72.0    63.8    65.3    50.2    57.0  
 Ireland    66.5    70.0    53.9    59.3    45.3    53.1  
 United Kingdom    71.6    72.2    64.7    65.8    50.7    57.4  
 Continental countries    67.0    67.8    57.3    61.2    33.9    43.2  
 Germany    69.9    71.3    58.1    62.2    37.6    48.4  
 France    61.5    61.5    55.2    58.8    29.9    38.1  
 Belgium    61.6    62.6    51.5    54.0    26.3    32.0  
 Netherlands    75.1    76.1    63.5    67.7    38.2    47.7  
 Austria    69.6    69.9    59.6    63.5    28.8    35.5  
 Mediterranean countries    59.6    64.6    41.5    49.6    33.0    38.2  
 Greece    57.3    62.0    41.7    47.4    39.0    42.3  
 Italy    58.6    63.4    39.6    46.3    27.7    32.5  
 Portugal    72.7    72.0    60.5    62.0    50.7    50.1  
 Spain    59.5    65.9    41.3    53.2    37.0    44.1  
 EU-15    65.8    67.9    54.1    58.7    37.8    45.3  
 United States    74.5    72.8    67.8    66.1    57.8    61.8  Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  141 
aPPendix 2: tHe (increasinG) Quality deFicit in FinnisH 
Production and exPorts
Karl Aiginger
Globalisation implies that high income countries specialize in goods and serv-
ices produced with sophisticated inputs (qualified labour, research, knowl-
edge). While this dimension is well known and often investigated, there are 
other dimensions of structural change across and within industries less ex-
plored. High income countries should specialize in industries in which qual-
ity defines the competitive edge (and retreat from industries where price com-
petition is all important) and they should upgrade production and services in 
each industry, supplying good in the highest “quality segment” of each indus-
try. neither quality competition as dominating mode is easy to define, nor is 
quality upgrading within industries easy to define. However, aiginger (2000 
and 1997) developed a set of 16 indicators to monitor the quality position of 
economies. this method has since been widely used for analysing the catch-
ing up of transition countries within and outside europe (e.g. sieber, 2009). 
Here we replicate this endeavour for 13 indicators for Finnish manufacturing 
for the period 1985 to 2006, and add findings by aiginger (2000) for the three 
indicators, we could not calculate for the longer period.
Position in quality intensive industries (RQE taxonomy)
Finland is slightly less specialized in industries in which quality defines the 
competitive edge than the european union (defined as eu 15). the share of 
High-rQe industries is 35.9% for Finland as compared to 37.8% for eu 15, the 
gap is nearly ten percentage points relative to sweden and Germany, three 
points relative to France. the gap is much larger for exports (35.8% to 46.9%), 
France and Germany have shares higher than 50% for the group of industries 
sheltered from low cost countries by quality competition as dominant mode 
or competition.
Finland has succeeded to increase its share of industries sheltered from 
price competition between 1985 and 2000 (from 28.9% to 38.9% in 2001), but 
since 2001 the share of high rQe sectors in value added as well as exports is 
decreasing again.
the deficit is even more pronounced if we calculate net figures i.e. the 
share of industries in which price competition is least important minus the 
share where it is most important. the net rQe is negative for value added as 
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only for Greece, spain, ireland and the netherlands (for value added) and 
Greece for exports. again this balance had improved up to 2000 (with some 
years showing a positive balance), but aggravated since. the main driver of 
the very disappointing position of Finland has been the persistently high 
share of price intensive industries. 38% resp. 43% of Finnish value added and 
exports are placed in industries where price competition is specifically strong, 
this is the most unfavourable position in all 14 countries compared.
looking into the industry position (3 -digit industries) shows that as 
expected the large share of price sensitive industries is driven by the wood 
and paper industries, but also by the large and increasing difference in the 
relative shares of the steel industry (larger in Finland). the lower share of 
quality intensive industries comes from relative low shares of the car industry, 
pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, botanical products and other chemical 
products as well as aircraft and spacecraft. the lower share of these industries 
in value added in Finland, overcompensates the higher share of Finland in 
ict industries. the deficits in all the quality dominated industries increased, 
while the higher shares of ict in value added decreased since 2000.
Unit values of exports and imports
While rQe analyses the position across industries, the unit value reveals both 
structural composition as well as quality upgrading within industries. the 
unit value of Finnish exports is 1,602 €/t. this is 32% below eu average (2,355 
€/t), one quarter below the unit value of swedish exports, half of Germany 
and denmark and less than half of ireland. the export unit value is increasing 
since 1995, a little more than eu average. However, Finland is the rare excep-
tion of a high-income country with an export unit value considerably below 
european average.
import unit values are low too, but not that much below eu average. 
literature shows, that while high-income countries import goods with intrin-
sically low unit values (raw material, basic goods), the overall unit value of 
imports increases with income per head, since high-income countries demand 
sophisticated inputs (intermediate goods) and engage in intra-industry trade 
with other rich countries. relative unit values below 1 indicate that the unit 
value of imports is higher than that of exports. Finland shared this feature 
with Greece, Portugal, sweden and the netherlands (2006). the relative unit 
value increased slightly up to 2001, stagnated thereafter.Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  143 
Shares of sunk cost industries, high skill and knowledge intensity
the share of sunk cost industries (technology driven plus marketing 
driven) is another indicator for the favourable structural composition of the 
structure of manufacturing. this share in value added is 36% and 29% in ex-
ports; both shares are first increasing and then decreasing.
the share in skill intensive industries is 13.5% for value added and 
19.2% for exports; both shares are again considerably lower than that of eu 
average, sweden and Germany. Finland is specifically specialized in medium 
skilled/white collar industries (ct as well as pulp and paper is grouped into 
this category). the relative best position is reached according to the share of 
industries using high content of knowledge based service; it is higher for ex-
ports as well as value added.
Good performance is seen if we divide industries with high resp. low 
potential for globalisation, taking a simple openness indicator (exports plus 
imports/production). the share of this industry group has been traditionally 
higher for Finland and increased up to 59% in 2001 for value added and to 
62% for exports, since that peak it stagnates or is slightly decreasing.
Shares in quality segments for 1998
additionally we report the finding of aiginger (2000) for exports according 
to quality segments within industries. 43% of Finnish exports belong to the 
highest quality segment (defined for each industry separately by using the 
spread of eu import data for many countries); while 27.5% belong to the low 
segment. While this gives a positive net balance, it is much lower than that 
for sweden (61% : 12%) and for total eu 55.7% : 15.5%). Finland takes only 
the 11th position out of 14 countries compared. Finland had also negative 
position for exports as well as value added in industries with high product 
differentiation according to aiginger (2000).
The summary
While Finland is excellent as far as technology input and the education base is 
concerned, and is a high-income country with a large and dynamic manufac-
turing sector, there are clear signals for deficits in industrial structure as well 
as broad upgrading of quality of exports and production.
it is difficult to measure quality and quality has different dimension. 
However, the set of 16 indictors developed by aiginger (2000) has become 
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deficiencies and the inclusion of specific industries into one category is often 
important for the results.
most indicators indicate quality upgrading for Finnish manufacturing, 
but most indicators also show that structure of manufacturing across as well 
as between industries is less favourable than for european average and most 
importantly less quality oriented if compared to leading countries. and the 
majority of indicators show that progress made up to 2000 has since levelled 
off, if not reversed (at least as compared to peer countries).Globalization and Business – Innovation in a Borderless World Economy  ·  145 
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5.   Growth EntrEprEnEurship and 
FinancE
Gordon Murray, ari hyytinen, and Markku Maula*
Tax policy should explicitly recognize the incentives needed for talented persons to 
consider an entrepreneurial career choice as well as for potential High Growth Entre-
preneurial Firms (HGEFs) to pursue (international) expansion. The planned reform 
of the Finnish tax system presents a unique opportunity to make the taxation treat-
ment of equity income more favourable to entrepreneurial risk-taking and creation of 
potential HGEFs. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy and the Ministry of Finance 
should publicly assume joint operational responsibility for policies that aim at pro-
moting entrepreneurship and knowledge-based HGEFs.
The present public support system is in need of a major revision. Issues of ac-
cess and relevance are particularly important for HGEFs. It is believed that both the 
governance and cost-effectiveness of the support system could be improved by reduc-
ing its complexity.
The Finnish innovation system suffers from a mismatch between 1) the grow-
ing demand by Finnish HGEFs for global insight, foreign expertise, international 
networks, and 2) an insufficient supply of inward foreign spillovers due to the scarcity 
of world class human capital, foreign R&D and cross-border venture capital within 
Finland’s borders. Even if there is no single policy measure that can resolve this issue, 
it should be urgently recognized and addressed.
The Finnish educational sector has a greater role to play in the creation of 
HGEFs. The reform of the Finnish university sector and the creation of Aalto Univer-
sity present an important and timely opportunity to create world class infrastructure 
for entrepreneurial education, training and research accessible to both Finnish and 
collaborative foreign interests involved in growth oriented and new knowledge based 
enterprise.
*  Gordon Murray is a professor at the University of Exeter Business School (UK). He is a senior adviser to 
the UK government’s Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and is a member of the Access to 
Finance Expert Group and the 2009 Rowland’s Growth Capital Review. He has been a member of similar 
groups at the European Commission (e.g., Professional Chamber of the Enterprise Policy, Risk Capital, and 
Gazelles). Ari Hyytinen is a professor at the University of Jyväskylä. Markku Maula is a professor at the Helsinki 
University of Technology.
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5.1.  introduction
high growth entrepreneurial firms (hGEFs) are widely regarded as a key driv-
er of employment, industrial productivity and long-term economic growth in 
developed economies.1 we take these positive contributions of hGEFs and the 
objectives and basic doctrines of the national innovation strategy (nis) large-
ly as given.2 this chapter therefore focuses specifically on the means available 
to promote a greater volume and quality of hGEFs in the Finnish economy.3 
we understand that our mandate is i) to provide an analysis and evaluation 
of how the Finnish economy and innovation system currently addresses and 
accommodates hGEFs, and ii) to identify areas for future improvement in 
those policies seeking to increase the number and contribution of hGEFs to 
the Finnish economy.
we face five main challenges in addressing this mandate: First, there 
are many ways to define a hGEF and specifically what is meant by the term 
‘high growth’. to find a general definition for hGEFs is difficult given the 
range of metrics applied to growth, (e.g., jobs vs. sales; absolute vs. relative 
growth); the duration and variability of the growth period; the means and 
processes by which growth is achieved (e.g., organic growth vs. acquisitions); 
and the ways in which firms may be classified (e.g., initial firm size, firm age, 
sector). the oEcd (2008b), for example, defines high-growth enterprises as 
measured by employment (or by turnover) as: ‘all enterprises with average an-
nualized growth in employees (or in turnover) greater than 20% a year, over a three-
year period, and with ten or more employees at the beginning of the observation pe-
riod’. researchers and policy makers talk about ‘new technology-based firms’ 
(ntBFs), ‘gazelles’, ‘young innovative companies’ (Yics) and employ a more 
or less convenient set of definitions (see, e.g., schneider & Veugelers, 2008).
we cannot easily resolve this problem nor is it prudent from us to adopt 
a single, possibly arbitrary, operationalization of the term hGEFs. instead, 
we take a pragmatic view and define a hGEF to be: an entrepreneurial firm 
that is relatively small to start with (e.g. has (much) less than 250 employees), 
is usually young (e.g., is younger than the median4) and has, for whatever 
reason, an expected or a realized growth rate which when computed over a 
substantial period of time exceeds a non-trivial threshold (e.g. the average 
three-year growth rate of employment or sales exceeds 20 percent per an-
num). thus, hGEFs are generally assumed to be young, relatively small but 
with the potential for significant growth. they are usually but not exclusively 
in industries characterized by significant new knowledge and innovation. 
where appropriate, we make more precise definitions of hGEFs explicit in 
the subsequent discussion.
the second challenge that we face when addressing our mandate is 
that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to systematically identify and rec-Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  149 
ognize hGEFs before their growth opportunities start to produce measurable 
outcomes. in part because we cannot know ex ante which companies can and 
will grow, we are also obliged to discuss in this chapter the overall levels of 
entrepreneurship and new firm entry in Finland. the logic of this wider pur-
view is that, in order to produce more and better hGEFs, Finland needs first 
to be able to create more new companies that experiment with novel (e.g., sci-
ence or new knowledge-based) ideas and thus have high potential value. the 
economy is then able to provide and focus greater resources and incentives 
in order to accelerate the growth opportunities for this selected minority of 
potentially high impact enterprises.5
the third challenge that we face is that the creation of new firms in-
cluding hGEFs in an economy is both a function of the supply of innovations 
and promising new ideas and the demand for such opportunities by existing 
and future entrepreneurs with sufficient skills and experience to exploit them 
successfully. this creates the well-known ‘chicken-and-egg problem’ of cau-
sality. namely, will a greater number of good entrepreneurs create better op-
portunities or do we first need the opportunities in order to encourage more 
entrepreneurs? in this paper, we avoid making circular inference by taking 
the supply side (e.g., the scale and quality of private and public sector r&d 
and innovation activity in Finland that becomes the ‘raw materials’ to entre-
preneurs) as given.6 Even with this strong assumption, it is very difficult if 
not impossible to determine how many hGEFs are optimal for Finland. the 
available evidence does not enable us to determine a number or stock of such 
firms with any acceptable level of confidence. however, we do address this is-
sue from a more qualitative perspective. the available evidence suggests that 
European countries, including Finland, are not necessarily laggards in terms 
of the volume of self-employment or small and medium-sized enterprises 
(sMEs).  however,  the  Finnish  economy  is  often  believed  (particularly  by 
Finnish observers) not to compare well to other advanced or rapidly emerg-
ing economies in the quality of entrepreneurial activity and the consequent 
number and potential of hGEFs created. despite Finland’s commitment to 
innovation and the considerable future public support signalled in the nis, 
the number and scale of hGEF activity is seen as disappointing when bench-
marked against other highly innovative and competitive countries. we take 
this shortfall between expectations and perceived reality as one of the starting 
points for our analysis.
the  fourth  challenge  in  addressing  our  evaluation  mandate  is  that 
hGEFs are not a single and homogenous entity. rather, they are a heterogene-
ous and constantly changing group operating in a diversity of environments 
for which growth opportunities are consequently often ‘lumpy’ over time 
(autio, 2008). these different milieux mean that several different barriers can 
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tunities. For some potential entrepreneurs, the largest constraint may be the 
limited supply of entrepreneurial finance to support the earliest stages of firm 
formation and growth (see, e.g., schneider & Veugelers, 2008; westhead & 
storey, 1997). in many circumstances facing hGEFs, standard collateral-based 
bank lending is a poor substitute for equity finance (williams, 1998). For other 
growth oriented firms, the critical barrier may be their limited access to other 
specialized factor markets such as skilled employees, specialist managerial 
talent or internationally focused business services (Bürgel et al., 2004). thus, 
in order to complete our mandate, we will also need to discuss the extent to 
which the Finnish innovation system addresses and accommodates the other, 
non-financial needs of potential hGEFs.
the fifth and final challenge is arguably the greatest. namely, to an-
alyze and evaluate a target that is moving in two material ways: First, the 
present global economic environment, while not a focus of our study, none 
the less produces huge uncertainties in future global demand and supply 
which are difficult to ignore. these vagaries are particularly acute for Finland 
as a strongly export oriented nation. our specific remit obliges us to look at a 
range of related issues, including new and emerging technologies, higher ed-
ucation, international labour markets, immigration and the nature of Finnish 
culture. these are all complex, highly dynamic and inter-related constructs 
capable of several interpretations and prescriptions. second, the national in-
novation system and particularly the public support system are changing 
very rapidly. there are numerous ongoing and planned policy initiatives that 
have started to shape the public support system and what it offers to hGEFs.7 
accordingly, because of the moving nature of our target, it is rather difficult 
to provide insightful analysis and robust evidence-based conclusions that will 
necessarily remain fully relevant and feasible within the extended time frame 
of policy actions.
what our mandate does not cover is the consequences of the ongoing 
financial crisis and economic downturn on hGEFs’ behaviour. we do not seek 
to make any comment or prescription regarding the present and severe prob-
lems of a global economic recession. our analysis addresses policy issues that 
remain of importance regardless of contemporary difficulties. we do assume, 
however, that the present crisis does not reduce the long-term capacity of the 
Finnish financial system to allocate capital efficiently. Further, we also assume 
that the present recessionary pressures do not lead to a permanent anti-glo-
balization and protectionist movement that significantly reduces long run 
growth opportunities for international trade.8
the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. in the next sec-
tion, we develop a framework for our analysis and give a brief account of 
the economic milieu and policy environment in which the creation of Finnish 
hGEFs is embedded. the third section describes the two key themes on which 
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sources that the Finnish system provides individuals in order to help them 
identify and pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. the logic we wish to em-
phasize in particular is that it is new entry by highly talented and experienced 
entrepreneurial individuals that is an elemental input to the processes which 
may eventually result in the creation of hGEFs. the second theme focuses on 
the incentives and resources that the Finnish public support system provides 
existing firms in order to assist their efforts to identify and pursue exceptional 
and sustained growth opportunities. the final section of this chapter offers 
our conclusions and a number of specific policy recommendations resulting 
from our analysis.
5.2.  EValuation FraMEwork and EnVironMEnt
the purpose of this section is to set the framework for our analysis and evalu-
ation. as we see it, the policy framework consists of three major parts: the 
economic rationales for the public support of hGEFs; the national innovation 
strategy (including the Government’s communication); and the institutional 
environment and economic milieu in which policies are implemented.
5.2.1.  puBlic EconoMics and hGEFs
the economic rationales for government policies that target new entrepre-
neurs and particularly hGEFs are multifaceted. they are often complex and, 
accordingly, can sometimes be misunderstood (for a review, see Michael & 
pearce, 2009). what all these rationales have in common is that they are based 
on the core idea that market outcomes can be inefficient due to the existence 
of important market failures of some sort. these market-failure arguments 
for (and, in some cases, against) government policy intervention include both 
externalities of entrepreneurial entry, and financial and non-financial barriers 
to entry (see, e.g., Boadway & tremblay, 2005; takalo, 2009).
Externalities of entrepreneurial entry and HGEFs
the private value of a new entry to an entrepreneurial agent may differ from 
its public or social value for a number of reasons. First, to the extent that new 
firms create new products and services or better production processes (i.e., 
greater productivity) that enhance the welfare of consumers, the private value 
of a new entry does not reflect its additional social value (‘appropriability 
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future entrants and innovators. these benefits are external to the new entrant 
because subsequent entrants and innovators can benefit from the accumula-
tion of past experience and knowledge. By learning vicariously from those 
who have tried to enter a market or innovate earlier (i.e. ‘inter-temporal sp-
illovers’ and ‘learning-from-others’ effects), the future and better informed 
entrants and innovators can more efficiently manage critical costs including 
r&d and market entry. third, the location choices of new entrants can lead to 
powerful agglomeration benefits for other firms. these externalities refer to 
the creation of industrial clusters (Folta et al., 2006; kenney & von Burg, 1999; 
porter, 1998). they can emerge for example because of network externalities, 
reduced transportation costs or improvements in labour market matching 
(“agglomeration externalities”).
while the above externalities are by and large arguments for policy in-
tervention, certain externalities can speak against such public actions. First, 
potential entrants do not internalize the destruction of rents or reduction of 
market share of established firms (‘business stealing effect’ and ‘trade diver-
sion  effect’).  second,  sometimes  potential  entrants  and  innovators  have  a 
strong incentive to be the first to enter a market or to make an innovation. 
there may be a ‘first mover advantage’ for entrants in many important in-
novations. if the probability of being first depends on the relative level of ef-
fort and investment, this may result in an undesirable contest that attracts too 
much rent seeking entry and investment from the society’s perspective.
Non-financial and financial barriers to entry
Entry decisions can be inefficient (even in the absence of externalities) if there 
are entry barriers. it is somewhat difficult to classify systematically such bar-
riers, not least because the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on 
their effects and relative importance on entry in general, and hGEFs in par-
ticular, are mixed.9
non-financial entry barriers include regulation, administrative obliga-
tions, and taxation, e.g. profit-insensitive taxes and administrative (tax-like) 
fees. they are commonly more of a burden to new firms than to established 
ones.10 however, unfortunately, it is very hard to draw general conclusions of 
their quantitative significance in a given market or at the level of the national 
innovation systems. strategic behaviour by incumbents is yet another form of 
entry barrier. the rival firms may for instance be able to enhance their mar-
ket power and ability to deter entry by making excessive investments and by 
building excess capacity. with such capacity, incumbent firms can signal their 
willingness to compete fiercely if a new entrant enters their market.
Financial entry barriers refer to the imbalance between the demand for 
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such financing. the origins of this imbalance are well-understood (e.g. asym-
metric information between investors and entrepreneurs, incentive and other 
agency problems etc.) and widely studied (see, e.g., hyytinen & pajarinen, 
2005; Maula et al., 2007). however, determining the existence, magnitude and 
materiality of such a gap and finding the appropriate form and magnitude 
of government intervention to address the gap in a given region or at a given 
point in time are less clear.11
5.2.2.  thE national innoVation stratEGY and hGEFs
the nis (and the related Government communication of 2009) presents four 
points of departure, or “basic choices” as they are called, for the development 
and implementation of the national innovation strategy.
National policies in a world without borders
Finland’s economic success has long relied on the openness of its economy, 
i.e. on the extensive and unimpeded trading of high value goods and services 
with the international community. Building on this doctrine, and subscrib-
ing to the belief that a key long term policy goal remains the reduction and 
removal of barriers between national borders that hamper the flow of goods, 
services, capital and labour, the Government’s communication on Finland’s 
nis emphasizes (p.16) that: “connecting and positioning Finland in the glob-
al knowledge and value networks requires ability to participate and influence 
these networks, international mobility of experts and determined develop-
ment of the attractiveness of the Finnish innovation environment”.
Given the limited size of the domestic market for the commercialization 
of innovations, the increasing irrelevance of national borders in international 
markets, and the need to understand customers who select products and serv-
ices by meritocratic criteria regardless of their provenance, this nis statement, 
as we interpret it in the light of our remit, is especially relevant for hGEFs. 
Entrepreneurs who have the capacity to create and develop internationally-
oriented hGEFs with a global reach and impact are a critically important but 
scarce resource. Earlier analyses of the Finnish public support system suggest 
that the diverse resources need by hGEFs to grow and ultimately to dominate 
(or at least influence) global markets are insufficiently developed in Finland 
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Demand and user orientation
traditionally, industrial or innovation policy has been largely driven by sup-
ply-side considerations. to emphasize the need for understanding the diver-
sity and peculiarity of markets and customers on a global basis, the Govern-
ment’s communication on Finland’s nis concludes (p.17) that: “innovation 
steered by demand, paying attention to the needs of customers, consumers 
and citizens in the operations of public and private sectors alike, requires a 
market and shared innovation processes between users and developers.”
while at the time of writing it is not clear what the content of the poli-
cies that aim at enhancing demand and user-driven innovation should or will 
be13, we share the view that a deep and often novel understanding of complex 
and changing customer needs is a necessity for any potential hGEF.14 For in-
ternational market leadership, the hGEF will frequently need to redefine fun-
damentally existing customer relationships as the status quo is challenged. 
the transaction costs of engaging globally distributed customers in the crea-
tion of new and better goods and services can be prohibitively high for inter-
nationally-oriented hGEFs, especially if they come from a geographically and 
culturally isolated economy.15
Innovative individuals and communities
new hGEFs cannot be created without the pivotal role of exceptional, entre-
preneurial individuals. in the Government’s communication on nis it is con-
cluded (p.19) that “individuals and innovative communities play a key role in 
innovation processes. innovation capabilities and incentives for individuals 
and entrepreneurs are critical success factors in the future”.
Entrepreneurs are a critical ‘catalyst’ for change and improvement in 
competitive and meritocratic markets (audretsch & keilbach, 2004). a glo-
bally competitive economy has to nurture and encourage entry into entrepre-
neurial occupations both at the level of individuals and wider communities. 
new ventures typically start with a big idea and few resources. should an ex-
ceptional growth opportunity emerge, the owner managers of such ventures 
have to be able very quickly to identify and access the additional resources 
necessary for rapid growth. as is well-known, it is the heterogeneous eco-
nomic, social and cultural milieu (i.e., clusters of entrepreneurs, business an-
gels, venture capitalists, experienced managers, flexible labour markets, high 
quality advisers, competitive exit markets etc.) supporting the entrepreneur-
ial process that has made silicon Valley a global powerhouse of innovation 
(Gill et al., 2000; kenney & von Burg, 1999; saxenian, 1994; us senate, 1999). 
while the technological and entrepreneurial powerhouse of california is not 
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inputs and infrastructure needed for the creation of innovation-driven and 
internationally oriented hGEFs will be radically different in Finland.
Systemic approach
scattered policy measures and piecemeal reforms are invariably ineffective. 
this  is  recognized  in  the  Government’s  communication  on  nis  where  it 
concludes (p.20) that: “the exploitation of the results of innovation activities 
[also] requires broad-based development activities enhancing structural re-
newal and determined management of change”.
in our view, a systemic approach to the creation and growth of hGEFs 
can be interpreted to mean at least three things. First, the active development 
of both markets and the ancillary private sector institutions that each supports 
the identification of and experimentation with novel ideas via new market en-
try. second, the design of public policies (taxation, regulation, education etc.) 
that specifically recognize and promote an entrepreneurial culture including 
appropriate incentives for informed risk-taking and growth; and the develop-
ment of a public support system that explicitly recognizes the special needs of 
hGEFs and their entrepreneurs. and, finally, effective market-focused coor-
dination and collaboration between the private and public sectors that enable 
the profit seeking vigour of commercial agents to be harnessed via mutually 
beneficial contracts that also meet public policy objectives.
5.2.3.  oVErViEw oF thE ‘EnaBlinG’ EnVironMEnt
the purpose of this section is to give a brief descriptive overview of the eco-
nomic, institutional and cultural contexts in which the creation of hGEFs is 
embedded.
Business demographics: New entry and HGEFs
the volume and quality of entrepreneurship/new entry are elusive concepts 
that are hard to measure reliably and comprehensively. Entrepreneurial qual-
ity ex ante is particularly problematic to identify. the following numbers com-
plement the earlier findings (see, e.g., autio, 2009; stenholm et al., 2009) and 
help set the stage for our analysis:
–	 according to statistics Finland, the number of new enterprises entering 
  the economy has grown since 2001 and has on average been around 32,000   
  per year in 2004–2007.16 Based on a special survey targeted to these enter-
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  in 2005, about 60% of the recorded enterprises are truly new ventures. that   
  is, these ventures are owned and run by an entrepreneur or a team of en- 
  trepreneurs that are or about to become active in their business. these   
  firms have not been founded in order to e.g. manage assets passively (e.g.   
  forests etc.). using this estimate, the volume of relevant new entry has in   
  the recent years been roughly 19,000 new ventures per year.
–	 Each year, about 0.6–0.7% of the Finnish business sector employees leave 
  their jobs to become entrepreneurs (hyytinen & Maliranta, 2008).17 this 
  share has been relatively stable over time with about 7,000–8,500 business   
  sector employees moving into entrepreneurship annually in the recent   
  past. about half (54%) of these transitions come from small firms with less   
  than 9 employees. transitions from work to entrepreneurship are in Fin- 
  land about as common as they are in other comparable countries (sten- 
  holm et al., 2009).
–	 using comprehensive data from the Business register of statistics Finland 
  and Finnish linked Employer-Employer data (FlEEd) covering the years   
  from 1996 to 2003, rantala (2006) documents that new Finnish firms are   
  very small on average. the median new firm has only 0.5 employees and   
  the arithmetic mean is 1.2 employees. he also documents that, based on the   
  standard oEcd classification, 19.0% of the new firms are in knowledge-in- 
  tensive business sectors while 2.5% of new firms are in the high-tech/me- 
  dium high-tech manufacturing industries. spin-offs from larger firms (as   
  defined in this study) account for less than 1% of new entry.18
–	 in an international comparison (stenholm et al., 2009), the early stage en-
  trepreneurial activity of Finns was historically quite moderate but seems   
  to have increased lately.19 in particular, about 5–7% of the adult population 
  has annually been involved in starting up a business (either as a nascent   
  entrepreneur or a new business owner) over the period 2000–2008. this   
  percentage has been increasing slightly during the past few years and in   
  2008, this share for Finland was 7.3%. the corresponding European and   
  nordic averages are 6.0% and 7.6%, re-spectively (ibid., p. 27 and 31). op- 
  portunity for ‘income increase’ is a primary entrepreneurial motive for   
  about 26% of the sampled individuals in Finland (ibid. p. 41). the GEM- 
  data suggest that this share is low in the nordic context but close to the   
  European average.
–	 the new global entrepreneurship index (GEindEX) constructed by acs 
  and szerb (2009) measures the quality and quantity of national economies’   
  business formation process. this index ranks Finland the 13th out of the 64   
  studied countries (denmark is the 1st and sweden the 2nd, followed by   
  new Zealand and united states). Based on a nordic comparison using   
  this index and its components, autio (2009) argues that “Finland lags be- 
  hind the trend line and its most comparable peers in terms of the quality   
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  ited by its entrepreneurial ventures.” somewhat surprisingly, he also finds   
  that “in terms of entrepreneurial attitudes, Finns rank well above the inter- 
  national  trend  line”,  allowing  him  to  conclude  that  “[…]  the  problem   
  seems to be in converting positive attitudes into high-quality action.”
–	 Generally, the Finnish university system has not been a systematic source 
  of  internationally-oriented  hGEFs.  kankaala,  kutinlahti  and  törmälä   
  (2007) report, for example, that between 2000 and 2005, the Finnish univer- 
  sities created on average 3–4 new research-based spin-out firms per year.   
  one should not, however, read too much into this estimate, because it is   
  based on very noisy data and scattered sources (like all the other available   
  indicators of this activity).20
Measuring the volume of hGEFs is not as difficult as measuring quality 
but nevertheless is often controversial.21 a distribution of Finnish firms’ real-
ized growth rates shows that, as in most other countries, there is a clear peak 
(cluster) around zero, i.e. most firms neither grow nor shrink (see, e.g., ran-
tala 2006, p. 66). this is a robust and common finding, as is the finding that 
there is also a mass of observations located in the extreme left and right tails 
of the distribution. this means that some of these ‘outlier’ firms will shrink 
and others will grow dramatically. it is this small number of positive outliers 
with exceptional growth potential that are the focus of much of innovation 
and enterprise policy.22
some stylized facts about the growth of Finnish small businesses after 
the national economic crisis of the early 1990s are as follows:
–	 Based on the Business register of statistics Finland and Finnish linked 
  Employer-Employer data (FlEEd) covering years from 1996 to 2003, ran- 
  tala (2006, table 7) estimates that close to 15 per cent of the surviving new   
  firms grew on average >20% per annum over the seven year period. he   
  also shows that the variance of growth rates across firms is highest during   
  the first years after entry but stabilized at a lower level thereafter.
–	 it can also be computed from the Business register of statistics Finland 
  that the share of sMEs with the average annual growth rate of employ- 
  ment of more than 20% in 2004–7 is 24%.23,24 among the sMEs that had 
  over 10 employees at the beginning of the measurement period, the abso- 
  lute number and relative share of high-growth sMEs (i.e. those sMEs with   
  a three-year average annual growth rate of domestic employment above   
  20%) are 810 and 6.1% in 2004–2007 and 564 and 4.3% in 2001–2004, respec- 
  tively.25
–	 Based on the special survey targeted at the recorded enterprise openings, 
  pajarinen,  rouvinen  and  Ylä-anttila  (2006)  estimate  that  in  2005  only   
  about 2% of these new entrants expect that their employment will grow over 
  20% per annum over the next three years thereby resulting in a total number   
  of employees of 20 or more. when calculated as an average over 2003–2008,   
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  the bi-annual survey of the Federation of Finnish Enterprises and the Min- 
  istry of Employment and the Economy.
–	 the GEM numbers reported in stenholm et al. (2009, p. 70) show that be-
  tween 2002–2008, about 12% of Finnish early stage entrepreneurs have   
  been growth-oriented, i.e. they have expected that their business would   
  grow during the next five years to more than 10 employees, representing   
  at least 50% increase in the number of employees. on average, this share   
  is 16.1% and 16.0% for the nordic and European countries, respectively.   
  the GEM numbers also show that over the same period, 4% of the estab- 
  lished  business  owners  in  Finland  expect  “high  growth”  (as  defined   
  above). on average, this share is 4.0% and 4.6% for the nordic and Euro- 
  pean countries, respectively.
–	 the GEM numbers reported in stenholm et al. (2009, p. 74–75) also show 
  that when compared to other nordic or European countries, Finnish early   
  stage entrepreneurs rarely believe that their business is based on the latest   
  technology.
–	 in oEcd (2008b), it is reported that 11.0% of Finnish service companies 
  and 7.0% of Finnish manufacturing companies were high growth enter- 
  prises, using a criterion based on the growth of turnover in 2005 (Finland   
  is the 5th out of the 14 included countries).26 if the growth of employment 
  is used as the criterion, these shares are 3.5% for the service and 1.5% for   
  the manufacturing sectors (Finland is the 13th out of the 17 included coun- 
  tries). using a stricter definition for the growth of employment (but the   
  same time period),27 Finland had 0.8% fast growing firms (‘gazelles’) in the 
  service and 0.4% in the manufacturing sectors (Finland is the 5th out of the   
  17 included countries). the corresponding shares are 1.8% for the service   
  sectors and 1.0% for the manufacturing sectors, if the turnover criterion is   
  used.
in summary, despite the evidence being a bit mixed, new experimental 
market entry is a relatively rare event when compared to Finland’s commitment 
to and investments in higher education, R&D and innovation activity. Importantly, 
experienced business sector employees appear particularly loath to start new firms. 
Entrants are typically small and, conditional on market entry, the expecta-
tions and realizations of (international) growth by the great majority of Finn-
ish early stage entrepreneurs are moderate if not negligible. the same ap-
plies to those already trading in the market. while we acknowledge that there 
some signs of increased entrepreneurial activity, hGEFs remain a surprising-
ly small proportion of both new entrants and the stock of extant companies. 
compared to the number and quality of hGEFs created by the us economy 
and other leading knowledge-driven economies (audretsch, 2002; Bartels-
man et al., 2008), Finnish firms appear invariably ‘modest’ in their ambitions 
and achievements.Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  159 
Public support and provision of risk capital
a number of reports in recent years have discussed the development of the 
Finnish venture capital market and describe the public support for and provi-
sion of risk capital in Finland (see, e.g., Maula & Murray, 2003; Maula et al., 
2007, and the references therein).28 to avoid repetition, we only provide in this 
chapter a brief and selective account. the key organizations and their existing 
services for hGEFs are summarized in table 5.1. as the table shows, there 
are a large number of public agencies presently involved in the provision of 
funding and services for entrepreneurs and growth companies. there are also 
many ongoing and planned developments in the Finnish public service in-
cluding risk capital provision. these new initiatives are discussed next.
table 5.1 is by no means comprehensive, as it only lists some of the 
existing activities of the public support system that are potentially relevant 
to hGEFs.29 we acknowledge that growth entrepreneurship has received in-
creasing policy attention in Finland in recent years via the nis and several 
government programs. the recent Government’s communication on Finland’s 
national innovation strategy to the parliament (2009) states that:
“Business development services and incubators will particularly target those 
companies which strive to generate rapid growth. the service system for growth 
companies will be developed as a whole, so that the roles and offerings of public 
operators form a clear entity.
By means of taxation, experienced capital investors and business experts will 
be motivated to commit themselves to the development of enterprises aiming at 
rapid growth and internationalization.
company taxation and insolvency legislation will be developed so as to encour-
age small innovative businesses to generate growth and take risks, and to create 
prospects for serial entrepreneurship.
new forms of operation will be established to encourage international venture 
capital and expertise to find its way to Finland.”160  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
Table 5.1.  Selected  public  organizations  providing  risk  capital  and  services  for  HGEFs 
(Spring 2009)
2 ·  
Taulukko 1.1.  
Finnvera plc (“financing solutions for enterprises”) is a specialised financing company, which provides its clients with 
loans, guarantees, venture capital investments and export credit guarantees. Finnvera has official Export Credit 
Agency (ECA) status. www.finnvera.fi/eng 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Funding from the Ministry of 
Employment and the Econ-
omy (MEE). Supervised by 
the Corporate Steering Unit 
of the MEE. 
In 2007, funded total 8000 
projects (896.9 million euro 
and 39% share of the total 
funding of the projects of 2.3 
billion). Total 28 000 cus-
tomers. Funded 3467 start-
ing companies and 1481 
growth companies with 10% 
average 3-year growth ex-
pectations (410.6 million).  
– Venture capital fund investments: Veraventure 
Ltd makes capital investments in regional funds 
organised as limited companies. The fund is a 
subsidiary of Finnvera plc. On the behalf of its 
parent company, Veraventure Ltd is in charge of 
managing and developing the investment activi-
ties of regional funds. 
– Direct seed capital investments: Seed Fund 
Vera Ltd, founded in Fall 2005, makes capital in-
vestments in innovative enterprises at their early 
stages. The fund is a subsidiary of Finnvera plc. 
Veraventure Ltd is responsible for its manage-
ment and practical activities. The fund makes mi-
nority equity investments in the target enter-
prises. Normally, the fund`s share of ownership in 
the enterprise is 15–40%. In addition to equity fi-
nancing, other possible investment instruments 
are convertible bonds, bonds with equity war-
rants and capital loans. The maximum invest-
ment in an enterprise is 500 000 euro. The initial 
investment is usually 100 000–250 000. Invested 
14.2 million in 59 companies in 2007. 
– Loan products for growth companies. 
 
Finnish Industry Investment Ltd, (“government-owned capital investor”) is a government-owned investment com-
pany, which invests in venture capital funds and directly in growth companies, together with private co-investors. 
http://www.teollisuussijoitus.fi/in_english/ 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Funded based on proceeds 
from privatizations and capi-
talization by MEE. Super-
vised by the Corporate 
Steering Unit of MEE. 
The investments amount to 
over 570 million euro. Staff 
22. New investments in 
2007 167.6 million of which 
144.5 in 13 funds and 23.1 
million in six companies. 
Additionally, Start fund 1Ky 
invested 12.7 million in 60 
companies. 
– Venture capital and private equity fund in-
vestments. Finnish Industry Investment Ltd has 
made investment commitments to altogether 87 
funds: to its subsidiary Start Fund I Ky and to 86 
private funds. The total investment capital of 
these funds amounted to 7.5 billion. The funds 
are administered by 34 management companies 
– Venture capital fund investments through a 
fund of funds: Kasvurahastojen Rahasto Ky is a 
common fund established by government-
owned investment company Finnish Industry In-
vestment Ltd and Finnish employment pension 
companies. Kasvurahastojen Rahasto Ky invests 
in funds that invest in growth companies. 
– Direct venture capital and private equity in-
vestments: Finnish Industry Investment Ltd in-
vests in all sectors with the following model (1) 
co-invests with private investors (funds, private 
individuals and pension institutes) nationally and 
internationally; (2) invests at most one-half of the 
capital and ownership, and (3) invests especially 
in projects that would not receive sufficient pri-
vate capital without Finnish Industry Investment. 
 
 
 Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  161    HeadingF · 3 
Finpro (“business solutions worldwide”) is an association founded by Finnish companies to help Finnish companies ac-
cess to high quality, comprehensive internationalization services around the world. http://www.finpro.fi/en-
US/Finpro/default.htm 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
An association partly fi-
nanced from public funds 
and partly from client invoic-
ing and membership fees. 
Supervised by the Innova-
tion Department of MEE. 
In 2007, Finpro had 2 024 
billable clients, 851 repeat 
clients, 72 growth compa-
nies. Finpro ry employed 322 
people in 2006. Finpro has 
50 Trade Centers abroad and 
8 offices in Finland. 
– Internationalization support such as consulting 
work done with the client companies both in 
Finland and in the Trade Center network, in both 
of which Finpro has specialist in those industry 
segments, which are important for Finland. The 
Trade Centers are staffed both with Finnish and 
local personnel to ensure the efficiency and ex-
pertise in matching Finnish interest with local 
business society and practices. Finpro partners 
with other innovation players in Growth Com-
pany Service having its offices in the main 
growth centers in Finland. The consulting ser-
vices are matched with the life cycle of growth 
companies – from business concept and market 
selections to partner search and business con-
cept implementation in the targeted countries. 
– Active role in Finnish Innovation Center pro-
gram (FinNodes) in collaboration with Tekes 
and other agencies. 
 
Sitra, the Finnish Innovation Fund (“in the interest of Finland and the Finns”) is an independent public fund which 
under the supervision of the Finnish Parliament promotes the welfare of Finnish society. http://www.sitra.fi/en/ 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Funded from an endow-
ment. Supervised by the 
Finnish parliament.  
Endowment size in the end 
of 2007 821 million euro. 
Personnel in the end of 2007 
was 100 employees. 
– Direct venture capital investments in Sitra’s 
programme areas. In the first phase, investments 
will be mainly made in the Health Care Pro-
gramme, the Food and Nutrition Programme and 
the Environmental Programme. The venture-
capital investments by these programmes are 
carried out in co-operation between the invest-
ment directors of the programmes and Sitra Ven-
tures. The aim of the market-based investments 
is to create and develop competitive and profit-
able businesses. Current portfolio, largely from 
previous activities, comprises approximately 60 
enterprises, with an overall investment of ap-
proximately 126 million euro. 
– Venture capital fund investments focused on 
Sitra’s programme areas. Based on prior activi-
ties, Sitra has a wide network of international 
funds with which it co-operates, and has invested 
in more than 20 VC funds. The funds are concen-
trated in early-stage technology enterprises in 
Europe and the USA. Investments in international 
funds to provide information and knowledge 
about Finnish opportunities in the world. 
Through its international contacts Sitra seeks to 
be able to evaluate development trends in tech-
nology and establish business and funding con-
tacts to help Finnish companies to expand to in-
ternational markets. In addition to the Europe 
and the USA, a network of contacts has been 
built up with Northwest Russia, one of the aims 
of which is to develop new forms of co-
operation. Has also invested in 15 Finnish VC 
funds. 
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The Foundation for Finnish Inventions (“from creativity to business”) provides advice, evaluations and funding for 
the development and exploitation of invention of the inventions of private persons and small enterprises. 
http://www.keksintosaatio.fi/ 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Private organization mainly 
funded through a grant from 
MEE. Supervised by the In-
novation Department of 
MEE. 
Budget 2007 6.6 million 
euro, of which 2.5 million 
was grants to inventors. Re-
ceived 967 applications of 
which it funded 267. 
– Commercialization services such as advice, the 
evaluation of inventions, the related funding for 
their protection, product development and mar-
keting and the promotion of their commercial 
exploitation. The Foundation provides unsecured 
risk funding in the form of grants and support 
funding. The services are free of charge. 
TE Centres (Employment and Economic Development Centres) – “regional partner for SMEs”) provide their customers 
with the expertise and regional services of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry and the Ministry of the Interior. Customers also have access to the services provided by Tekes, the Fin-
nish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation http://www.te-keskus.fi/ 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Funding from MEE. Super-
vised by the Corporate 
Steering Unit of MEE.  
There are fifteen TE Centres 
in Finland. The personnel is 
about 1800. 
– Advice and small grants for startups. Technol-
ogy departments (or “innovations and internali-
sation”) activate enterprises (mainly SMEs) to 
R&D, to promote start ups and growth compa-
nies, to promote regional knowledge based 
competencies and to give services regarding pri-
vate persons’ inventions in a co-operation with 
the Foundation of Finnish Inventions. “Innova-
tions and internalisation area” of a TE Centre 
forms also the regional network of Tekes (the re-
gional personnel, about 80 people altogether, 
belongs both to Tekes and TE Centre organiza-
tions). Of the annual more than 2000 R&D-
projects of private enterprises and universities 
funded by Tekes, about 40% analysed by the re-
gional TE Centre’s technology advisers, especially 
focusing to the projects of SMEs. The financing 
decisions are made by Tekes – only small deci-
sions (under 15 000 euro) targeted at pre-phases 
of larger projects are made by TE Centre´s tech-
nology departments. 
Tekes, Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (“technology delivering results” funds innovative re-
search and development projects in companies, universities and research institutes and seeks to be a gateway to the 
best technology partners in Finland. http://www.tekes.fi/eng/ 
Funding and reporting  Size and volume  Offerings for HGEFs 
Funding from MEE. Super-
vised by the Innovation De-
partment of MEE. 
In 2008, Tekes invested 516 
million euro in R&D projects 
by companies, universities 
and research institutes. Of 
this funding, 78 million went 
to small companies (379 pro-
jects) and 75 million to micro 
companies (543 projects). 
– Direct funding for young innovative enter-
prises (NIY) in collaboration with Seed Fund Vera 
Ltd is a new financing instrument with an objec-
tive to increase the number and to accelerate the 
development of enterprises which are willing to 
grow fast and to become international. Funding 
granted in phases with maximum 1million euro 
per enterprise (in areas eligible for regional aid 
the maximum is 1.25 million). The support can be 
in a form of a grant, loan or risk capital up to 75% 
of the eligible costs. The funding may include a 
pre-phase for preparing a business plan. The pro-
ject may include (almost) all the costs which con-
tribute to the achievement of the business goals 
such as personnel costs, travel costs, materials 
and equipment, external services. Funding allo-
cated with the help of an external advisory panel 
consisting of VCs and other experts. 
– R&D grants and loans for growth companies. 
– Funding for opportunity evaluation studies 
through TULI programme administered by uni-
versity innovation centres. 
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in  line  with  these  policy  goals,  several  new  initiatives  have  been 
launched recently in order to develop those public services targeted at growth 
entrepreneurs and hGEFs. these initiatives include but are not limited to:
–	 division for growth ventures: this new unit30 was established within the 
  innovation department of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy   
  at the beginning of 2008. it has been assigned an overall responsibility for   
  structuring, developing and implementing growth business policy as part   
  of the more comprehensive innovation and industrial policy. it should   
  however be emphasized that although this unit has the responsibility for   
  activities related to growth ventures, the actual governance of the various   
  agencies which provide funding and services for hGEFs is still distributed   
  across the different departments of the Ministry (as shown in table 5.1).   
  this absence of financial resources invariably reduces the authority of this   
  division.
–	 new role for the Foundation for Finnish inventions: From the beginning 
  of 2009, the Foundation for Finnish inventions (FFi) has been given an ex- 
  plicit role in the pre-incubation phase of the commercialization of univer- 
  sity inventions. to this end, FFi has been given €3 million additional fund- 
  ing from the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 2009.
–	 new fund-of-funds launched by Finnish industry investment: Finnish in-
  dustry investment established a €135 million fund-of-funds for Vc firms   
  in collaboration with several institutional investors at the end of 2008. the   
  size of the fund-of-funds is Eur 135 million with 40% deriving from pub- 
  lic sources and 60% from private sources. the stated aim of this facility is   
  to enable new venture capital funds to be founded without the need to   
  build de novo investor syndicates in each case.
–	 Business accelerators: the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, to-
  gether with tekes and Veraventure, is preparing a program of private in- 
  vestor driven business accelerators, i.e., a new type of incubator that focus- 
  es on hGEFs with global potential.31 in april 2009, 43 applications were 
  made by potential accelerator teams in a call opened by tekes as the coor- 
  dinator of the program. the aim of the program is to select and establish   
  3–5 new business accelerators. tekes and seed Fund Vera have plans to   
  invest €45 million in this program over the next three years and will direct   
  this funding to the client companies of the accelerators.
–	 international innovation partnerships: the Ministry of Employment and 
  the Economy is also considering launching new international innovation   
  partnerships. the stated objective of this initiative is to engage several   
  highly regarded, international innovation partners in order to help strength - 
  en the competencies of Finnish universities and research institutions to   
  commercialize their research outputs globally. again, another stated objec- 
  tive of this initiative is that it will provide additional support for interna- 
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–	 Growth company service and EnterpriseFinland: the agencies providing 
  public support to growth entrepreneurs and hGEFs have also recently   
  tried  to  improve  the  coordination  of  their  services.  Growth  company   
  service initiative, originally established in 2003, aims to improve collabora- 
  tion  between  the  involved  agencies  (Finnvera,  Finpro,  tE centres  and   
  tekes). however, its actions have not yet resulted in an integrated service   
  offering. as a part of the broader development program of the Enterprise- 
  Finland service (targeted at various firm segments, including growth com- 
  panies), there are plans to develop the Growth company service into a   
  more customer-oriented and integrated offering.32 there is also an ongoing 
  plan to increase the effectiveness of public service provision by segmenting   
  systematically the potential and existing customer firms of the public agen- 
  cies under the supervision of the Ministry of Employment and the Econo- 
  my.
–	 policy initiatives to increase the supply of risk capital: intentions to re-
  move various regulatory/tax related obstacles for the provision of risk cap- 
  ital have been mentioned in government programs since 2003. opportuni- 
  ties for cross-border fundraising were improved in 2006, although some ac- 
  knowledged problems remain. other on-going policy developments in- 
  clude assessment and removal of the remaining obstacles for cross-border   
  venture capital investments; introduction of tax incentives for business an- 
  gels; augmentation of the Finnish mutual fund legislation with special   
  clauses for venture capital investing; and an assessment of the opportuni- 
  ties of charitable foundations to invest in venture capital funds.
–	 tax initiatives for r&d: in early summer 2009, it was announced that a 
  new scheme for r&d tax credits will be introduced in order to enhance   
  r&d and innovation activity. at the time of this writing, the precise design   
  of the scheme is not known.33
–	 Entrepreneurial culture and education: the Ministry of Employment and 
  the Economy and the Ministry of Education have a number of plans to   
  increase their collaboration and to strengthen areas of joint interest, e.g.,   
  university based entrepreneurship and related research and teaching.34
this list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it shows that there are nu-
merous ongoing and planned policy initiatives that, if and when implemented 
fully, will shape in the future how the Finnish innovation system will support 
the creation of hGEFs.35 the list also shows how much of a rapidly moving 
target the Finnish innovation system is from the evaluators’ viewpoint. these 
enhanced objectives also raise additional issues of complexity and communi-
cation both for the producers and the consumers of the policy process.Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  165 
5.3.  analYsis and EValuation
Entrepreneurial activity can be defined by three related and inter-dependent 
activities: the identification of new economic opportunities; the evaluation of 
the opportunities so identified; and their subsequent exploitation in order to 
realize additional value from the production of new or improved products 
and services (shane & Venkataraman, 2000). in an effective entrepreneurial 
economy, a high level supply of innovations and new ideas (and thus entre-
preneurial opportunities) is roughly in balance with a developed demand for 
opportunities by (potential) entrepreneurs with sufficient skills and experi-
ence to organize the necessary resources to create and grow a new business.36 
this means that there needs to exist contemporaneously the opportunity (un-
realized demand), the resources (underused assets of labour and capital) and 
the capacity (human capital exemplified by entrepreneurial experience and 
expertise) to generate a steady flow of new entry. the simultaneous absence 
of supply and demands side resources can result in a ‘thin market’ for entre-
preneurial opportunity (nightingale et al., 2009).
taking the supply side largely as given37, the purpose of this section is 
to discuss and identify some of the challenges that individuals face in identi-
fying and pursuing entrepreneurial opportunities. we include the challenges 
present in making entrepreneurship a preferred career choice. we also note 
the difficulties that incumbent entrepreneurs and existing firms face in iden-
tifying and pursuing corporate growth opportunities after entry. specifical-
ly, we focus on four sets of potential hurdles or limitations: entrepreneurial 
and growth incentives; availability of risk capital; resources for international 
growth; and the more abstract question of the degree of entrepreneurial cul-
ture in Finland.
5.3.1.  EntrEprEnEurial and Growth incEntiVEs
this section splits the development of an enterprise into entry and growth 
phases. we adopt this staged viewpoint not because we believe that staging 
entry and growth is the best way to think about the creation and growth of 
firms but rather, because thinking in terms of separate ‘silos’ of entry and 
growth seems to reflect the current policy approach. this separation is prob-
lematic for a number of reasons including the noted fact that it is not possible 
to determine ex ante which small minority of firms in a population of start-
ups will subsequently become the future resource-demanding hGEFs.38 this 
separation of the sources of early stage growth finance by individual program 
often increases the administrative burden and transaction costs on the appli-
cant firm (cowling, 2009; sharpe et al., 2009)166  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
To start or not to start a (growth-oriented) business?
why do people – and particularly those with high education and/or business 
experience – become entrepreneurs in Finland? and from where exactly do 
new Finnish entrepreneurs come? does it pay for an experienced manager, 
a business sector employee with high human and social capital or a skilled 
researcher to leave his or her job for the uncertainties of an entrepreneurial 
career? we ask these questions to emphasize that our evaluation mandate is 
not to consider how an ordinary (‘randomly chosen’) Finnish man or woman 
can be encouraged to become self-employed. rather, it is the entrepreneurial 
attitudes and behaviour of a small cohort of exceptionally talented and ex-
perienced individuals that is a critical input to a process that may eventually 
lead to the creation of a hGEF.
people become entrepreneurs for a range of pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary reasons. the former refers to expected earnings, dividend income and 
capital gains, while the latter to a mixture of non-monetary benefits that may 
be derived from being an entrepreneur. these can include greater autonomy, 
independence, job satisfaction, more flexible working hours, social status, 
etc.
there exists a latent supply of individuals who are able and prepared to 
make changes in future career directions. some of these persons are sufficient-
ly risk-tolerant to consider founding a growth-oriented firm. an even smaller 
share of such scarce persons has the commitment and social capital to attract 
and build a competent start-up team around them. they must also have the 
technical experience and human capital to establish and run a knowledge-
based hGEF. if viewed as potential entrepreneurs, these rare individuals may 
be characterized as:
–	 forward-looking and likely to make the decision to start (or not to start) a 
  business by explicitly weighting the costs against the expected benefits.   
  they are rational and instrumental in their actions. they do not typically   
  start a business by accident or without deliberation;
–	 having a high opportunity cost of entering entrepreneurship.39 they have 
  the ready option to be employed and work in a well-paid job in the private   
  or public sector;40
–	 understanding the risks (to their personal wealth, career, reputation etc.) 
  that they will have to bear and the effort that they will have to commit (i.e.,   
  hard work, stress and long working days) in order to create and build such   
  a new firm.
if this profile is accurate, the picture that emerges is that such an indi-
vidual may be strongly (but not exclusively) motivated by pecuniary rewards. 
they will be incentivized by the prospect of creating substantial wealth for 
themselves but will also appreciate the opportunity cost of such actions. Even 
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can rarely influence directly the non-pecuniary benefits that entrepreneur-
ship may generate. it is, for example, difficult to imagine how policy could 
influence the degree of autonomy or job satisfaction that a firm creates for its 
manager-founder.41
as a general rule, an incentive system should reward targeted individ-
uals for making good choices and decisions but it should not provide (overly 
generous) protection against the consequences of bad choices and decisions. 
Entrepreneurial incentives, as we understand and use the term, seek to in-
crease the pecuniary rewards to entrepreneurs who have started to build a 
successful enterprise. these ‘upside incentives’ consist largely of the share a 
potential entrepreneur can expect to claim of the added value that he or she 
creates in the future by starting a business today. the state through its taxa-
tion system has the power to determine in significant part the level of financial 
rewards that the entrepreneur receives (and the state relinquishes) from his or 
her successful endeavours.
as far as we can determine (and as we argue this issue in greater detail 
in sub-section 5.4.2 below), the Finnish innovation system, including the rel-
evant aspects of the tax system, provides no specific or tailored upside incentives 
to individuals to encourage them to choose an entrepreneurial career over the 
(safer and more secure) option of paid employment. interestingly, the survey 
conducted by Etla in connection with this evaluation shows that small and 
young innovative firms think that reducing company and capital taxation is 
much more important for them than, for example, the availability of risk capi-
tal or guidance and information provided by the public sector (see appendix, 
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). a clear majority of these small innovative firms also 
are more convinced (than larger innovative or other firms) that the emergence 
of new growth companies could be facilitated by providing them with tax 
incentives on their future earnings and capital gains (see appendix, Figure 
5.5). the absence of explicit upside economic incentives can be seen as a ma-
jor weakness of a public innovation system that seeks to increase the number 
and growth of hGEFs. a less conducive and incentivized environment may, 
in particular, result in a mismatch between the supply of entrepreneurial op-
portunities and the demand for them by individuals with high human and 
social capital.
Entrepreneurial incentives may also be enhanced by decreasing the 
cost burdens of starting and growing a young enterprise. in particular, fur-
ther incentives can be designed by reducing the incidence (risk) and costs of 
failure to individuals. while the costs of failure are important and can be both 
of a pecuniary (e.g. loss of personal wealth) and non-pecuniary (e.g. stigma 
of failure) kind, it is unclear to us whether the Finnish system (labour market 
policies and institutions, bankruptcy procedures etc.) is exceptionally harsh 
in how it treats failing entrepreneurs.42 nor are we convinced that a major 
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decision of talented and well-educated Finns whether or not to become an 
entrepreneur. this does not mean, of course, that there may not be scope for 
improvement at the margin.
To grow or not to grow?
it is unlikely that firm owners that have experienced high growth will sub-
sequently decide unilaterally to deselect themselves from this activity. there 
may, of course, be some entrepreneurs who elect to go for a quieter life style 
over time. however, such firms are perhaps less likely to position themselves 
directly in the way of major growth opportunities. if this surmise is correct, 
the question is not how we (continue to) incentive owner managers but, rath-
er, how do we ensure that Finnish hGEFs remain in attractive market envi-
ronments of sufficiently competitiveness and scale that will allow them real 
opportunities for exceptional growth and economic gain. this redirects the 
policy focus to questions identifying the nature of the ‘enabling environment’ 
for continued and significant growth. although still important, entrepreneur-
level incentives are largely replaced by a concern with the removal of barri-
ers that impede the desired actions of potential hGEFs. resources specific to 
hGEFs’ changing needs will still need to be put in place. Most particularly, the 
management of exceptional growth firms requires access to an extremely chal-
lenging and demanding set of competencies. Most first time, owner-managers 
of hGEFs will likely not have sufficient skill sets (at least in a fully developed 
and tested form), and will necessarily need to have access to human capital 
and further levels of professional advice consistent with the growth needs 
of the enterprise. it is in the providing of highly informed and experience-
proven human capital across multiple but related areas of corporate need that 
the deeply integrated professional and social networks of a silicon Valley or 
a Greater Boston have proved to be so exceptional at creating a world class 
competitive advantage (Gill et al., 2000).
this viewpoint emphasizes the importance of well-functioning (factor) 
market for human capital, be it the labour market for scientists, marketing or 
export professionals; the market for business services; or the market for expe-
rienced board members to oversee the growth process. the questions to ask 
then become: from where can business talent and experience of the highest 
level be acquired in Finland? does it pay an experienced manager or an em-
ployee with high human and social capital to leave his or her job in a relatively 
established firm for a career in a small but high growth entrepreneurial firm? 
why would a skilled researcher, enjoying the benefits and security of employ-
ment in a large organization elect to join a high-risk hGEF?43 similarly, how 
expensive it is for a hGEF to identify and recruit highly skilled employees 
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For Finland, the enabling environment must provide sufficient demand 
and the necessary quantity and quality of factor inputs to ensure that Finnish 
born companies can exploit material opportunities wherever they occur. this 
suggests in a globalizing and increasingly borderless world that Finland as-
sumes a role more akin to the headquarters of a multinational corporation. it 
also suggests that nokia’s metamorphosis from a Finnish to world business 
is a useful example to consider when national entrepreneurial policies are 
designed. over time, any highly successful Finnish hGEF is likely to be mark-
edly less Finnish and increasingly global in its activities, its locations and its 
priorities.
5.3.2.  aVailaBilitY oF capital and rEsourcEs For Growth
an important ingredient for the creation of hGEFs is the sufficient availa-
bility of risk capital as well as the complementary information and support 
from active and competent investors and advisors. however, there is ample 
international evidence (Bank of England, 2001) that the majority of profes-
sional equity investors, including both limited and general partners, do not 
wish to invest at the earliest and most risky stages of a young firm’s life-cy-
cle (avnimelech & teubal, 2006; Miller & Friesen, 1984). when considering 
the situation in Finland, it becomes quite obvious that relative to Finland’s 
considerable investments in higher education, r&d and innovative activities, 
the volume of risk capital targeted to the commercialization of the outputs of 
r&d appears negligible (although not entirely absent). Figure 5.1 illustrates 
this mismatch. it shows the relative volume of venture capital (Vc) invest-
ments in companies in Finland and other countries and regions (Vc per Gdp) 
in comparison to r&d expenditure per Gdp in the same regions. this com-
parison shows that, relative to its investments in r&d (exploration), Finland 
invests disproportionately less in the commercialization of the results of the 
r&d investments (exploitation).44 we have already noted that an economy’s 
ability to exploit intellectual property is an issue of fundamental importance 
(see Bhide 2009 in endnote 2).
however, the relative amount of capital available does not give the full 
picture of the supply of capital. First, there are only a handful of active private 
venture capital investors which will even consider investing in firms that are 
in their earliest development stages. a very large share of the early stage ven-
ture capital has come from public sources in Finland during the recent years.45 
second, the funding has been divided in small chunks for a large number of 
companies with limited opportunities to engage in hands-on value adding 
roles. From scholarly research it is well known, that a viable Vc fund should 
usually have a minimum size of approximately €50 million46 (nightingale et 
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grounds (Zarutskie, 2008). third, some level of competition between several 
Vc providers is important in order to have a market that is attractive for aspir-
ing entrepreneurs. Fourth, cross-border venture capital and public programs 
also require competent and internationally experienced, private Vcs (Mäkelä 
& Maula, 2008). against this background, a perceived problem in the Finnish 
environment has been the very small number of active Vc funds with fund 
size above €50 million which have been willing to make a-round investments 
(see e.g. Maula et al., 2007). limited availability of competitive early stage 
venture capitalists reduces the attractiveness of the environment for potential 
growth entrepreneurs. it also can be argued that the allegedly alternative sup-
ply of angel finance (Mason & harrison, 2003) in Finland is rather limited, or 
at the very least not easily tapped by the large majority of potential entrepre-
neurs including those with high education and business experience.
the public supply of seed and early-stage funding is not negligible, 
especially if the recent initiatives are taken into account. as noted, the Finn-
ish government, like several other countries, has assumed a significant role in 
the provision of early stage equity investments. however, from the perspec-
tive of a potential entrepreneur, the public suppliers are scattered around the 
system. a clear division of labour among public providers is not evident from 
the users’ perspective. there is thus a lack of a systemic approach, a weakness 
which is recognized by the nis. nor are we convinced that the present pub-
lic providers of pre-seed and seed capital have a strong enough mandate to 
Figure 5.1.  National VC investments versus R&D investments: an international comparison
Notes: Sources are EVCA, PEREP Analytics, and OECD (for R&D). * NVCA/PwC MoneyTree and Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (for R&D). ** IVC Research Center. *** NVCA/PwC MoneyTree. R&D refers to gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D. VC investment has been defined according to the country of destination approach in 
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finance truly experimental business ideas that might be the necessary precur-
sors of hGEFs. our concern with the Finnish support system as it is presently 
constituted is that (from e.g. potential users’ perspective), there appears to 
be several partially overlapping but not integrated public sources of seed, early 
stage and growth funding which are provided under numerous headings. 
however, despite the abundance of public sources and instruments, once the 
firm needs are greater than the relatively modest sums required to finance a 
and B rounds, the ability to access Finnish sources of funding quickly increas-
es in difficulty. this is very problematic, because appropriate forms and levels 
of risk finance are necessary but not sufficient for the rapid development of a 
hGEF. we can see that the relatively small numbers of firms that are able to 
access multiple rounds of Vc finance in the usa are likely to receive consid-
erably larger total sums of money than their European equivalents (dimov & 
Murray, 2008). also critically, the relatively small numbers of north american 
hGEFs selected by Vcs (shane, 2008) are also in receipt of a formidable array 
of growth-oriented support resources.
our main concern with the public support system providing capital to 
potential hGEFs is that even if the recent (both implemented and planned) de-
velopments are taken into account, the system still remains very scattered and 
fragmented.47 Because of differences in rules, guidelines, application processes 
and customer information systems between the support agencies, there is no 
easy-to-access and integrated service offering that potential hGEFs can easily 
and quickly access.48 when viewed collectively, the new initiatives regardless 
of their intentions do not seem to address this problem nor do they simplify 
the system. Quite the contrary, they may on occasion add new services and 
dimensions to the current system and thus make it even more complicated to 
understand and access. as far as we can determine, no material efforts have been 
directed to make the innovation and support systems more streamlined, more cost-
efficient or more accessible to its HGEF users. there are plans that may address 
some of these operational issues but it is very uncertain at the moment how 
effectively they can be resolved.49
it is of interest to observe that the survey conducted by Etla at the 
connection of this evaluation shows that all respondent firms (be they small 
or young, large or old) as well as the involved government agencies give a 
clearly lower grade to the ability of the Finnish innovation system to promote 
entrepreneurship and the creation of hGEFs than they award the innovation 
system as a whole (see appendix, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7, and Figure 5.8).172  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
5.3.3.  intErnational Growth
For hGEFs, the limits in demand of the Finnish market will be reached quickly. 
internationalization is a necessity for continued and significant firm growth. it 
is frequently the case that first internationalization efforts are made to neigh-
boring countries with similar cultural histories and experience (Bürgel et al., 
2004; Johansen & Vahlne, 1977). however, Finland is located a considerable 
distance from several of the most important international markets for hGEFs. 
accordingly, in order to succeed in key markets, hGEFs are obliged to ad-
dress the issues of both geographic and cultural distance. we know that for 
technology based firms particularly, internationalization is likely to be a rapid 
event (Bürgel & Murray, 2000; rialp et al., 2005). thus for Finnish firms, these 
issues are likely to be pressing from very early after market entry.
ideally, the challenges of global marketplace should be recognized ear-
ly on and prior to the founding of a new start-up. since the intellectual assets 
of a young firm cannot easily be protected from foreign competition, a new 
enterprise and its investors would benefit from comprehensive market intel-
ligence already being accessible by the opportunity evaluation phase of the 
proposed business. this ideal outcome is difficult and costly to achieve. at 
least in some cases, the private value of producing global market information 
and intelligence falls short of its social value. thus, the reality is that many 
companies are started and funded (privately and by government organiza-
tions) with noisy estimates of the international demand and the likely degree 
(and quality) of competition. internationalizing firms seeking to establish a 
permanent presence in key overseas markets will also over time have to invest 
in infrastructures to support customers in several countries. the building of 
an international sales infrastructure with appropriate distribution channels 
is a large and risky investment. without accurate market intelligence, such 
investments are even more difficult to justify early in a firm’s life cycle. im-
proved access to global market information and networks would reduce the 
uncertainty of such decision making and could facilitate greater commercial 
success of the potential Finnish hGEFs.
Global  insight,  foreign  expertise  and  global  networks  should  be 
present and accessible in the innovation system at the time the opportunity is 
recognized. Given the global dimensions of many key markets, the question 
then becomes who could and should introduce such a foreign (non-Finnish) 
perspective or provide global reach and information? in short, the generic 
question is – how can an ambitious, skilled and growth oriented entrepre-
neur acquire critical market information whenever it is in his/her interests to 
do so?
From a broader perspective, an obvious problem is that Finland re-
ceives negligible spillovers from immigrant human capital and foreign r&d.50 
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the developed world. when combined with the distance to key markets, this 
lack of ‘foreign and cultural spillovers’ results in a number of challenges:
–	 First, the management teams of Finnish start-ups are typically culturally 
  homogeneous, which is in stark contrast to the us where most Vc backed   
  start-ups include immigrant entrepreneurs or key employees. Managerial   
  labor markets in Finland will similarly reflect this lack of diversity.
–	 second, Finnish hGEFs are very dependent on national sources of risk cap-
  ital. this compares unfavourably to israel where two thirds of Vc fund- 
  ing to start-ups comes from foreign investors. similarly, three quarters of   
  the nearly £20 billion raised by the large uk venture capital and private   
  equity industry in 2007 came from overseas investors. Finland’s ability to   
  secure international support pales in comparison. Yet, Finland is interna- 
  tionally recognized for the quality of its innovation system and the skills   
  and education of its citizens. Finland’s loss from such a situation is not just   
  money. as can be witnessed in israel, international investors can also pro- 
  vide their international experience, contacts and certification to the hGEFs   
  that they finance.
–	 third, Finnish companies in general, and hGEFs with their limited re-
  sources in particular, have difficulties in getting onto the radar screens of   
  the biggest corporate or public purchasers. Major strategic purchase and   
  acquisition decisions by corporations are commonly made in the interna- 
  tional head-quarters of the corporations. they are difficult to access or   
  influence without a direct physical presence and contact with the net- 
  works where the decision makers are represented. without external assist- 
  ance,  young  firms  find  such  high  level  access  particularly  difficult  to   
  achieve in their early years.
–	 Fourth, only a handful of major r&d centres of global corporations are 
  based in Finland. such r&d centres are one avenue for Finnish entrepre- 
  neurs to enhance their global reach and to gain insight into global cus- 
  tomer needs. inward investments allow Finns to look outwards globally.   
  conversely, the absence of such international resources forces a more my- 
  opic and parochial perspective.
–	 Fifth, Finland’s university and research communities, particularly in the 
  key disciplines of science and technology are largely staffed by Finnish   
  nationals.51
–	 Finally, and similarly to the previous point, the public support system is 
  also overwhelmingly staffed by Finnish nationals most of whom have lim- 
  ited international experience, networks or access.
our aim is not to argue that there is a lack of public support for the in-
ternationalization of innovations and hGEFs or export efforts of Finnish com-
panies. Quite the contrary, nearly all public agencies provide some kind of 
support for such internationalization using one or more policy instruments.52 
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ment where much of the information must be derived from secondary sources 
and where networking opportunities are restricted given the absence on Finn-
ish soil of foreign entrepreneurs, researchers, r&d departments and major 
foreign-owned businesses. thus, the challenge for Finland is to attract strong 
and multifaceted linkages to foreign talent that by its very presence would help 
accelerate and deepen the international understanding and perspective of 
participants in the Finnish innovation system.
it is unlikely that there is just one barrier stopping a Google or an equiv-
alent world class business setting up a major r&d facility in Finland. simi-
larly, Finland has to recognize that a large number of developed nations are 
presently seeking to attract highly educated migrants from asia and beyond. 
in such a competitive market for scarce and highly mobile talent, Finland is 
not likely to fare well in comparison to, e.g., the u.s., canada, australia or 
the u.k. they are all large countries with excellent education and research fa-
cilities and, importantly, with established immigrant communities. Finland’s 
efforts to become ‘more cosmopolitan by other means’ has to be accelerated 
simply because a small nordic country with a harsh climate is rarely a first 
choice of destination for elite and highly mobile communities of knowledge 
workers. in these circumstances, it is beholden on Finland to explore actively 
the novel ways by which this problem may be resolved or diminished.
5.3.4.  EntrEprEnEurial culturE
‘culture’ is an intangible element within the entrepreneurial infrastructure. 
intuitively, a society that visibly celebrates and otherwise endorses entrepre-
neurial activity would appear to be at a strong advantage in seeking to pro-
mote additional entrepreneurial and innovative activity among its citizens. 
however, the term ‘culture’ is not easy to define or quantify. Moreover, it is 
likely to mean different things to different parties be they economists, policy 
makers, entrepreneurs or the ‘man and woman in the street’. none the less, 
there does appear to be a fairly common and widespread view in Finland that 
its citizens do not have a particularly entrepreneurial culture. this is espe-
cially the case if one compares Finns to a us or anglo-saxon benchmark.53 in 
Finland, often, the explanation for this situation is made with relatively vague 
and anecdotal reference to historic circumstances, attitudes etc. similarly, cul-
ture is also often described or assumed to be an unchangeable ‘given’ or at 
least very slow to change in a stable society.
Yet, the key question of concern is whether or not Finnish entrepreneur-
ial culture (i.e. popular attitudes to new and growth enterprise and to the de-
sirability of entrepreneurial activity) is an important factor in future economic 
growth. Further, and critically, can Finnish attitudes be made more accepting 
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between the prevailing culture and values of a society and their tangible trans-
lation into multiple areas of commercial activity. the practical manifestation 
of a supportive entrepreneurial culture will be seen in the ‘entrepreneurial ori-
entation’ of its citizens and their commercial behaviour.54 it seems plausible to 
assume that entrepreneurial culture (at the macro level) and entrepreneurial 
orientation (at the firm and individual levels) are mutually reinforcing and 
thereby are likely to contribute positively to the creation of hGEFs.
Evidence to determine the cultural climate faced by (potential) entre-
preneurs in Finland is weak. however, there are a number of contemporary 
indications including a bi-annual survey by the Federation of Finnish Entre-
preneurs (FFE). what we can infer from these indicators and see in this FFE 
survey over time is that entrepreneurial attitudes and experiences appear to 
be improving in Finland. Further, the attitudes and experience of growth ori-
ented entrepreneurs are no worse (and sometimes more positive) than for all 
entrepreneurs surveyed. Younger persons in Finland appear to more strongly 
identify with entrepreneurial values.55 however, while this positive trend is 
perhaps encouraging, the fact remains that too little is known of the cultur-
al and ‘soft’ issues of entrepreneurship than may be able to direct specific 
policy decisions in a Finnish context. For example, in Finland, are positive 
attitudes of young persons an indicator of future entrepreneurial activity? a 
closer tracking of entrepreneurial values within the Finnish culture and their 
implications for future business activity is a research omission that should be 
corrected.
while entrepreneurship is taught in a number of Finnish universities, 
this teaching is not primarily focused on an understanding of, and a prepara-
tion in, the creation and cultivation of high growth/high impact and interna-
tionally competitive businesses. this latter subject is qualitatively different 
from small or family business studies. secondly, our understanding is that 
students taking these courses are likely to be primarily recruited from busi-
ness and economics programs. the provision of entrepreneurial training to 
the Finnish science base – and particularly to high quality undergraduate, 
masters and doctoral students in the natural sciences – is likely to be much 
less systematic. the linkages between young scientific researchers and their 
equivalent business school colleagues through their interaction in university-
based entrepreneurship programs is one significant characteristic of the best 
enterprise training in both the usa and the uk (oEcd, 2008a; roberts & 
Eesley, 2009). For many countries, and possibly including Finland, this limited 
scholarly engagement with entrepreneurship education may well have a neg-
ative impact on the potential for spin-outs and other commercial outcomes 
from innovation activity. indeed, a recent study in the uk based on 25,000 
respondents from GEM’s year 2005 data (cowling, 2009) shows that school 
and particularly university training in entrepreneurship can have a positive 
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in short, while an incontrovertible case for cultural change still need to 
be constructed, there is likely to be a convincing argument for promoting a 
wider and more popular communication and celebration of entrepreneurial 
activity in Finland if the goals of the nis are to be achieved. such promotion 
may also make Finland a more attractive destination for high human capital 
immigrants wishing to work in a strongly meritocratic, entrepreneurial and 
growth oriented economy and society. the international promotion of this 
compelling case needs to be more evident in current policy discussions.
5.4.  conclusions and policY rEcoMMEndations
5.4.1.  Main conclusions
the focus of this study has been to address the key question of what policy 
initiatives can be identified in order to encourage a greater number of suc-
cessful high Growth Entrepreneurial Firms (hGEFs) being spawned in the 
Finnish economy. it is often argued that Finland does not produce enough of 
such firms when compared to competitor countries both in and beyond the 
nordic region. similarly, it has been suggested that Finnish entrepreneurs ap-
pear invariably ‘modest’ in their ambitions. these concerns suggest that Fin-
land has a structural mismatch. despite being recognised as one of the most 
innovative countries in the world with an equivalently high level of r&d in-
tensity and business r&d spending (European innovation scoreboard 2008, 
2009; oEcd, 2008c) these inputs do not appear to have resulted in equivalent 
outputs of a greater global supply of world-class, advanced goods and serv-
ices stemming from Finnish ideas and/or from Finland originated, entrepre-
neurial firms.
we share the view that  there is some level of structural mismatch. 
the returns to Finnish tax payers’ money invested in public r&d and in the 
public support system should be higher, if measured in terms of the number 
of world class hGEFs created. while the Finnish innovation system accom-
modates the needs of small businesses and entrepreneurs relatively well if a 
European comparison is made, the increased emphasis on growth-oriented, 
innovative companies in recent policy making (including the nis) is in our 
view clearly warranted and the correct strategic choice. Many recent plans 
and policy initiatives correctly recognize the importance of economic incen-
tives at the level of individuals, and the need for an integrated and holistic 
public support service for growth companies. such a public service should 
facilitate not blunt market signals.
in order to address the structural mismatch in the supply of and de-
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rate levels. this analysis leads us to the creation of four sets of policy recom-
mendations.
5.4.2.  policY rEcoMMEndations
Enhancing incentives for entrepreneurship and risk taking
Observation #1: the innovation system, including the relevant aspects 
of the tax system, provides little incentive for a highly talented individual 
to choose a risky entrepreneurial career. in fact, there seem to be few, if any, 
explicit upside incentives to entrepreneurial entry and risk-taking.
Challenge #1: individuals with high human and social capital and the 
ability to create hGEFs have a high opportunity cost of entering entrepre-
neurship. policy ought to recognize explicitly the importance of economic 
incentives at the level of talented and scarce individuals.
as we have argued, in order to create more and better hGEFs, Finland 
needs a continuing and increased supply of entrepreneurs who are character-
ized by their ability to accept and manage risk as well as by the high quality of 
their (international) commercial experience and expertise. it is very likely that 
these people with high human and social capital will appreciate their mar-
ket value and will demand substantial pecuniary incentives for their collabo-
ration (for interesting recent u.s. evidence, see hall and woodward, 2009). 
the Finnish innovation system should therefore provide sufficient financial 
inducements for them to leave their current position (e.g. established private 
sector careers) when and where appropriate for both the risk and rewards of 
entrepreneurial ownership.
it is the tax system which determines the distribution of the earnings 
and value-added generated by a (new) firm between the state and entrepre-
neur. it is very hard to determine whether or not the current ‘dual income 
tax system’, as currently implemented in Finland, hinders or encourages the 
entry into entrepreneurship of individuals with high quality business experi-
ence and good education. the available analyses and the academic literature 
remain ambivalent on how Finnish dual income taxation treats entrepreneur-
ship and risk-taking; or whether such activities can best be encouraged by 
providing tax incentives (see for example, hietala & kari, 2006; kanniainen et 
al., 2007; sörensen, 2009, and the references used in these studies). however, 
to the extent that the system is not neutral, there seems to be few, if any, upside 
incentives to entrepreneurial entry and risk-taking.57 if such incentives are in 
place, they are likely to be incidental and not systematic.58 Furthermore, the 
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attention to the incentives required for individuals to be motivated both to 
build and to exit valuable businesses (perhaps over repeated iterations as 
serial entrepreneurs). Yet, we have increasing evidence from the academic 
literature that tax incentives (including capital gains taxes) are extremely im-
portant in the investment decision to create and grow a new business (ar-
mour & cumming, 2006; da rin et al., 2006; keuschnigg & nielsen, 2004; 
poterba, 1989).
accordingly, we strongly recommend that these incentives are explicit-
ly taken into consideration if and when the tax system is reformed. Given the 
complexity of the issue59, it would be inappropriate from us to give detailed 
prescriptions on how the dual income tax system should be redesigned. any 
reform should, however, consider the following issues:
–	 although the economic theory of taxation does not give a clear cut pre-
  diction on whether risk-taking or (high-growth) entrepreneurship should   
  be given a non-neutral treatment in the taxation, the planned reform of the   
  Finnish tax system presents an important opportunity to challenge posi- 
  tively this principle. it is unlikely that the nordic dual income tax system   
  and the Finnish tax system in particular could not be made more favora- 
  ble to individual-level risk-taking and more encouraging of growth-orient- 
  ed firms.60 taxation of equity income could, for example, explicitly recog-
  nize the extra-ordinary risks that the entrepreneurial owner-managers of a   
  hGEF have to bear and the positive spillovers to the society at large that   
  such entrepreneurial risk taking potentially generates.61
–	 the role of capital gain taxes as a means to incentivize and reward the 
  recognition and pursuit of growth opportunities should be explored from   
  the perspectives of both entrepreneurial owner-managers and risk capital   
  investors (armour & cumming, 2006; da rin et al., 2006; keuschnigg &   
  nielsen, 2004).
–	 the decision to establish and grow a hGEF is a discrete and significant 
  choice. an entrepreneurial career is not a trivial or incremental commit- 
  ment. thus, entrepreneurs are more likely to be affected by the average 
  tax burden and not by the marginal rates of taxation (see devereux & Grif-
  fith, 1998; kanniainen & panteghini, 2008 and the references in these stud- 
  ies).
–	 risky market entry may generate pecuniary returns only after a consider-
  able delay. the tax system ought to explicitly recognize the dynamics of   
  the process that leads to the creation of hGEFs. it is the expected, future   
  after-tax monetary rewards that are likely to influence the incentives of   
  forward-looking individuals with high social and human capital to estab- 
  lish a growth venture today. the tax system should avoid introducing   
  (short run) ‘success taxes’ that undermine these incentives.
in sum, we think that to the extent possible, the tax system should be 
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and competitiveness. at the moment, it seems to be an underutilized instru-
ment that can be more effectively used to give individuals appropriate incen-
tives, especially to those who have the mix of human and social capital to 
become high-growth entrepreneurs.
our disproportionate emphasis on the incentives of entrepreneurial 
owner-managers does not mean that the recent policy efforts (e.g. tax incen-
tives to business angels and venture capital investors or the tax treatment of 
certain fund structures to increase the supply of private risk capital) should be 
seen as misguided. Quite the contrary, these initiatives are likely to be comple-
mentary to the provision of incentives to entrepreneurs.
the foregoing discussion leads naturally to our next observation about 
the Finnish innovation system:
Observation #2: the involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the en-
trepreneurial and innovation policy process has been insufficient, particular-
ly in matters of devising a tax system that unequivocally enhances incentives 
for entrepreneurship and risk taking.
Challenge #2: in its present form, the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy and the Ministry of Finance do not assume joint responsibility for 
high growth enterprise policy. Forging of a joint responsibility for entrepre-
neurship between the two ministries has to be a priority.
in common with most public administrations, the Ministry of Finance 
assumes a major role in monitoring and supervising the financing of expendi-
ture on existing and new policy initiatives. any suggestions that influence 
the taxation mechanisms of an economy must ultimately receive the agree-
ment of the exchequer if any action is to be forthcoming. it is our impression 
that the Ministry of Finance has remained a shadowy but influential presence 
in the development of the entrepreneurial and innovation policies.62 we be-
lieve strongly that the involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the innova-
tion policy process has to be both more public and more explicit if any future 
changes are to be effective.63 stronger linkages have to be created between the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy and the Ministry of Finance in 
order to exploit their complementary roles in the creation of hGEFs. in par-
ticular, the forging of a joint responsibility for entrepreneurship between the 
ministries should become a priority. in practice, for example, this could mean 
the establishment of a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Finance that is re-
sponsible for the promotion of enterprise and innovation capabilities.64 such 
a unit could take responsibility for the developing of appropriate taxation 
policy so that the Finnish tax system better supports entrepreneurship, risk 
taking, the creation of hGEFs and thereby long term productivity and eco-
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such an inter-ministry association. however, it would be expected that senior 
staff secondments from each ministry were represented in their respective 
entrepreneurship policy units.
Streamlining the public support system
Observation #3: the present public support system is the result of sev-
eral years of evolving policy actions and also reflects the interests of a variety 
of public bodies. the system has become excessively complex to both access 
and administer.
Challenge #3: there is a clear and urgent need for an easy-to-access, 
streamlined and integrated support service available to Finnish hGEFs.
the present Finnish public support infrastructure, which seeks to address 
growth firms both in their pre-commercial and commercial stages, is the re-
sult of a long history of evolving policy actions and practice across a variety 
of governments and ministries. policy makers necessarily seek to cater for the 
needs of a wide spectrum of potential users under a range of circumstances. 
as a result, the enterprise support system has become excessively complex 
to both access and administer. From the perspective of an outside observer 
(e.g. a potential entrepreneur), programs often seem to overlap with other 
programs and on some occasions multiple public agencies appear to work 
broadly in the same area and/or with the same firms. one costly outcome 
from this complex system is that high growth entrepreneurs incurring high 
opportunity costs for their time and effort are not always able to locate and ac-
cess appropriate sources of support efficiently, quickly and/or at an acceptable 
cost. while it is hard to quantify how complex the system is, the survey con-
ducted by Etla at the commencement of this evaluation provides evidence 
for this view. the survey shows that nearly three-quarters of young and small 
innovative firms think that the public support system facilitating private busi-
ness and innovation activities is ‘very or quite complex’ (see appendix, Figure 
5.9). our conjecture is that one reason for this finding is that nearly all agen-
cies provide some sort of support to “new ventures” and “growing firms”, 
or provide services with similar titles and headings. as a result, high growth 
entrepreneurs are not always able to locate and access appropriate sources of 
support efficiently. Even if the ongoing initiatives and plans are taken into account, 
this observation calls for efforts that would make the support system more 
streamlined, specialized and more cost-efficient and above all, more relevant 
for Finland’s highest potential young firms.
Further, the provision of advice and support does not seem to take into 
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very recently, Finnish enterprise policies have largely addressed firm forma-
tion while providing little support for the critical stage of subsequent, rapid 
firm development.65 our view is that the present structure of advice and sup-
port to Finnish entrepreneurs can be further streamlined and integrated in a 
fashion that can genuinely be described as ‘systemic’, and thereby better able 
to meet professionally hGEF users’ changing needs over time.66 the present 
need by firm clients to devote scarce time and attention in order to under-
standing the complex support system diverts scarce managerial resources 
away from a market orientation. this means that both support for entry and 
(international) growth objectives needs to be integrated if a systemic and co-
herent enterprise policy regime is to develop and be effective.67
while the precise details of streamlining and integration of the system 
are beyond our remit, we would offer Figure 5.2 as one potential scenario of 
how the various actions of government in the enterprise support field could 
possibly  be  streamlined  and  more  efficiently  organized.  we  would  stress 
that, given that these actions already come under the ambit of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, much of the restructuring can be carried out 
within the authority of one existing ministry. we would also like to acknowl-
edge that the proposed integration of the services is to a large degree consist-
ent with some of the recent initiatives (e.g. the EnterpriseFinland initiative 
and the group strategy of the Ministry) and current proposals that aim to re-
organizing similar and related services into common user focused categories. 
ideally, some of the governmental and semi-governmental agencies, as well 
as some of the services of the larger governmental organizations directed at 
supporting growth entrepreneurship would be organizationally merged and 
integrated. there also seems to be a clear need to reconsider the internal or-
ganization of the responsibilities for entrepreneurship development, growth 
ventures policy and steering of the related financing and support agencies 
and institutions within the Ministry of Employment and the Economy.68 we 
acknowledge that these may be controversial propositions but, if effectively 
implemented, such reorganization would ease the governance of the services, 
lessen the risk of duplication and enhance the cost efficiency of the system.
we would also see the revised structure, an illustration of which is pre-
sented in Figure 5.2, being of an order more comprehensible and accessible to 
high growth entrepreneurs seeking public support or guidance in order to ex-
ecute ambitious growth strategies. as such, this recommendation is largely in 
line with the current efforts to develop the present infrastructure, particularly 
the EnterpriseFinland system and the segmentation of the new and existing 
customer firms within the support system. however, with regards to these 
initiatives, no material effort to streamline the system or to make it more cost-
efficient has actually been put in place to date. Making the system more ac-
cessible to potential (high growth) entrepreneurs is of a first order importance 
and goes significantly beyond the current plans and efforts. there are some 182  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
‘simple fixes’ to improve collaboration and integration as has been recognized 
by the new initiatives. however, such easy changes will be quickly exhausted. 
they will not be sufficient to engender material and long run improvements.
Figure 5.2.  Streamlined public support system?
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Global linkages locally exploited
Observation #4: Finland remains one of the least racially and cultur-
ally diverse populations in the developed world and is located at a consid-
erable geographic and cultural distance from several of the most important 
markets for hGEFs.
Challenge #4: there is a mismatch between the entrepreneurial de-
mand for global insight, foreign expertise, international networks and the 
supply of inward foreign “spillovers” from immigrant human capital, for-
eign r&d and cross-border venture capital. the risk is that opportunities 
on global markets will not be recognized. when opportunities do arise, the 
danger is that they will be assessed and (mis)understood from a limited, 
exclusively Finnish geography and perspective.
we are not the first to stress that the informational barriers and networking 
challenges that Finnish hGEFs face when trying to access global resources 
and markets are real and severe. there is clear evidence that companies with 
internationally networked and experienced managers internationalize more 
quickly and more extensively to positive economic effect. we do not want to 
argue that there is a lack of public support for the internationalization or ex-
port efforts of Finnish companies. indeed, nearly all public agencies provide 
some kind of support to such activities. however, there is a lot of room for 
improvement both in the coordination of these services and in greater under-
standing from policy makers and public agencies as to why the internation-
alization of hGEFs deserves special attention from the public support system:
–	 First, the real challenge to the internationalization of the Finnish hGEFs 
  is the nearly complete absence of foreign talent, international investors,   
  and foreign companies and service providers in the Finnish innovation   
  system. they would, by their very presence, reduce the informational barri-
  ers and networking challenges of globalizing hGEFs. there is no single   
  policy measure that can resolve this challenge but it should be recognized   
  and given greater priority in the policy discussion.
–	 secondly,  direct  public  support  for  the  internationalization  of  hGEFs 
  should be concentrated on areas where the private value of producing in- 
  formation about global markets or building international networks falls   
  short of its social value. For example, enhancing the visibility and networks   
  of Finnish hGEFs is a means to overcome the local bias of international   
  investors (i.e., the preference of foreign investors to invest in geographi- 
  cally close and familiar companies). the costs of informing foreign inves- 
  tors about the supply of Finnish hGEFs is material but largely fixed (i.e. it   
  is nearly as costly to inform a group of foreign investors about a single   184  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
  Finnish hGEF as it is to inform them about 30 Finnish hGEFs). this pro- 
  vides an economic justification for publicly supporting such activities.
–	 third, the visions of policy makers (including civil servants) or established 
  businesses should not be the exclusive sources of information driving the   
  allocation of public resources that are used to support the international   
  market entry or expansion of Finnish firms. hGEFs entering new markets   
  with novel products and services often represent a direct and disruptive   
  challenge to accepted market views based on historic conditions and prac- 
  tices. there is a need to ensure that future support and funding allocations   
  are primarily influenced by factors that recognize the emerging global   
  market demand.
Building an entrepreneurial culture in Finland
Observation #5: there appear to be a fairly wide-spread self-percep-
tion that Finns are not very entrepreneurial.
Challenge #5: an understanding and appreciation of the exceptional 
skills and determination required to build a growth venture with global 
market potential is still limited both among the general public and in the 
innovation and university system. partly because of this unawareness, risk-
tolerant and growth-oriented entrepreneurs appear to be under-valued in 
Finland. the present reform of the university system and the creation of 
aalto university represent a timely opportunity to address this challenge.
despite Finland scoring high on innovation performance (European innova-
tion scoreboard 2008, 2009) and having engineered one of the most remark-
able economic turnarounds in recent times (and contemporaneously created 
one of the most outstanding global businesses in nokia), its citizens readily 
downplay their entrepreneurial capabilities. while accepting the caveat that 
it is neither easy to change attitudes or culture within a stable community 
nor always clear why government should engage in such activities, there are 
a number of areas where Finland needs to challenge what arguably are per-
ceived as accepted norms of economic behaviour. above all, we would ar-
gue that the risk taking and pioneering spirit of the entrepreneur needs to be 
recognized and celebrated for its importance to Finland’s economic future. 
the importance of an entrepreneurial culture should be valued because it is 
likely to be complementary to the tax and other incentives designed to enhance 
entrepreneurship and to change entrepreneurial risk/reward ratios.69 while 
systematic evidence on such complementarities is scant, we think that the 
support measures are likely to be considerably less powerful if the central 
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to provide precise recommendations on how an entrepreneurial cul-
ture can or should be built in Finland is beyond our remit. we nevertheless see 
a number of areas where there is room for additional effort:
–	 First, entrepreneurship appears an ‘orphan’ in the Finnish policy system. 
  while all questioned ministries and associated organizations allude to its   
  importance, it appears to be on the margins of the direct policy responsi- 
  bilities of each of the concerned government departments. consistent with   
  what we have suggested above about the need for formalized collaboration 
  between the various ministries and for reorganization of the public sup- 
  port  system,  this  situation  needs  to  change  –  and  publicly  be  seen  to   
  change.
–	 second, most policy measures in Finland and elsewhere focus on concrete 
  assistance, and particularly finance, for companies including hGEFs. lit- 
  tle attention has been paid to influencing the attitudes and start-up cul- 
  ture.70 in addition to improving the conditions for growth entrepreneur-
  ship (e.g. by increasing incentives), the cultural issues can be addressed by   
  improving the awareness of entrepreneurial opportunities and better com- 
  municating  the  ‘pros  and  cons’  of  entrepreneurship  as  a  career  choice   
  among the general public. the provision of such information needs to be   
  complemented by comprehensive and research-informed entrepreneurial   
  training.
–	 third, the creation of a greater number of better quality hGEFs is directly 
  linked to the entrepreneurial effectiveness of the university system. we   
  agree with the view put forward in oEcd (2008a) that a transformation of   
  the activities of higher education institutions is called for if they are to play   
  their full part in stimulating the creation of hGEFs and thereby economic   
  growth in modern knowledge economies. while there is considerable de- 
  bate as to the introduction of applied subjects such as entrepreneurship   
  into the schools’ curricula, there is a greater consensus as to its importance   
  at university level training. in the development of an entrepreneurial cul- 
  ture in Finland, the university sector has a particularly important role giv- 
  en the critical role of new knowledge based enterprises within the innova- 
  tion system.71 we would also suggest that the key targets are science (in-
  cluding medicine) and engineering students both at undergraduate and   
  postgraduate levels. we would stress that curricula should be influenced   
  towards teaching entrepreneurship and new ventures development from   
  the predominant perspective of high growth and internationally focused,   
  new knowledge businesses. however, we would also argue strongly that   
  such courses should always be voluntary. in order to ascertain the attrac-
  tiveness of an entrepreneurial career, young men and women need infor- 
  mation and (ideally) direct experience of such activities. Entrepreneurship   
  courses can help meet these goals by addressing directly information im- 
  perfections and asymmetries. to make rational and considered choices,   186  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
  scientists need to appreciate what it takes to build a rapid growth venture   
  with global market potential. accordingly, they also need to have an un- 
  derstanding as to how new knowledge can be transmuted into new prod- 
  ucts and services regardless of their own academic roles or positions in the   
  innovation value-added chain.
–	 Fourth, while we believe that students from all disciplines in all universi-
  ties should have access to entrepreneurial program choices, we are mind- 
  ful of the scarcity of world class experience in the creation and accelerated   
  growth of new enterprises. if Finland wishes to remain a world class inno- 
  vative economy, it also needs to have world class infrastructure for en- 
  trepreneurial training, education and research. the reform of the univer- 
  sity system and, in particular, the formation of aalto university represents   
  a unique opportunity to create such an infrastructure. this infrastructure   
  could for example take the form of an entrepreneurial centre that is an ac- 
  cessible resource to high potential entrepreneurs and businesses regard- 
  less of their location. such a centre should have complementary remits for   
  academic research, knowledge transfer and practitioner engagement. crit- 
  ically, it should be global in purview and the centre’s employees, students   
  and visitors should strongly reflect its global ambitions in their experience,   
  culture, nationality and diversity. in order to meet such goals, the financ- 
  ing and incentivization of faculty is likely to have to be internationally   
  competitive. Given the centre’s ambitions, its governance needs to be a   
  matter of some deliberation. again, it is inappropriate in this report to de- 
  sign in detail such an infrastructure for international entrepreneurial activ- 
  ity. however, it should be also seen, as with our other recommendations,   
  as creating a very visible, public and powerful signal that Finland is com- 
  mitted to a global entrepreneurial mindset across the range of its innova- 
  tion activities.
5.4.3.  concludinG thouGhts
in conclusion, we believe that the Finnish innovation system could significant-
ly increase the effectiveness of the support offered to its high growth entre-
preneurial firms. we have summarized the results of our analyses and discus-
sions into a number of specific recommendations (see above). however, we 
would wish to conclude with two observations which are related to the nature 
of policy actions: namely, complexity and political intent.
First, new programs and policy initiatives are simple to introduce but 
can all too easily make the existing support system increasingly complex. in 
many respects, it is far easier to create new programs than to retire existing 
but no longer relevant activities. the result of this phenomenon is that there 
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in any modern government. in Finland at the present time, there are too few 
efforts to streamline the existing support system available to young firms. 
Making the system more cost efficient and more accessible to potential (high 
growth) entrepreneurs is of a first order of importance.
second, it remains to be seen whether or not there is enough political 
will to make the promotion of growth entrepreneurs and hGEFs a primary 
goal of the relevant ministries and the various agencies under their command. 
in practice, most countries have a large number of programs for start-ups and 
small businesses. such programs are seldom of real relevance and help to ex-
ceptional hGEFs. all too often growth firms remain on the sidelines in policy 
discussions and actions. their needs are quite different from the very large 
number of ‘rank and file’ small businesses. Finnish growth entrepreneurs and 
hGEFs require incentive and support systems that are complementary, ef-
fective and easy to understand and access. in the absence of such ‘catalytic’ 
resources, access to world class technological and scientific expertise will re-
main a necessary but not sufficient condition of Finland’s future economic suc-
cess.188  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
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appEndiX: surVEY rEsults
Figure 5.3.  How important are the following aspects from the perspective of your business? 
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts the 
share of firms answering to the question very important or quite important. Small innovative firm: Less than 
50 employees and has done innovative activity during the past 3 years; Large innovative firm: At least 50 
employees and has done innovative activity during the past 3 years.
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Figure 5.4.  How important are the following aspects from the perspective of your business?
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts the share 
of firms answering to the question very important or quite important.
Figure 5.5.  The emergence of new growth companies could be facilitated by providing 
them with tax incentives regarding their future earnings and profit sharing. How efficient 
are such tax incentives in increasing the number of growth companies?
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts the share 
of firms answering to the question very or quite efficient.
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Figure 5.6.  One of the objectives of the NIS is to promote growth entrepreneurship and cre-
ate rapidly growing companies. How would you grade the system in this respect?
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts means 
to the question (scale 4−10).
Figure 5.7.  One of the objectives of the NIS is to promote growth entrepreneurship and cre-
ate rapidly growing companies. How would you grade the system in this respect?
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts means 
to the question (scale 4−10). Innovation support agencies: TEM, Tekes; Education support agencies: OPM, 
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Figure 5.9.  One of the most central functions of the system is to facilitate PRIVATE business 
and innovation activities. Against this backdrop, how would you characterize the innovation 
system as a whole?
Figure 5.8.  How would you grade the Finnish National innovation system (NIS) at the mo-
ment?
Notes: The data source is a survey conducted by ETLA to support the evaluation. The figure depicts means 
to the question (scale 4−10). Innovation support agencies: TEM, Tekes; Education support agencies: OPM, 
Akatemia. Univ. dept. h. = University department heads, Univ. rectors = University rectors, Polyt. rectors = 
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EndnotEs
1   For a recent survey of how rapidly growing firms contribute to job creation, see Henrekson and Johans-
son (2009). The contribution of new firms to productivity growth has not yet been conclusively established 
(nb. it can even be negative, see e.g., Shane, 2009), but surviving HGEFs have a positive effect on productivity 
growth.
2   Many recent studies and accounts that examine the linkages between innovation and economic 
growth put increased emphasis on the commercialization of new technologies and innovations instead of 
inventions. Bhide (2009) concludes, for example, that “[i]t doesn’t matter where scientific discoveries and break-
through technologies originate   − for national prosperity, the important thing is who commercializes them.”
3   By the NIS, we refer both to the Finland’s National Innovation Strategy 2008 and to the Government’s 
Communication on Finland’s National Innovation Strategy to the Parliament. 
4   A number of studies of rapid internationalisation by ‘young’ NTBFs use a ten year definition (e.g. Bürgel 
et al., 2004; Storey & Tether, 1998).
5   As briefly summarized in e.g. Hyytinen and Maliranta (2008), a growing economics literature empha-
sizes the process of “creative destruction” and market experimentation of new ideas as a source of long-term 
economic growth (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2001; Klette & Kortum, 2004). Such experimentation calls for a suf-
ficient supply of high-quality entrepreneurs and makes selection of talented employees into entrepreneur-
ship instrumental for long-term growth. If anywhere, this holds in economies close to the global technology 
frontier, such as the Nordic countries (see e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2006; Audretsch & Sanders, 2007). Empirical 
evidence suggests that companies with high potential value are more likely to come from the science base 
in developed economies (Autio, 2008).
6   It is difficult to obtain reliable and objective measures of the scale and quality of private and public 
sector R&D and innovation activity and thus the availability and quality of knowledge and innovation based 
entrepreneurial opportunities. The European Innovation Scoreboard 2008, published early 2009, suggests 
that Finland’s innovation performance is good, especially if benchmarked against the other EU countries. 
7   The majority of the analyses reported here were conducted in February 2009 (with some of the conclu-
sions and recommendations published at www.evaluation.fi in March 2009). During the Spring 2009, several 
new plans and policy instruments have been launched by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
and its various agencies and committees. For example, the monitoring group of growth entrepreneurship 
published a report in June 2009 which discusses many of the challenges related to growth entrepreneurship 
in the Finnish innovation system.
8   In the short-term, the on-going economic crisis may affect the creation of HGEFs for a number of rea-
sons including but not limited to reduced supply of (risk) capital and weakened export demand. To focus 
on structural issues, we try to look beyond the macroeconomic cycle. Of course, if the crisis deepens and 
becomes a long-lasting global depression, it is likely also to have some significant adverse effects on the 
long-term creation of HGEFs.
9   For an example of this perversity, Cassiman and Ueda (2002) show that a decrease in the cost of starting 
up can actually reduce the rate of market entry.
10   ‘Red tape’ or administrative burdens can generate major compliance costs particularly on small busi-
nesses. Several governments have set up initiatives to control the growth of these costs. See for example: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/admin-burdens-reduction/home_en.htm
11   There are two things that are worth emphasizing: First, imperfections in the market for early stage and 
small business finance do not automatically mean that there is too little entry. Asymmetric information in 
the market for early stage finance can, for example, result in excessive entry and over-investment due to the 
cross-subsidization of bad projects by good projects (see, e.g., de Meza, 2002; and, for further references, 
Takalo, 2009). Second, the precise reason for the imperfections in the market for small business finance is 
often not known (see, e.g. Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006). This is unfortunate, because it often determines 
whether or not the imperfection can be understood and addressed effectively. 
12   As we will discuss in greater detail below, the future creation of successful HGEFs which are based on 
Finnish experience and intellectual assets will likely require the leveraging of substantial resources from 
foreign partners and early stage investors to ensure their full commercial impact. The additional resources 
to create globally competitive enterprises are not restricted to finance. Such a change will also require a 
profound reorganization of the means by which Finnish businesses envisage and engage in international 
participation.
13   See also the analysis of Breznitz, Ketokivi and Rouvinen in this report.
14   A similar concern as to the limited focus on demand-side entrepreneurship policies has been expressed 
by the UK government’s Department of Business Innovation and Skills (Toschi & Murray, 2009). 
15   This remoteness can exacerbate the difficulties that Finnish HGEFs face in the understanding of actual 
and potential customer groups.198  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
16   The numbers on enterprise openings come from Statistics Finland’s Business Register and are based 
on those firms that are “liable to pay value-added tax or act as employers”. They do not cover foundations, 
housing companies, voluntary associations, public authorities and religious communities, or enterprises of 
the Finnish municipalities. Of the officially recorded enterprise openings, 33% were limited liability firms in 
2004–2007.
17   Hyytinen and Maliranta estimate this rate of transition based on a representative sample of business 
sector employees that covers years from 1997 to 2001 and consists of 409,277 individuals. This resulted in a 
total of about 1.4 million person-year observations.
18   Rantala’s definition for a spinoff is that it is a firm with 2 or more workers, such that more than 60% of 
them are coming from other than the parent firm and that the group of people moving from the parent firm 
to the new firm does not account for more than 10% of the parent firm’s work force.
19   The precise definition of this activity is given in Stenholm et al. (2009, p. 25): “Early stage entrepreneurial 
activity (TEA) refers to nascent entrepreneurs and new business owners. Nascent entrepreneurs are defined as in-
dividuals aged between 18 and 64 who have taken concrete steps towards establishing a new business during the 
past 12 months. New business owners are adult individuals who are owner-managers of a firm, which has been 
paying salaries (either to owners or to employees) over 3 months but less than 42 months”.
20   Nor should one infer from this number how intense university-industry collaboration is overall. At least 
some indicators suggest that the Finnish business sector, especially established firms, collaborate actively 
with the university system. 
21   It is important to emphasize that we are not particularly interested in the prevalence of small businesses 
or in the overall participation rate of population in self-employment or entrepreneurial activity, as measured 
for example by the number of SMEs or the ratio of established business owners to the adult population. 
22   Fast growth firms are said to share a set of common characteristics that appear to transcend nationality 
and sector (Autio, 2008): They are rare, ubiquitous across geography and sector and innovative in products 
and/or processes. Fast growth is lumpy and volatile. Conversely, we do not know when exceptional growth 
will start, for how long it will occur and when it will decline again. The US seems to create more HGEFs than 
Europe and that surviving US firms tend to grow more rapidly than their European equivalents. 
23   Calculated as a percentage of all SMEs with a non-negative growth rate of employment.
24   These SMEs account for 62% of the gross job creation of all SMEs with a non-negative growth rate of 
employment. These numbers are similar for years 2001–2004 and change only a little if one focuses only on 
the SMEs that have 10 or more employees at the beginning of the measurement period.
25   See also Deschryvere (2008) and the recent report ”Kasvun mekanismit” (Kovalainen & Heinonen, 
2009).
26   The precise definition is as follows: “enterprises with average annualised growth in employees (or in turno-
ver) greater than 20% a year, over a three-year period, and with ten or more employees at the beginning of the 
observation period” (OECD, 2008b).
27   OECD (2008b) defines ‘gazelle enterprises’ as “a subset of high-growth enterprises; they are the high-growth 
enterprises born five years or less before the end of the three-year observation period. In other words, measured in 
terms of employment (or of turnover) gazelles are enterprises which have been employers for a period of up to five 
years, with average annualised growth in employees (or in turnover) greater than 20% a year over a three-year 
period and with ten or more employees at the beginning of the observation period.”
28   Detailed descriptions of the individual public sector organizations and services provided can be found 
from a shared web portal of the organizations EnterpriseFinland., see www.enterprisefinland.fi.
29   Our table excludes for example the SME foundation.
30   http://www.tem.fi/?l=en&s=2383
31   See http://www.vigo.fi/
32   Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (2008).
33   See, e.g., the mimeo of The Ministry of Employment and the Economy (2009) released in early June. 
Tanayama and Ylä-Anttila (2009) provide a review of the literature on subsidies to business sector R&D and 
gives some recommendations on the desirable properties of such a subsidy scheme. 
34   For some recent analyses and initiatives by the Ministry of Education (2009b, 2009a) (Yrittäjyyskasvatuk-
sen suuntaviivat Opetusministeriön julkaisuja 2009:7 and Korkeakoulupohjaisen yrittäjyyden edistäminen 
Opetusministeriön työryhmämuistioita ja selvityksiä 2009:10).
35   We emphasize that besides those that we have listed, a number of other ongoing developments also 
have an effect on how the Finnish innovation system supports the creation of HGEFs. For example, the tech-
nology transfer framework of the higher education system is (and has been) subject to many simultaneous 
changes: They include but are not limited to: the ongoing reform of the Universities Act, the foundation of the 
so-called Strategic Centres for Science, Technology and Innovation (known as ”SHOKs”) that aim at enhancing 
cooperation between the academia and the business sector and the recent enactment of the new University 
Inventions Act (in early January 2007). See Tahvanainen (2009) for a brief review of these developments.Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  199 
36   Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) usefully see the entrepreneur as an economic ‘catalyst’ transmutating 
input resources to novel products and services.
37   Here we mean that our analysis will be focused on the uptake and exploitation rather than the gen-
eration of new opportunities. It should not be taken to mean that Finland should not continue to strive to 
improve its innovative output.
38   As Storey (1998) has noted in his study of the top decile of the fastest growing firms in the UK, factors 
that can discriminate for the most exceptionally successful companies may also similarly signal potentially 
failing companies. For example, a personal commitment to exceptional growth goals may be acceptable 
‘strategic stretch’ for a high quality entrepreneur or conversely the irrational and ill founded hubris of a poorly 
trained and self deceiving business owner.
39   Cassar (2006) investigates how the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are related to the growth-orien-
tation of their new firms.
40   The more secure the rewards from remaining an employee, the greater the incentives necessary to 
change the people’s perceptions of self-interest.
41   However, efforts by the state to increase the status with which entrepreneurs are held in a society may 
indirectly influence such psychic benefits as public esteem and self regard. In the UK, entrepreneurs are 
increasingly becoming ‘celebrities’ and, as such, exemplars for many persons.
42   Systematic evidence on this aspect of the Finnish innovation system is quite scant. The Ministry of Em-
ployment and the Economy has commissioned a study examining this issue (forthcoming later in 2009).
43   Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) provide an economic analysis of this question, considering in particular 
the role of unemployment insurance. 
44   Figure 5.1 can be cr iticized, because Nokia accounts for a large share of the Finnish R&D expenditures. 
However, Nokia’s R&D should also be seen as a source of new business ideas, like any R&D that is being done 
in Finland. Although the relative importance of Nokia and its R&D activities as a source of growth ventures is 
hard to determine, anecdotal pieces of evidence suggest that many of the most growth oriented ventures 
in Finland are related to the Nokia cluster and have founders or business angel investors that have either 
worked in Nokia or that have close connections to Nokia. It is also important to note that in Figure 5.1, the 
relative position of Finland is qualitatively similar when using scientific output (scientific publications per 
capita) as a measure of innovation intensity instead of the R&D expenditure. 
45   The increased role of public finance in early stage VC funds is a pattern replicated in several countries 
including the UK and the USA.
46   In 1996, Murray and Marriott (1998) calculated via a cash flow model using UK and US data that the 
minimum viable size of an independent VC fund in 1996 was around €21 million. In 2009, updated estimates 
for Nightingale et al, 2009 indicated a minimum viable early stage VC fund size in the UK of circa £50 mil-
lion.
47   We acknowledge that collaboration between the various agencies of the Finnish innovation system 
responsible for supporting HGEFs has increased recently. The rotation of personnel between the agencies is 
a good example of this. 
48   It should be stressed that it has taken weeks if not months for us to determine and understand the 
various ways in which the Finnish innovation system supports potential HGEFs. Time is a scarce managerial 
resource and the owner-managers of HGEFs cannot spend a lot of time to learning what the public system 
can offer to them. Time-consuming public support services are therefore likely to be an ineffective means to 
support HGEFs. 
49   See e.g. the report by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy on the renewal of the Enterprise-
Finland system (Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö, 2008).
50   See also the views put forward by Aiginger, Okko and Ylä-Anttila in Chapter “Globalization and business 
– Innovation in a borderless world economy” of this report.
51   See also the analysis by Veugelers, Tanayama and Toivanen in Chapter “Education, research, and the 
economy” of this report. 
52   These instruments are heterogeneous and include various sources of funding, support services, pro-
grams and networks that are either directly aimed at supporting internationalization or that use interna-
tionalization as an allocation criterion. See mimeo titled “TEM-konsernin kansainvälistysmistoiminnan kehit-
täminen” (produced by Gaia Consulting Ltd) for an overview of the public activities that either directly or 
indirectly support the internationalization of Finnish innovations and firms. 
53   We also fully recognise that this benchmark will increasingly be the entrepreneurial spirit of an Asian or 
other non European community in a globalising world.
54   Entrepreneurial orientation refers to a firm’s strategic orientation and its pro-active mode of addressing 
business opportunity. See Rausch et al. (2009) for a review of entrepreneurial orientation and other factors 
influencing small business growth.200  ·  Gordon Murray, Ari Hyytinen, and Markku Maula
55   An encouraging contemporary piece of anecdotal information supporting the more accepting atti-
tudes of young people is the Aalto Entrepreneurship Society, a student initiative, that has already over 1000 
members despite Aalto University not yet formally being incorporated.
56   Some academic scientists may even be hostile to the introduction of entrepreneurship studies into 
student curricula. These subjects are seen as ‘commercial’, a term that is frequently used pejoratively. 
57   We emphasise that these conclusions are based on indirect evaluation and assessment. They are not 
the result of any complete or conclusive quantitative analysis of the extent to which the Finnish tax system 
encourages or discourages, say, a seasoned private sector manager or an expert with international work 
experience to establish a firm and to become an entrepreneur. Nor have we found any comparative analyses 
of how well or badly the Finnish dual income tax system addresses this challenge, for example relative to the 
tax systems of the other countries that are R&D intensive.
58   How the planned R&D tax credit supports the creation of HGEFs cannot easily be inferred from the 
mimeo that The Ministry of Employment and the Economy released in June 2009 (The Ministry of Em-
ployment and the Economy, 2009). As we understand the planned new scheme, it provides firms with an 
incentive to use R&D inputs, but significantly it does not reward them for producing commercially successful 
innovations. 
59   See, for example, Kanniainen (2007) and the numerous analyzes and mimeos that the working group 
on the reform of the Finnish tax system has produced and commissioned. They are available from http://
www.vm.fi/vm/fi/05_hankkeet/012_veroryhma/06_esitysaineisto/index.jsp.  We  acknowledge,  in  particular, 
that there are a number of desirable features that a tax system should ideally have and that guide the overall 
design of the system. 
60   See e.g., Henrekson & Sanandaji (2008) and Keuschnigg & Dietz (2007) and the mimeos produced and 
commissioned by the working group on the reform of Finnish tax system. Kari and Kröger (2009) provide 
a number of additional references. See also Crawford and Freeman (2008) who have explored the need to 
reform small business taxation in the U.K.
61   General principles, like the ”normal return to investment” in some tax models, do not seem allow for the 
additional expected return that entrepreneurial risk-taking demands. We acknowledge that this is a complex 
issue, but argue that paying attention to the (risk-taking) incentives of the (potential) owner-managers of 
HGEFs is very important.
62   The Minister of Finance is the permanent member of the Research and Innovation Council. Interest-
ingly, the minutes of the meetings of the Council reveal that, in the past, the Minister of Finance has rarely 
participated in the formulation of the innovation policy. This is despite the Council being the premier forum 
for such policy-making.
63   The need for the greater involvement of the Ministry of Finance in the design of growth-enhancing 
policies has already been recognized. The remit and associated work of the working group on the reform 
of the Finnish tax system is a concrete example of this change. Another example of the Ministry’s efforts to 
meet this need is evidenced by the report on HGEFs that it published recently (Rainio, 2009). This report, 
however, pays only limited attention to the importance of tax system in creating entrepreneurial incen-
tives. We also acknowledge that the Ministry of Finance has been involved in the design of innovation and 
entrepreneurship policy at many formal and informal levels. However, the point we want to emphasise is 
that taxation has not in the past been seen as a concrete means to enhance the effectiveness of the Finnish 
innovation system and the sustaining of longer-term economic growth. The recent plans to introduce a new 
scheme for R&D tax credits can also be interpreted as a step towards the greater involvement of the Ministry 
of Finance.
64   The UK’s HM Treasury has a Business and Enterprise Unit as well as a Growth and Enterprise Tax team 
involved in tracking and responding to entrepreneurship and small business policy developments in other 
ministries including the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. 
65   In his recent assessment of the Finnish high growth entrepreneurship, Autio (2009) concludes that 
“high-growth entrepreneurship merits specific attention in a national innovation strategy because of the direct 
economic potential associated with the phenomenon”.
66   The authors of this analysis recognise that calls to streamline and segment the present public support 
systems may generate significant opposition as present organizational objectives and responsibilities are 
challenged.
67   The creation of HGEFs calls for a range of integrated resources and incentives to be quickly made avail-
able in order to promote, accelerate and sustain exceptional firm growth. This support should not exclusively 
be addressed to start up and early stage firms. It needs to be recognised that accelerated firm growth can 
occur at different times in a firm’s life cycle (Ács, Parsons, & Tracy 2008).
68   The distribution of responsibilities for the policies relevant to enhancing the creation of growth ven-
tures and the control of resources available to support the policies should be evaluated critically and re-
considered. At the moment, the responsibilities seem to be somewhat scattered around the Ministry. For 
example, the Group responsible for Entrepreneurship Development and Enterprise Support is a part of Em-
ployment and Entrepreneurship Department of the Ministry, the Group responsible for Growth Ventures is Growth Entrepreneurship and Finance  ·  201 
a part of the Innovation Department, whereas a number of agencies and institutions providing support to 
new entrepreneurs and growth ventures are steered by the Ministry’s Corporate Steering Unit. 
69   Entrepreneurial culture and tax incentives are complementary, if the effect of the former magnifies the 
desired effect of the latter. 
70   See e.g. Autio et al. (2007) for a review and categorization of entrepreneurship policy measures.
71   Besides their role in enhancing entrepreneurial culture, Finnish universities have a number of other 
roles to play in the creation of HGEFs. One of them is technology transfer. The available evidence indicates 
that the university system has not been a systematic source of science- or knowledge-based HGEFs. One of 
the questions on which policy-makers have to take a stance is whether universities are given an incentive to 
maximize their revenue (e.g. licensing or IPR income) from university innovations and spin-offs or whether 






Finland as a whole would benefit from redesigning its policy combination in order to 
foster the reallocation of its resources to their most productive uses.
In redesigning the policy combination due attention should be paid to creative 
accumulation and creative destruction. It is important that different policies clean up 
their acts following a sound division of labour. 
Innovation policy should celebrate firms that endeavour to move the current 
technology frontier forward no matter where they are actually located, even when 
they happen to locate in ‘advantaged’ regions. Innovation policy should also foster 
the diffusion of knowledge by helping inefficient firms adopt more efficient production 
methods. 
Product and labour market policies should be used to grease the wheels of crea-
tive destruction. In particular, competition policy should be used to promote the entry 
of new innovative players. It should also stimulate the reallocation of market shares 
from less to more efficient competitors. 
Regional imbalances should not be of any concern for innovation related poli-
cies, no matter whether promoting knowledge diffusion contributes to regional con-
vergence or peddling creative destruction increases regional disparities. Any regional 
agenda may lead to slower productivity growth and cumulative losses in value add-
ed.
Social equity should be targeted through traditional redistributive tools by tar-
geting ‘disadvantaged individuals’ rather than ‘disadvantaged regions’.
*  Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano is a professor at Bocconi University (Italy). He is a fellow of Bruegel, CEPR, 
CReAM, FEEM, GEP, IEA, KITeS, LdA. In Finland he was an expert at the Prime Minister’s first globalization 
project. He is the co-author of Economic Geography and Public Policy (Princeton Univ. Press). Aki Kangashar-
ju is a research professor at VATT, The Government Institute for Economic Research. Mika Maliranta is a re-
search director at ETLA and a (part-time) professor at University of Jyväskylä.









































































































Figure 6.1.  Geographical distribution of innovations in Finland in 1945-2005






















































to	be	identified.6	table	6.1	shows	the	sources	and	support	amounts	per	person	208  ·  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Aki Kangasharju, and Mika Maliranta
TEKES        MTI Agriculture Labour
2001 121.9 88.7 9.2 n/a
2002 117.3 97.6 9.3 n/a
2003 118.8 86.1 13.4 32.1
2004 130.2 98.1 16.5 38.2
2005 136.4 109.8 15 37.5










VTT, Technical Research  
Centre of Finlandor other 
public research institute
Public research institute unit
Science Park
Table 6.1.  Business support in terms of direct subsidies, loans and guarantees
Source: The Structural Business Statistics data and the Firm Support panel. MTI = Ministry of Trade and In-










Figure 6.3.  Structural funds coverage 2002–2006


































0 3.8 22.1 6.1 1.4 5
1 6.8 444 15.4 4.6 61.6
2 10.8 175.2 8.9 6.2 19.8
4 15.5 111.9 3 0.8 16.6
Objective region TEKES        MTI Agriculture Labour
0 178.7 38.5 1 31.1
1 108.9 532.4 35.8 95.6
2 87.9 221.1 1.5 64.4
4 93 147.9 1.4 48.7
Objective region TEKES        MTI Agriculture Labour
0 178.7 38.5 1 31.1
1 108.9 532.4 35.8 95.6
2 87.9 221.1 1.5 64.4
4 93 147.9 1.4 48.7
Table 6.2.  Business support by source in 2006, euro per employee
Notes: Basically all business sector industries are covered from “Mining and quarrying” (Nace 10) to “Sports 
activities and amusement and recreation activities” (Nace 93) excluding Financial and insurance activities 
(Nace 64–66) according to the standard industrial classification (Nace Rev. 2). MTI = Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.
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Local developers
Public	and	private	developers	are	mainly	science	parks	and	technology	cen-

















































































Wood Technology and Forestry
Polymer Technology and Tooling
Häme CoE
Vocational Expertise and e-Learning
Lahti Region CoE
Design, Quality and Ecology
Kuopio Region CoE
Pharmaceutical Development
Health Care- and Agro-biotechnology
South-East Finland CoE
High Tech Metal Structures, Process 
and Systems for Forest Industry,
Logistics and Expertise on Russia
Hyvinkää Region CoE
Lifting and Transfer Machines 
Lapland CoE





Metal and Maintenance Services
Tampere Region CoE
Engineering and Automation, ICT,
Media Services and Health Care Tech
CoE for Western Finland
Energy-technology
Oulu Region CoE
IT, Medical-, Bio- and
Environmental Technology
Seinäjoki Region CoE
Food Industry and Embedded Syst.
Satakunta CoE




Surface Tech. of Materials, ICT and 
Cultural Content Production
JyväskyläRegion CoE
IT, Control of Paper Making, Energy
and Environmental Technology
Helsinki Region CoE
Active Materials and Microsystems, 
Gene Technology, Software Product
Business, Digital Media, e-Learning 
and Cultural Industry, Health Care 














Figure 6.5.  Centres of expertise
Source: TEM.






































Regional Centre Programme (RCP)
the	aim	of	the	Regional	centre	Programme	is	the	development	of	a	network	
of	regional	centres	covering	every	region/province,	based	on	the	particular	

































































































































Figure 6.7.  Decomposition of productivity levels across Finnish regions
Notes: Business sector, Object 0 region = 100. Decomposition has been made separately for each of the 18 
industrial sectors and 11 services industries. The industry-level results are aggregated to the sector level by 
using the national industry shares. Labour productivity is measured by value added per person. Observa-




































































































































































































































Notes: The bars depict employment shares of new firms; averages of years from 1997 to 2007. Entrants are 
those that were not found in the market three years earlier (some of them may have existed ealier so that 
they have made a re-entry). Computation has been made separately for each of the 18 industrial sectors 
and 11 services industries. The industry-level results are aggregated to the sector level by using the national 
industry shares. Data source: Firm-level structural statistics database of Statistics Finland.
Figure 6.8.  Market shares of entrants 










Objective 0 Objective 1 Objective 2 Phasing-out






















Figure 6.9.  The contribution of the entrants to industry productivity
Notes: The bars depict the entry component; averages of years from 1997 to 2007. Computation has been 
made separately for each of the 18 industrial sectors and 11 services industries. The industry-level results 
are aggregated to the sector level by using the national industry shares. Data source: Firm-level structural 
statistics database of Statistics Finland.










Objective 0 Objective 1 Objective 2 Phasing-out




















Figure 6.10. The allocation effect of the new firms
Notes: The bars depict the impact on allocation component; averages of years from 1997 to 2007. Computa-
tion has been made separately for each of the 18 industrial sectors and 11 services industries. The industry-
level results are aggregated to the sector level by using the national industry shares. Data source: Firm-level 
structural statistics database of Statistics Finland.
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Figure 6.11. The effect of public innovation support on regional aggregate productivity
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Figure 6.12. Effect of public innovation support to allocation by region
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these	 negative	 outcomes	 have	 two	 alternative	 interpretations.	 on	
the	one	hand,	one	could	say	that	direct	and	indirect	public	support	has	not	







































































































work.	 Running	 innovation	 policy	 and	 competition	 policy	 with	 a	 regional	
agenda	may	come	at	a	high	cost	in	terms	of	foregone	growth	both	at	the	local	
and	at	the	national	level.Local Innovative Activity and Regional Productivity: Implications for the Finnish National Innovation Policy  ·  233 
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It	should	be	noted	that	exp  Φ1 ( ) 	is	a	weighted	geometric	average	of	
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obviously	a	similar	decomposition	can	be	made	for	the	incumbents
   Φ1 1 1
incumbent incumbent incumbent s = + ( ) ϕ ϕ cov , 	 (10)
and	for	the	entrants
   Φ1 1 1
entrant entrant entrant s = + ( ) ϕ ϕ cov , 	 (11)Local Innovative Activity and Regional Productivity: Implications for the Finnish National Innovation Policy  ·  237 
By	inserting	(10)	and	(11)	into	(8)	we	obtain	(see	melitz	&	Polanec,	2009)
     Φ Φ 1 1 1 1 1 = + ( )+ − ϕ ϕ
incumbent incumbent entrant entrant s S cov , Φ Φ1
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endnotes
1   Regional policy is actually a combination of modern and more traditional tools. Modern tools are more 
like extensions to national policies, such as innovation and industrial policy that try to diffuse economic 
growth and development all over the country, by helping the deployment of economic resources outside 
the largest cities. Traditional tools, on the other hand, operate more directly in the periphery in terms of rural 
and island policies.
2   The empirical analysis of this evaluation is based on two databases. The first is the Structural Business 
Statistics data (SBS data) that basically cover all firms in the Finnish business sector industries excluding 
Financial and insurance activities. It is constructed by linking several surveys and data obtained from the Tax 
Administration’s registers. For a more detailed description, see http://tilastokeskus.fi/meta/til/syr_en.html. The 
second data source is Firm Support panel that is compiled by Statistics Finland together with the ministries 
involved (see Pajarinen et al., 2009). For access to these (and other micro-level) data, please contact the 
Research Laboratory of the Business Structures Unit, Statistics Finland, FIN-00022 (see http://tilastokeskus.
fi/tup/yritysaineistot/esittely_en.html).
3   In this analysis the region of a firm is the one that has the highest employment share of the four regions 
examined. The four regions are shown in Figure 6.3.
4   Finnvera is a state-owned financing company which provides its clients with loans, guarantees, venture 
capital investments, and export credit guarantees. Promoting regional development is one of Finnvera’s 
goals. The Annual Review 2008 describes the mission as follows: “By supplementing the financial market and 
by providing financing, Finnvera promotes the business of SMEs, the exports and internationalisation of enter-
prises, and the realisation of the State’s regional policy goals.”
5   These figures are from Regional Accounts and R&D-statistics compiled by Statistics Finland.
6   More specifically, data are constructed by linking the Structural Business Statistics and the Firm Support 
data maintained in Statistics Finland. 
7   From a statistical point of view, the difference is highly significant as the standard error is only 8 Euros 
(thus, the t-value is about 49).
8   See Appendix and Melitz and Polanec (2009) for technical details.
9   In our computations a firm’s productivity is measured in the natural logarithm units. For the presenta-
tion of the results, however, we have taken anti-logs of the components which implies that comparisons are 
made by using geometric averages (see more details in Appendix).
10   Böckerman and Maliranta (2007) examine the regional differences of micro-level dynamics in twelve 
manufacturing industries. Although their study focuses on the manufacturing sector only and uses a differ-
ent dynamic decomposition, the results are largely consistent with ours. Their results indicate that the mid-
80s was the turning point in the regional productivity development. Productivity-enhancing restructuring 
became an increasingly important source of industry productivity growth in the Southern Finland but less 
so in the other parts of Finland, especially in the Eastern Finland.
11   Maliranta (2003) shows that an important part of the productivity-enhancing restructuring within man-
ufacturing industries in Finland can be attributed to the relative young plants (to those less than 13 years 
old).
12   These numbers are not reported in the figures but are directly linked to those portrayed in Figure 6.8 
and Figure 6.9 as shown in equation (8) in the Appendix.
13   It should be noted that the differences in the industry structures are not controlled for here so that the 
results are not strictly comparable. However, when comparing differences over time within one category 
(A-F) the effect of industrial structures is cancelled out. Furthermore, this comparison concerns only firms 
active during the whole period from 2001 to 2007.
14   This recent pattern of divergence has been highlighted in Section 6.3.Education, Research, and the Economy  ·  239 
*  Reinhilde Veugelers is a professor at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) and a research fellow at 
CEPR. In 2004–2008 she was an economic advisor at the Bureau of European Policy analysis (BEPA) to JM 
Barroso, European Commission. In 2007–2009 she is the president of the European Association for Research 
in Industrial Economics (EARIE). Reinhilde Veugelers serves as the chair of the evaluation panel. Tanya Tan-
ayama is a researcher at HECER, Helsinki Center of Economic Research, and ETLA. Otto Toivanen is a professor 




The objectives in reforming the Finnish education and (public) research sectors are as 
follows:
–  Increasing the quality of research.
–  Streamlining the sectors to reduce fragmentation and overlapping activities. 
–  Increasing internationalization.
–  Tackling the problem of late graduation.
–  Enhancing efficient knowledge dissemination from the sectors to the rest of soci- 
  ety.
The most pressing and timely challenge is to increase the quality of research 
in Finland, which is best achieved by providing autonomous universities incentives 
through funding rules emphasizing it (see our separate proposal for details).
To streamline the higher education sector we recommend a clear division of 
tasks between universities and polytechnics. In addition the role and tasks of public 
research organizations (PROs) should be critically re-assessed. 
To reduce the problem of late graduation, our main policy recommendation is 
to make a clear distinction between bachelor’s and master’s programs and ensure that 
it is easier for students to change fields and establishments when exiting the bachelor’s 
and entering the master’s programs. To further enhance industry – science links we 
stress the need to avoid top-down policy making in selecting areas for academic re-
search. In addition, technology transfer offices should have an adequate scale, exper-
tise and resources to truly be efficient.















































































































































































Table 7.1.  Percentage of actors considering the institution serving well the specified task
Source: Kotiranta et al. (2009).
Universities Polytechnics PRO's 
International top class research
Smaller innovative firms 90 % 4 % 25 %
Larger innovative firms 91 % 3 % 25 %
Other firms 84 % 6 % 26 %
All Firms 89 % 4 % 25 %
All Actors 93 % 3 % 34 %
Research for the national needs
Smaller innovative firms 56 % 34 % 51 %
Larger innovative firms 65 % 32 % 52 %
Other firms 60 % 34 % 43 %
All Firms 59 % 34 % 49 %
All Actors 68 % 36 % 64 %
Supply of experts for international business activities
Smaller innovative firms 82 % 26 % 14 %
Larger innovative firms 85 % 29 % 17 %
Other firms 83 % 27 % 11 %
All Firms 83 % 27 % 14 %
All Actors 86 % 27 % 15 %
Supply of experts for local business activities
Smaller innovative firms 39 % 82 % 13 %
Larger innovative firms 46 % 86 % 13 %
Other firms 35 % 78 % 12 %
All Firms 39 % 82 % 13 %































Other public  funding 
172.6 , 27% 
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Academy of Finland 




















Table 7.2.  Government budget appropriations or outlays for R&D in 2008
Source: Statistics Finland.
R&D funding, € mill. Share of R&D funding, %
Universities 452.2 25.2
University central hospitals 48.7 2.7
Academy of Finland  296.5 16.5
TEKES - Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation
526.3 29.3
Government Research Institutes 281.6 15.7
Other R&D funding 192.6 10.7















Table 7.3.  Funding for education
Source: OECD (2008a). Data are for 2005, unless * (=2004).
Panel A. Spending on tertiary education as percentage of GDP, 2005.
US Japan EU19 Finland Denmark Sweden UK Germany France
Total 2.9 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.3
Public 1.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.1
Private 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2
Panel B. Expenditure on instruction and R&D in higher education institutions.
Educational Core Services as % of GDP
US EU19 Finland Denmark* Sweden UK Germany France
2.26 1.07 1.35 0.85 0.78 0.63 0.86
Educational Core Services per Student, relative to EU19 average
US EU19 Finland Denmark* Sweden UK Germany France
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US Japan UK Sweden Denmark Finland Germany France Spain Italy
A. Autonomy
Selection of students 7.8 6.6 6.7 8.9 7 7.1 2.8 2.8 10 3.7
Budget flexibility 8.5 8.2 6.8 6.2 6.2 7.7 7.2 6.8 7.9 7
Staff Policy flexibility 10 10 10 10 10 7.5 7.5 1.8 4.9 7.9
Hiring/Firing 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 0.9 3.8 10
Wage/non-wage 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 2.7 5.9 5.7
conditions
Course content 10 10 10 5.5 10 10 5.5 10 10 5.5
B. Accountability
Evaluation mechanisms 6.6 6.2 7.7 6.5 4.6 4 6.9 5.6 6.5 6.8












Table 7.4.  Spending on research in higher education
Source: OECD (2008b). Data are for 2007 unless * (=2006).
Expenditures on R&D by Higher Education Sector, as % of GDP
US Japan* EU27* Finland Denmark Sweden UK* Germany France
0.36 0.43 0.39 0.65 0.70 0.77 0.46 0.40 0.41
Total Expenditures on R&D as % of GDP
US Japan* EU27* Finland Denmark Sweden UK* Germany France
2.68 3.39 1.77 3.47 2.54 3.63 1.78 2.53 2.08
Share of total R&D performed by Higher Education Sector  
US Japan* EU27* Finland Denmark Sweden UK* Germany France
13.3 12.7 22.3 18.7 27.5 21.1 26.1 16.3 19.2
Higher Education Sector R&D financed by industry
US Japan* EU27* Finland Denmark* Sweden* UK* Germany* France*
5.7 2.9 6.6 7.0 2.5 5.1 4.8 14.2 1.7
Table 7.5.  Governance characteristics of universities in OECD countries


















Box 7.1. Financing modes of higher education in the EU
Block grants are common, with serious autonomy on how to spend grants. In several countries a sig-
nificant amount of public funding is associated with a performance contract. Nevertheless, whether 
or not the qualitative objectives included in these contracts are met, has still little influence on the 
amount of funding allocated in the following contract, for the moment. Almost all European coun-
tries use standardized funding formulas for the allocation of public funds. The use of performance 
indicators is becoming increasingly common. Most of the time, this includes the number of students 
enrolled at an institution and research activities. However, in most countries, only a small proportion 
of funds are allocated on performance indicators. The UK (England) is indisputably one of the coun-
tries where the amount of funding allocated to institutions depends most on their performance in 
terms of students’ results and the quality of research.
Public funds for research are allocated via various mechanisms. All countries have at least part 
of these funds allocated on a competitive basis for specific research projects and programs, next to 
basic research grants. The calculation of these basic grants varies markedly across countries.
The vast majority of European countries have implemented incentives to support higher edu-
cation institutions in their search for private funding and in developing partnerships with the private 
sectors, with tax allowances for donors the most common.

















Table 7.6.  Higher education attainment rates (% of population aged 25–64 with complet-
ed tertiary education in 2006)
The source is DG Research, data from Eurostat. For Italy and Switzerland the last observation year is 2004.
Source: OECD (2008a).
Figure 7.2.  Doctoral graduates per 1000 population aged 25–34, in 2000 and 2005
US Japan EU19 Finland Denmark Sweden UK Germany France
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Figure 7.4.  Number of Finnish publications and share of EU25 and OECD publications in 
1985–2005













































































































Share (%) of OECD countries' 
publications
Share (%) of EU25 countries' 
publications
Table 7.7.  ISI publication output
Notes: Authors calculations on the basis of NSF, S&E indicators. Countries ranked according to contribution 
to overall EU growth (share*growth); only countries with at least 1% in EU-27 2005 share are reported.
Avg. annual
1995 2000 2005 95－00 00－05 growth (95－05)
Poland 2.3% 2.9% 2.9% 3.8% 4.3% 4.1%
Hungary 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 5.8% 2.1% 3.9%
EU27 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2.6% 1.1% 1.8%
Share in EU-27  Change
Portugal 0.5% 1.2% 1.2% 12.8% 8.7% 10.8%
Greece 1.1% 1.8% 1.8% 7.4% 7.3% 7.3%
Spain 5.8% 6.6% 7.8% 5.4% 4.3% 4.8%








































































Table 7.8.  EU performance on scientific publications
Source: OECD, STI 2007.
S&E Publications per researcher relative to OECD average (1=OECD=0.164) 2003
US Japan EU25 Finland Denmark Sweden UK Germany France






Figure 7.6.  Relative change from 1991 to 2006 in publications per higher education sector 
R&D expenditure (million constant US dollars 2000 prices and PPPs)
Figure 7.5.  Scientific publications in relation to public expenditure on R&D
Notes: The source is DG Research, data from Thomson Scientific/CWTS, Leiden University, Eurostat, and 
OECD. In order to take into account the gap between R&D input and scientific output, a two year lag be-
tween public expenditure on R&D and scientific publication has been applied. For EU27 the scientific pub-
lications full counting method was used at a country level. At the aggregate level, double counting was 











































































































































NorwayEducation, Research, and the Economy  ·  255 
Box 7.2. Looking into universities: what are the structural characteristics of the departments 
of Finnish and foreign universities?
During the first half of 2009 Etlatieto Oy surveyed Finnish university departments from seven fields 
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, computer science, electrical engineering, psychology and histo-
ry). Questions about structural features were sent to both Finnish and foreign departments (US, UK 
and Scandinavia). The unique survey aimed at finding out the differences (1) between departments 
from selected countries, (2) between national departments with a different ranking and (3) between 
different fields.
Finnish university departments are definitely small
A first finding underlines that the average size of Finnish university departments is smaller than the 
size of the foreign university departments. This size difference applies both to the number of staff 
and to the number of students. The discrepancy is pronounced in the case of the US but holds also 
compared to other countries. Figure 1 illustrates the differences in department sizes by plotting the 
average number of junior and senior professors versus the number of Ph.D. level researchers on out-
side funding. Figure 2 shows those differences in department size by plotting the average number 
of new undergraduate and graduate students.
The best departments tend to be bigger
A second finding reveals that the best departments in a certain country tend to be bigger than the 
rest, although the relationship between size and ranking seems not to be linear.
Returning to figure 1 shows that the average number of professors of the best departments is 
larger than that of the other departments. Indeed, an additional t-test revealed that the best depart-
ments in the US and the UK have a significantly higher number of junior/tenured-track professors 
than the other US/UK departments.
It is also interesting to note that in our sample (according to the number of staff) the best 
Scandinavian departments are remarkably bigger than the European departments and the rest of 
the US departments.
At first sight this pattern also holds for the number of students. But here results seem to de-
pend on which category of students is considered (undergraduates or graduates). In addition there 






























































Figure 1.   Average size of research personnel in different university departments: # of professors vs. # of 
Ph.D. level researchers on outside funding in 2008
Source: Deschryvere (2009).256  ·  Reinhilde Veugelers, Tanja Tanayama, and Otto Toivanen
Departments of different fields are allowed to have different sizes
A final result reveals that Finnish university departments are small, irrespective of the department 
field. Figure 3 plots department fields along two size dimensions (number of staff and students) and 
discloses two findings: Firstly, the variation in department size between different fields seems to be 
smaller in Finland than abroad, and secondly, only in the case of Computer Science and Physics Fin-
land seems to approach the size (number of students) of the foreign departments in our sample.























































UK best FI best
FI rest
Figure 3.   Comparing the size of university departments by field: Finland (fi) versus the rest (for)
Source: Deschryvere (2009).




























































































Figure 7.7.  OECD countries’ relative citation impacts in 1991–1995 and 2001–2006
Notes: The source is Lehvo and Nuutinen (2006), data source Thompson Scientific. Relative Citation Impact 
measures the number of citations per publication of a country relative to the OECD average.















































20 University of Helsinki  45.80 % 1.41
44 University of Kuopio 11.30 % 1.27
88 University of Tampere 9.20 % 1.16
111 Helsinki University of Technology 12.30 % 1.12
136 University of Oulu 13.70 % 1.06
167 University of Jyvaskyla 7.70 % 0.99
Table 7.9.  Place and score of Finnish universities in Leiden Top 250 Ranking
Notes: The source is Leiden CWTS, 2009. * Total is all Finnish universities in Top 250. Table columns therefore 
add up to 100. ** Quality of Publications is measured as CPP/FCSm: Citations Per Publications, relative to the 
field-based World Average.
Table 7.10.  Aggregate Shanghai Rankings
Notes: The source is Brueghel PB 2007/04, Why Reform Europe’s universities. The best university in the Top-50 
is given a score of 50, the next best university is given 49, and so on. For each country (or region), the sum of 
Top-50 Shanghai rankings that belong to this country is summed, and divided by the country’s population. 
Finally, all the country scores are divided by the US score, as benchmark. This gives the Country Performance 
Index for the Top 50 universities. The same logic applies, respectively, to the Top-200 and TOP-500. Selected 
























































































Table 7.11.  UIC-ranking of Finnish universities
Source: Leiden CWTS, 2009.
UIC-Rank Name Share of UI co-
publications in total 
publications
6 Helsinki University of Technology 6.10 %
55 University of Turku 3.90 %










Sweden 17.4 14.1 18.8 48.7
Belgium 13.2 10.3 15.8 37.5
Germany 8.5 5.8 9.3 25.2
France 10.1 7.6 10.9 25.8
UK 10.0 8.8 11.2 20.3
Table 7.12.  The share of innovative firms cooperating with HEIs, by firm size
Source: CIS-IV, Eurostat.
Table 7.13.  Importance of universities as sources of innovation / information
Source: CIS-IV, Eurostat. 
% firms quoting universities and other HEIs as important sources of innovation (2004)
Finland Belgium France Germany Netherlands


























Table 7.14.  Perceptions of industry leaders about higher education
Notes: On the basis of WEF, GCI 2008; Tertiary enrolment is on the basis of hard data; Score relative to the 
US (=1).
Higher  Tertiary  Availability of  Brain Drain Quality of the  Quality of  University-
education  Enrolment scientists and  educational  scientific  industry 
and training engineers system research  research 
institutions collaboration
Finland 1.07 1.14 1.07 0.85 1.24 0.90 0.95
Denmark 1.05 0.98 0.96 0.80 1.16 0.89 0.91
France 0.95 0.70 1.02 0.66 1.00 0.86 0.67
Germany 0.91 0.58 0.89 0.75 0.98 0.92 0.93
Sweden 1.03 0.97 1.02 0.80 1.06 0.90 0.97
UK 0.93 0.74 0.87 0.75 0.92 0.90 0.88









Figure 7.8.  Percentage of international students in tertiary enrolments
Source: OECD (2008a).
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
To Finland
From Finland
Table 7.15.  International  co-publications  and  participation  in  EU  collaborative  research 
projects
Notes: Authors calculations on the basis of NSF, S&E indicators. The year is 2005. ICP: International Co-Pub-
lications, P: total Publications; sICPworld: share of the country in total world International Co-Publications; 
sICPFin: share of the country in total Finnish International Co-Publications; RICPFin: share of the country in 
total Finnish International Co-Publications relative to the country’s share in total world International Co-Pub-
lications. Only countries with >250 co-publications with Finland are represented; Countries are ordered in 
descending order of total number of co-publications.
ICP/P sICPworld sICPFin RICPFin
US 0.32 0.44 0.27 0.61
UK 0.62 0.19 0.2 1.08
Germany 0.67 0.2 0.19 0.97
Sweden 0.75 0.05 0.19 3.84
France 0.72 0.14 0.1 0.71
Spain 0.57 0.07 0.1 1.41
Netherlands 0.72 0.07 0.09 1.45
Italy 0.59 0.09 0.09 0.94
Russia 0.59 0.06 0.08 1.49
Norway 0.78 0.02 0.07 3.78
Switzerland 0.99 0.06 0.07 1.22
Denmark 0.84 0.03 0.06 2.31
China 0.3 0.08 0.03 0.31
India 0.27 0.03 0.01 0.36












Figure 7.11. The countries with the most central participants in FP5 and FP6































































































































































































































































Increasing institutional autonomy and accountability
most	European	member	states	have	implemented	national	legislation	chang-
es	aiming	at	providing	universities	with	more	institutional	autonomy	in	terms	





















































































































































































Box 7.3. Some best practices from LERU
A survey of 12 European Universities, all members of the League of European Research intensive 
Universities (LERU) (which includes the University of Helsinki), shows high levels of similarity in the 
approach adopted towards managing ISLs as well as the incentives provided at the respective insti-
tutions. It is obvious that the level of maturity with TTO structures and ISLs can differ amongst the 
institutions surveyed. However, the basic approaches and tenets are quite similar. More specifically:
–	 The universities surveyed consider the exploitation of research activities as an explicit mission of 
  their institution.
–	 All universities surveyed recognize the need to support a mix of ISL activities ISLs, IP manage
  ment and spin-off creation generate important spillovers amongst them. Every university sur- 
  veyed combines the three activities in its TTO structure.
–	 Each university also recognizes the need to decentralize its TTO structure, with a lot of frequent 
  interactions with the research groups and with large levels of delegated decision power towards  
  the TTO as it comes to decision-making with the research groups on what to exploit under what  
  conditions using which mechanisms.
–	 Each university has a well-established incentive policy towards its researchers. The incentives, 
  financial and administrative, occur both at the level of the individual researchers involved in ex- 
  ploitation of research as well as at the level of the research groups involved.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































second,	it is necessary to stream-line the higher education and research struc-
ture.	division	of	tasks	between	institutions	is	needed	in	order	to	reduce	the	284  ·  Reinhilde Veugelers, Tanja Tanayama, and Otto Toivanen









third,	we	strongly	argue	that	the	best	way	to increase the participation of 
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While	 we	 emphasize	 strong	 incentives	 for	 academic	 excellence	 our	
proposal	also	allows	for	funding	aimed	at	maintaining	the	diversity	of	the	





















































































































































































































Allocation mechanism of research-based funding
in	practice,	the	research-based	funding	could	also	be	allocated	through	the	
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EndnotEs
1   E.g. ‘Mobilising the Brainpower of Europe: Enabling Universities to Make their Full Contribution to the 
Lisbon Strategy’, COM(2005) 152 of 20 April 2005 and Council Resolution of 15 November 2005.
2   Industry-science links refer to the different types of interactions between the industry and the sci-
ence sector that are aimed at the exchange of knowledge and technology (start-ups, collaborative research, 
contract research, consulting by science, development of IPRs by science and other formal and informal 
co-operation).
3   More information on PROs can be found at the web site of the Advisory board for Sectoral Research 
(http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Tiede/setu/?lang=en).
4   For consulting the homepage of the Academy of Finland go to (http://www.aka.fi).
5   For consulting the homepage of Tekes go to (http://www.tekes.fi/).
6   See (www.koulutusnetti.fi).
7   See (www.koulutusnetti.fi).
8   Proton and ASTP, two associations of Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) in Europe, are currently carry-
ing out surveys among their members. ASTP surveys are comparable to the American AUTM-surveys.
9   To compare: Technical University Denmark (7.4%), Chalmers (7.2%) and Karolinska (5.4%).
10   Strategy for Internationalisation, thematic OECD review, “Osaava, avautuva ja uudistuva Suomi”, Suomi 
maailmantaloudessa -selvityksen loppuraportti, 2004, “Suomen vastaus globalisaation haasteeseen” – Ta-
lousneuvoston sihteeristön globalisaatioselvitys, 2006, Suomen Akatemian kansainvälisen toiminnan strate-
gia 2007–2015.
11   See (http://cordis.europa.eu/erawatch/).
12   See (www.hefce.ac.uk/learning/nss).









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8.1.  An outline of actors and responsibilities in the Finnish national innovation system
ConclusionThe Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy com-
missioned an international evaluation of the Finnish national innovation system. An 
independent panel conducted the work with the support of Etlatieto Oy (a subsidiary 
of ETLA, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy). This Full Report elaborates 
on the issues introduced in the Policy Report; together they summarize the findings 
and recommendations of the evaluation.
The panel welcomes the two new elements of Finnish innovation policy – the broad-
based approach and demand and user orientation – but points out risks in their adop-
tion. The former should not lead to considering even minor changes as innovations 
or to labeling all enterprise policies as innovation policy. The latter should be inter-
preted as impartiality to the source, type, and application domain of innovation.
The two main challenges – relatively weak internationalization and somewhat lacking 
growth entrepreneurship – remain orphans in the Finnish system. They are both side 
issues for a number of public organizations and not particularly forcefully advanced 
by any. The panel puts forth an outline of (public) actors and their responsibilities in 
the system, which particularly implies changes in these two domains.
The panel calls for a clarification and coordination of the roles and interrelations of 
international, national, regional, and local innovation and non-innovation policies. 
In recent years local and regional public actors have grown important also in innova-
tion policy, even if they are largely ignored at the national level. The current national 
innovation support has an ‘unspoken’ regional bias, which may not benefit regional 
development and may come at the cost of foregone growth. 
The panel takes a strong stance for the ongoing university reform. With relatively au-
tonomous universities incentivized through appropriate funding rules, it has real po-
tential to address the most pressing and timely challenge in Finnish higher education 
– the increase of research quality. Polytechnics are important actors in the Finnish 
system with their strong regional and applied role. To streamline the higher educa-
tion sector, the panel recommends a clear division of labor between universities and 
polytechnics.
The Finnish system is at a crossroads due to both internal and external factors. In-
novation (policy) is in turmoil worldwide. The current state of the Finnish innovation 
system is good but it does not suffice. There is both a unique opportunity and a sense 
of urgency in implementing reforms. Major adjustments are needed in order for Fin-
land to meet its future challenges.